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PREFACE 
 
Freedom under law is like the air we breathe. People take it for granted and are 
unaware of it--until they are deprived of it. What does the rule of law mean to us in everyday 
life? Let me quote the eloquent words of Burke: "The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid 
defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow 
through it; the storms may enter; the rain may enter--but the King of England cannot enter; all 
his forces dare not cross the threshold of that ruined tenement!"  But the rule of law does more 
than ensure freedom from high-handed action by rulers. It ensures justice between man and 
man however humble the one and however powerful the other. A man with five dollars in the 
bank can call to account the corporation with five billion dollars in assets--and the two will be 
heard as equals before the law (Dwight D. Eisenhower, Statement on the Observance of Law 
Day, 1958). 
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. 
CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION-THE PLACE OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS IN 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
 
In the conflict-filled twentieth and twenty first centuries the problem of how states make the 
transition from war and  human rights abuses to more stable political systems with political rights, civil 
liberties and human rights protections is a critical question.  They are often hamstrung by the lack of 
governmental institutions capable of controlling the violence and providing civil liberties, political and 
human rights protections to citizens.  In the past twenty years the concept of transitional justice, 
defined by Van de Merwe, Baxter and Chapman (2009) as “…societal responses to severe repression, 
societal violence, and systematic human rights violations that seek to establish the truth about the past, 
determine accountability, and offer some form of redress, at least of a symbolic nature” (1-2) has been 
increasingly used to explain how this transition can be accomplished.   There are a variety of tools of 
transitional justice, including war crimes trials, amnesties, memorials, pardons and truth and 
reconciliation commissions, apologies, reparations, each employing different methods to achieve the 
same goal: transitional justice.      
Assuming the effectiveness of such remedies, the choice of method of transitional justice is 
critical for states.  The wrong choice will not only impede accountability and redress, and can sometimes 
result in the return to violence and human rights abuses.  For example, in Sierra Leone in July of 1999 
the provision for amnesty for all combatants in the bloody civil war and the attempt to make a violent 
rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), into a political party, resulted in the renewal of the 
civil war and further violence (Peace Agreements Digital Collection, n.d.).  The failure to provide 
transitional justice can also be as damaging to post-conflict states, leaving them unable to escape the 
effects of the conflict and move toward stability, peace, and rule of law.  
This dissertation focuses on Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) as a method of 
transitional justice and evaluates both the relationship between TRCs and democracy and more 
specifically their relationship to the establishment of the rule of law in post conflict states.  The rule of 
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law is the specific focus because TRCs, with their emphasis on truth telling, reparations, disclosure of 
past human rights abuses and reconciliation can have a positive effect on the growth of rule of law in 
post conflict societies.  There are outcomes other than democracy and the rule of law that are often tied 
to TRCs, such as peace and justice, both of which theoretically flow naturally from TRCs and are 
important considerations for post conflict states.  However, the focus here is specifically on democracy 
and the rule of law because transitions to democracy include elements of both peace and justice; 
democratic states exercise the rule of law and build judicial capacity and democratic states are 
purportedly more likely to be peaceful toward other democracies.  The efficacy of TRCs for the rule of 
law is also compared to another transitional justice method, amnesties, to empirically test these two 
methods of transitional justice to see which method is more likely achieve the rule of law.  There is, of 
course, similarities between TRCs and amnesties and many TRCs encourage states to issue an amnesty.  
Because of these similarities, the combination of TRCs and amnesties are also tested to see if they are 
more effective than either method alone. 
 
Transitional Justice and the evolution of Truth Commissions 
 Transitional justice, as defined by Van de Merwe above has been a concern internationally since 
the end of World War II and has had three main phases.  The first phase consisted of the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo war crimes tribunals and various domestic and international war crimes trials, along with efforts 
to denazify Germany and demilitarize Japan (Mindzie, 2010, 114).  These efforts largely ended by the 
mid-1950’s as some convicted war criminals were released and the Cold War fight between the United 
States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) took over in importance.  The second phase 
occurred after the Cold War ended and states transitioning from Communism to some form of 
democracy tried a variety of methods of justice including release of secret files,1 prosecution, lustration, 
                                                          
1
 The release of secret Stasi files by Germany. 
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memorials and TRCs. The third phase at the end of the twentieth century broadened and deepened 
transitional justice, with a new emphasis on ending impunity and making transitional justice an integral 
rather than optional part of a peace process (Mindzie, 2010, 114).  This period is characterized by a 
variety of transitional justice methods, including the ad hoc war crimes tribunals for Rwanda, Yugoslavia, 
Sierra Leone and Cambodia, as well as the TRC in South Africa in 1995, the most publicized and 
influential TRC in the forty years of TRCs as well as a growing opposition to general amnesties. 
Truth and reconciliation commissions came into existence after the first phase of transitional 
justice as an alternative to war crimes trials.  Hayner (2011) notes that  
Countries are confronting questions of justice and accountability in a wide range of political 
contexts, following the end of a military regime or repressive government, or after a civil war.  It 
is now perfectly clear that there are many needs arising out of these circumstances that cannot 
be satisfied by action in the courts—even if the courts function well and there are no limits 
placed on prosecuting the wrongdoers, which is rare.  Thus, complementary approaches to 
criminal justice have slowly taken shape (7-8).   
 
The first generally acknowledged TRC occurred in Uganda in 1974 when then dictator Idi Amin 
created the Commission of Inquiry into the Disappearances of People in Uganda since 25 January, 1971 
to control public indignation over human rights abuses by his government (Truth Commission: Uganda 
74, United States Institute of Peace, n.d.) .  Olson, Payne, and Reiter record an earlier TRC in Pakistan in 
1971 that was conducted regarding the events that led to the independence of East Pakistan (Olsen, 
Payne, & Reiter, 2010, 185).  Over eighty TRCs, depending on the definition used, have occurred since 
these early efforts.  Some have made genuine efforts to bring out the truth about events and reconcile 
the state, others like the 1974 Ugandan TRC were conducted to discover enemies of the state and to 
further repress detractors of Idi Amin’s regime (Truth Commission: Uganda 74, United States Institute of 
Peace, n.d.)   They have occurred on all continents other than Antarctica, making them a global 
phenomenon rather than purely a Western or Latin American transitional justice method.   
One of the complications in analyzing the impact of TRCs is that there have been a variety of 
definitions for TRCs since 1974 and not all bodies that fit the definition of a TRC are titled TRCs by their 
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organizers.  In particular, commissions prior to the South African TRC in 1995 tended to be called 
commissions of inquiry or ad hoc commissions, rather than TRCs.  However, since they served the same 
functions as TRCs it is necessary to use a clear definition of TRCs to create a comprehensive list for the 
purpose of comparative analysis.  Hayner and Freeman have the most comprehensive definition of TRCs, 
defining them as commissions that are 1) temporary bodies, 2) officially sanctioned, authorized, or 
empowered, 3) non-judicial bodies, 2 4) usually created at a point of political transition, 5) focus on the 
past, severe acts of repression and violence that were committed and over a period of time, 6) not just a 
single specific event, 7) generally complete their work with the submission of a final report that contains 
conclusions and recommendations, 8) focus on the broad causes and consequences of events, not just 
the facts, 9) focus on violations in the sponsoring state and occur in the sponsoring state, and 10) are 
victim centered bodies (Freeman and Hayner, 2002, Freeman, 2006, 14-19). The definition does not 
include amnesties but TRCs can, under this definition, choose to issue amnesties or not.  This definition 
will be used in this dissertation which results in a somewhat different set of TRCs than some of the other 
studies, including one by Hayner.  This definition is used in this dissertation because it creates a broad 
variety of similar institutions to be studied.  For example, TRCs such as the South African TRC which 
offered amnesty for telling of the truth by perpetrators to establish the record of the events of 
apartheid are included in the definition along with TRCs that did not offer amnesty. 
This definition differentiates TRCs from other commissions that are permanent, just fact finding, 
focused on a single incident, or unofficial commissions.  A variety of other  like commissions have also 
occurred, primarily human rights commissions conducted by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
for objectives that differ from official state objectives and do not have access to state resources or 
prerogatives such as investigative power, the ability to grant immunity or amnesty or the ability to act 
on recommendations (Freeman, 2006, 42).  Because TRCs, by the definition used here, are officially 
                                                          
2
 Non-judicial means they do not determine guilt or innocence or punish perpetrators. 
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sanctioned they have the power and resources of the government to back them.  They also often 
receive funding and support from international sources.  Although NGO or IGO organized commissions 
may have some impact on democracy and the rule of law, their purposes and abilities are so different 
from state sanctioned or organized TRCs they will not be included.  Single event TRCs will also be 
excluded because, while they are interesting and often help to heal society after traumatic events, they 
do not involve issues that are large enough to affect a comprehensive effect on democracy or the rule of 
law in a state.  The selection of cases for this dissertation is explained more fully in Chapter Three. 
Since 1974 the focus of TRCs has changed dramatically with less focus on justifying the actions 
of previous regimes and more on exposing the truth about the responsibility for conflicts and human 
rights abuses and providing for the reconciliation of society.  They have become merged into the bigger 
field of transitional justice which had its start with the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals and 
the violent conflicts in the post-colonial world, driven by the necessity to devise a way to provide public 
justice for states trying to leave their repressive and violent pasts and move toward accountability for 
the past and some sort of redress.  Transitional justice grew in popularity in the 1980’s and includes 
methods of redress such as memorials to victims of conflicts, reparations for victims, amnesty and 
pardons for perpetrators, symbolic changes to anthems and flags, legislative reform (as in abolishing 
discriminatory practices) and war crimes tribunals.  TRCs are a form of transitional justice because their 
truth seeking mission can develop accountability, while reconciliation can lead to reparations and an 
acceptance of the facts of what happened by society, however a poorly conducted TRC often leads to 
neither truth finding nor reconciliation.  The Ugandan TRC in 1974 is a clear example of this-the result of 
the TRC was retribution against the TRC commissioners, no dissemination to the public of the truth 
discovered by the commission and no redress for victims or the public in general.  Uganda went on to 
five more years of repression under Idi Amin and a succession of authoritarian rulers and civil conflicts 
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since then (usip.org/Uganda).  A bad TRC that does not lead to the growth of democracy and rule of law 
can be worse than no transitional justice. 
Because of examples like Uganda (1974), TRCs are often seen as, at best, either as a poor 
substitute for war crimes tribunals or an expensive alternative to prosecution or amnesties for 
perpetrators.  On the positive side, they offer an alternative to the social disturbance and possible 
return to civil war that can result from prosecution of offenders.  Millions of dollars and massive 
amounts of human effort and suffering have gone into TRCs and in many cases they have been relied 
upon as the primary or sole source of redress and reparation for victims.  New TRCs have been proposed 
for conflict ridden states like Yemen, Sudan and Colombia, leaving the question of when TRC’s become 
politically feasible and whether or not TRCs help states reconcile and move along the path to democracy 
and the rule of law critical as transitional justice moves forward. 
 
TRCs Compared to Other Forms of Transitional Justice 
There are other types of transitional justice that are often related to the growth of democracy 
and the rule of law.  Because of Nuremberg and to a lesser extent Tokyo, Rwanda and Yugoslavia, war 
crimes tribunals are usually familiar to the general public, while other methods of transitional justice, 
such as TRCs are much less so.  Unlike war crimes tribunals, a TRC is not an adjudicative entity 
empowered to find guilt or innocence.  Instead of guilt or innocence, TRCs are commissioned to find out 
the truth about past events in a state which can sometimes lead to the naming of perpetrators, as 
occurred in the Liberian and South African TRCs, but prosecution of those people named is either 
avoided, postponed or deferred to an international or domestic court, rather than the TRC.   
The most common other form of transitional justice is that of amnesties.  Mallinder (2008) has 
created a database of amnesties worldwide that is among the most comprehensive and documents 506 
amnesties from 1945 to 2008 (8).  Olson, Payne, and Reiter in their Transitional Justice Database 
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document 676 amnesties from 1970 to 2008 (tjdbproject.com).  Amnesties are often used in conjunction 
with TRCs but are the antithesis of war crimes trials because they prevent the prosecution of offenders, 
giving them amnesty instead either in return for information or in the interest of social order.  Freeman 
(2009) argues they can also be problematic for TRCs since amnesties can interfere with reparations and 
the establishment of truth.  However, he also argues that in some cases amnesties are not the antithesis 
of transitional justice but rather enable it.  Citing the judgment of the Constitutional Court in Colombia 
in the case of Gustavo Gallon y otros from Colombia, Freeman says that: 
Rather than be cast as the antithesis of transitional justice, amnesty becomes its enabler by 
potentially helping to pave the way at the national level for increased truth, reparation, and 
reform with respect to past violations, and for increased democracy, peace, and justice in the 
long term (19). 
 
He notes that there is no certainty that amnesty will lead to this effect, just that it might.  The 
South African TRC, with its extensive amnesty program, would be an example of this phenomenon.  
According to Freeman, the amnesty in South Africa was used as a trade-off in place of prosecution 
because it would aid the transition to democracy (15-16).  He also agrees, however, that amnesties do 
not always have a positive effect, citing the four peace agreements that provided for amnesties in 
Angola’s long civil war as an example of a case where amnesty did not lead to peace or justice (13). 
Freeman identifies five phases in amnesties since the 1970’s which coincide with critical phases 
in both amnesties and TRCs.  In the 1970’s the first phase for amnesty occurred when amnesty for 
political prisoners was felt to be necessary to mobilize public opinion in opposition to authoritarian 
regimes, as long as it was coupled with measures to resolve the underlying conflicts within the state (2).  
Amnesties became a popular form of transitional justice during this phase, but evolved as a form of 
transitional justice in the future phases.  In the 1980’s, the second phase of amnesty was generally 
linked to impunity and self-amnesty primarily by military dictatorships that used amnesty to escape 
from responsibility.  The third phase occurred at the end of the Cold War and variety of issues regarding 
democratization led to the discrediting of amnesty efforts.  The fourth phase began in 1993 with the 
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Vienna World Conference on Human Rights where there was recognition of the need to combat 
impunity for human rights abuses and coincided with the first war crimes trials after World War II being 
implemented in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (2-3). 
The fifth phase is the modern day global fight against impunity for perpetrators of war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and genocide.  This period has seen the establishment of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) which militates against the use of amnesties by taking control of criminal 
prosecution out of the hands of the state and placing it in the hands of the international community.  It 
has also seen the growing use of universal jurisdiction to prosecute war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, making amnesties of less value since they are not a defense against prosecution in a foreign 
court (2-3). 
 
TRCs and Democracy and Rule of Law 
There are four major reasons why the question regarding the connection between TRCs and the 
growth of democracy and the rule of law is important.  First, much of the rationale is contained in the 
charters of the various TRCs; they contain language suggesting that one of the main purposes of the TRC 
is to build democratic institutions, find and publish the truth about conflicts, address impunity, create 
the rule of law and facilitate reconciliation in post conflict states.   If the goal is to foster the growth of 
democracy it is critical that states choose the transitional justice tool most likely to bring about that 
growth; initial and or blanket amnesty is relatively unlikely to do so since it does not entail an 
institutionalized transparency process.  Another rationale often used is the ability of TRCs to contribute 
to the building of judicial institutions and reduce violence in post-conflict states, increasing the rule of 
law.  Unfortunately, the choice of transitional justice methods is often dictated less by the potential for 
success and more by the identity of the decision maker, with the international community preferring 
war crimes trials and TRCs , while national forces may prefer pardons and amnesties to encourage 
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people to forget and move on (UNDP, 2006, 6).  States with limited funds may prefer less expensive 
tools such as amnesties and pardons and memorials, while severely conflict-torn states like 
Mozambique may prefer to avoid opening old wounds through trials and settle for forgetting (Cobban, 
2007).  What is often lost in this process of satisficing is the consideration of which tools are most likely 
to achieve successful or to maximize transitional justice.  TRCs are often used to the exclusion of other 
forms of transitional justice and if they do not lead to the growth of democracy and the rule of law, then 
other forms should be utilized in their place.    
Justice and the rule of law are crucial to any state and particularly to states in transition to 
democracy.  Many have corrupt and failed justice systems which exacerbate tensions between ethnic 
groups and classes within society.  As noted by Van der Marwe (2009)  
The toughest test of a specific transitional justice mechanism’s efficacy is not only how well it 
engages with past human rights violations but also how effectively it builds institutions, policies, 
and practices that will enable the embryonic democracy to deal with emerging and potential 
patterns of social conflict and violence (5).   
 
The question of the effectiveness of TRCs in the building of the rule of law and judicial institutions and 
practices is a critical one because of the lost opportunity cost that can otherwise result.  If TRCs are 
chosen in the place of another transitional justice method, and they do not lead to the desired outcome 
of increased democracy and rule of law, the opportunity to make a difference in the state is lost. 
Second, there are a variety of costs for a TRC, some economic, some non-economic.  There is a 
real economic cost to the nation utilizing a TRC and the choice of a TRC means a tradeoff of limited 
resources away from other pressing needs and to the TRC.  Data regarding actual costs for TRCs are 
extremely difficult to obtain, particularly from the earliest TRCs but some is available.  Justice in 
Perspective notes that the Liberian TRC (2006-2009) originally had a budget of fourteen million dollars 
which was later reduced to eight million dollars.  Sierra Leone (2002-2004) budgeted four million five 
hundred thousand dollars for its TRC and South Africa (1995-2002), one of the larger TRCs, budgeted 
eighteen million dollars each year for two and one half years, plus a smaller ongoing budget for follow 
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up and reparations (justiceinperspective.org).  Earlier TRCs such as Uganda (1986), Haiti (1995-1996) and 
Chad (1991-1992) had budgets between five hundred thousand and a million dollars, Chile (1990-1991) 
and El Salvador (1992-1993) had budgets of one million five hundred thousand dollars and Guatemala 
(1997-1999) had a budget of approximately five million dollars (Hayner, 2002, 285).  
This cost seems high, and is compared with other post-conflict methods of transitional justice 
such as amnesties or memorials.  They are, however, much less expensive than the other common 
method of transitional justice, that of war crimes tribunals.  Cobban (2007) notes that each case at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) costs approximately forty two million dollars while a 
case at a TRC cost approximately forty three hundred dollars, or one tenth of one percent of a war 
crimes case, making trials an expensive choice of transitional justice.  She notes that a disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) procedure for a former combatant, which help former 
combatants make the transition to civilian life is substantially cheaper with a cost of  approximately one 
thousand dollars and may be as effective (209).   
Regardless of the actual amount spent, the money spent on a TRC is money that could have 
been spent on other pressing needs for post conflict states, such as infrastructure, training of the police 
and military and the establishment of justice systems and employment opportunities for citizens.  It is 
always a question, of course, if money would be spent on these issues.  Cobban (2007) notes that 
surveys of citizens of post-conflict states like Rwanda cite concerns for the economy, jobs and education, 
not justice or rule of law.  She argues that choice of the more expensive options such as war crimes 
tribunals and TRCs needs to be weighed against the public concern with economic issues, making 
relatively inexpensive options such as TRCs a good choice (210). 
Third, there can be also high non-economic costs for TRCs.  Stable democracies like the United 
States (TRCs in 1980 and 2004) and Australia (TRC in 1996) were able to conduct a TRC with a minimal 
amount of social upheaval.  The United States Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of 
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Civilians (CWRIC) which discussed the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II finished its 
report in 1984, shortly before the presidential election.  It was finally signed by President Reagan in 1988 
after bipartisan pressure was brought and no significant protests occurred (Maga, 1998, 617).  The 
Australian TRC resulted in protests from indigenous leaders about land rights and some concerns from 
citizens and corporations regarding the loss of homes or commercial rights, but Australia and the United 
States were democracies according to Freedom House and Polity IV before the TRC and both continue to 
be one (Short, 2003, 507).   There were also no changes in the rule of law in either country, although 
both TRCs involved questions of the use of the legal system to create or preserve unequal treatment of 
minority groups.   
The situation of unstable democracies and autocratic states is quite different, with many 
experiencing political and social upheaval during and after TRCs.  TRCs can themselves generate violence 
(Hayner, 2011, 196).  In Liberia, in 2009, for example, death threats were made against TRC 
commissioners after their report was released and many recommendations, such as lustration of the 
current president, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, could not be implemented due to political pressure (ictj.org). 3   
Other states such as Ecuador (1982-1984) and Zimbabwe (1985) did not release their final TRC reports 
due to concerns that violence could occur if the report was released (justiceinperspective.org). In the 
first TRC in Uganda (1974) the TRC resulted in political reprisals against all four commissioners and a 
report that was only released to the chief perpetrator, Idi Amin (usip.org). 
Beyond these economic and non-economic costs, the personal cost to victims and their families 
from a TRC is impossible to calculate: it can help to bring closure, information about lost or killed family 
members and knowledge to the general public of the events of the conflict, but it can also reopen 
wounds and cause further trauma.  Studies are mixed regarding the personal costs to victims and their 
families from TRCs but at best reminders about the events are painful.  
                                                          
3
 It was later declared unconstitutional by the Liberian Supreme Court (netnewspublisher.com). 
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Lastly, there is a dearth of information regarding what is the best method of transitional justice 
and this choice of methods is critical for post-conflict states.  The wrong choice can exacerbate tensions 
and increase the potential for future human rights abuses, conflicts and wars.  The better choice can 
lead to the growth of democracy and rule of law.  The problems caused by outside pressure and finances 
are made worse by the fact that little empirical study has been conducted of these various transitional 
justice tools.  Van der Merwe (2009) notes that “While the conceptual literature on justice is still not 
well developed, the empirical literature is even sparser” (127).  He argues that basic data, such as the 
number of perpetrators and offenses is hard to measure and that since so few offenders are charged in 
war crimes tribunals the statistics do not reflect an accurate picture of the delivery of justice (van der 
Merwe, 2009, 128).  But, only limited study of the impact of these tools on the public and institutions 
have occurred, particularly for a tool such as a TRC.   
 There are, therefore, four reasons why we should study TRCs in a comparative and empirical 
manner.  First, TRCs are often used to the exclusion of other forms of transitional justice.  If TRCs or 
particular models of TRCs, do not lead to the growth of democracy then other forms could or should be 
utilized in their place.   Second, there is a very real economic cost involved in conducting a TRC.  If the 
result of a TRC is to strip a state further of resources and cause more human suffering in the 
remembrance of events, it should be for a good cause. Third, there are serious non-economic costs 
involved in conducting TRCs.  History has shown that TRCs can, at least immediately after the process, 
cause more instability in a state, violence and personal costs to individuals in emotional and 
psychological stress.   Fourth, there is a general lack of information on whether or not and under what 
conditions TRCs foster the growth of democracy.  States have increasingly turned to TRCs since the 
1990s’s, particularly since the South African TRC, without knowing if there is a clear connection between 
the goal of democracy and the transitional tool of a TRC.   
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 In order to explore the potential relationship between TRCs and democracy and rule of law, data 
regarding TRCs, amnesties, types of conflict, conflict intensity and regional differences were analyzed 
through a quantitative analysis of all states experiencing conflicts from 1981 to 2010 with two 
dependent variables-- changing level of democracy and rule of law.  Case studies of two states, Liberia 
and Mozambique were also utilized to see the interaction of these variables in greater depth in one 
state that conducted a TRC and an amnesty and one state that utilized only an amnesty.  This 
dissertation consists of seven chapters.  Chapter Two discusses the literature that exists regarding 
democracy, rule of law and amnesty with transitional justice.  Chapter Three explains the cases included 
in the group of states that conducted TRCs as defined above and the group of states that had a conflict 
but did not conduct a TRC, as well as the methodology used in the quantitative study and the two case 
studies.  Chapter Four explores the relationship between TRCs and democracy and the rule of law and 
compares TRCs to amnesty in their ability to make changes in rule of law along with the role of conflict 
intensity.  Chapter Five is a case study of Liberia, exploring the history of its conflict and the effect of the 
TRC that was conducted from 2006 to 2009 on democracy and rule of law in that state, to the extent 
that we can gauge it in the relatively short time since the war ended.  Chapter Six is a case study of 
Mozambique, exploring the history of the conflict and the effect of its general amnesty passed in 1992 
on democracy and rule of law.  Chapter Seven is the conclusion, drawing together findings from the 
quantitative chapter and the two case studies to the existing literature and making recommendations 
for further study. 
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CHAPTER TWO: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW: THE QUESTION OF 
CAUSALITY                   
 
Most of the existing literature that evaluates the impact of TRCs considers the relationship 
between TRCs and democracy.  This literature review begins with discussion of transitional justice in 
general and how the TRCs fit into transitional justice.  The relationship between democracy and TRCs 
will next be discussed, with the main dispute being whether TRCs lead to democracy or democracy leads 
to the choice of a TRC as a transitional justice method.  Third, the relationship between TRCs and the 
rule of law of law will be considered.  The chief dispute is whether TRCs, by not prosecuting offenders 
but providing for forgiveness, add to the atmosphere of impunity in post-conflict societies and impede 
rule of law or increase rule of law by offering an alternative to amnesty or war crimes tribunals.  Another 
question in the literature concern the merit of TRCs as compared to amnesties and which is more or less 
likely to lead to the growth in rule of law.  According to the literature, amnesties may be even more 
likely to lead to impunity than TRCs, but amnesties are nonetheless used by many post-conflict societies 
as a resolution to the conflict, making this question critical.  War crimes trials are outside the scope of 
this study. 
One of the emerging areas in the literature on TRCs is the effect of conflict intensity on the 
choices of transitional justice methods and the effectiveness of those methods in supporting the growth 
of democracy and the rule of law.  Although conflict intensity has been examined in the context of the 
effect of the intensity on the resolution of a conflict, this dissertation is one of the first to examine the 
relationship between conflict intensity and democracy and rule of law.  The level of intensity of a 
conflict, from a minor civil unrest with relatively few civilian deaths to a massive civil war like those in 
Liberia and Mozambique which cause hundreds of thousands of deaths, displacements of citizens and 
economic disaster, has an effect on peacemaking.  Most literature on conflict intensity involves the 
impact of intensity on potential success in the peacemaking process. Transitional justice is often part of 
the peacemaking process and, at least arguably, can assist in making peace more durable. The emerging 
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literature on this issue primarily discusses the impact of conflict intensity of the choice of transitional 
justice method and the effectiveness of that measure.  The small amount of literature regarding them 
will be discussed at the end of the literature review. 
 
Transitional justice and the Place of TRCs 
The first consideration is the role of TRCs in transitional justice.  Theorists of transitional justice, 
including Lanegran and Graybill (2004) have made the case there are four main issues facing the future 
of transitional justice.  First is whether a method of transitional justice provides real reconciliation or is 
just a political compromise.  Second is whether there is a consistent set of goals for transitional justice.  
Third is the question of whether TRCs can heal and reconcile society or simply provide a panacea for the 
harms resulting from conflicts?   And fourth concerns the ideal balance for transitional justice between 
TRCs and war crimes tribunals, considering the political goals of the domestic and international 
community toward efficiency as opposed to a focus on effectiveness (2).  
The question of the role of TRCs in transitional justice is clearly seen in these four issues.  One of 
the general criticisms of TRCs is their lack of connection to retribution, punishment or criminal 
prosecution of perpetrators.  This criticism becomes more intense when a TRC is coupled with an 
amnesty such as the amnesty in South Africa, where perpetrators, who were not required to show 
remorse or ask for forgiveness, were granted amnesty in return for testifying about their actions.  The 
perception was that the South African TRC, with its choice of amnesty, was a political compromise 
rather than a good form of transitional justice.  Skaar (1999) argues that in fact the choice between TRCs 
and war crimes tribunals or other types of transitional justice is motivated by the balance of power 
within the state, not by necessity or the ability to aid in democratic transition.  She argues that: 
The government’s choice of policy depends on the relative strength of demands from the public 
and the outgoing regime, the choice tending towards trials as the outgoing regime becomes 
weaker and towards nothing as the outgoing regime becomes stronger, with truth commissions 
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being the most likely outcome when the relative strength of the demands is roughly equal 
(1110). 
 
States with a strong military that has not been disbanded after the conflict and have not given amnesty 
to military members are least likely to choose trials or TRCs since the chances of the military attempting 
a coup against the new government are too high.  States where amnesties were used or the military was 
successfully neutralized tend to choose TRCs or war crimes tribunals.  Skaar also points out that choices 
tend to change with time and that states are more likely to choose transitional justice methods such as 
TRCs after some movement toward democracy has been accomplished (1125).  
Not all theorists see TRCs as useful in promoting transitional justice.  In order to resolve these 
criticisms and to determine if TRCs can assist in democratic transition, it is necessary to study their effect 
on post-conflict societies.  Unfortunately much of the literature tends to focus on the effects of TRCs on 
society and on individual victims and family members of victims of human rights abuses, not the effect 
of TRCs on the state.  A variety of effects from TRCs have been mentioned in the literature, from 
psychological healing of individual victims, to reconciliation of ethnic or racial groups, to the 
establishment of rule of law and to the transition to democracy in post-conflict states.  The most 
influential author on TRCs, Priscilla Hayner, notes that TRCs have many responsibilities beyond simple 
truth and reconciliation.  According to Hayner (2011): 
Truth commissions are typically tasked with some or all of the following goals: to discover, 
clarify and formally acknowledge past abuses; to address the needs of victims; to “counter 
impunity” and advance individual accountability; to outline institutional responsibility and 
recommend reforms; and to promote reconciliation and reduce conflict over the past (20). 
 
Many of those tasks are related to the individual level; addressing the needs of the victims and 
advancing individual accountability work primarily at the individual level although TRCs make 
recommendations for restitution, psychological services and job programs for both victims of abuses 
and groups such as former child soldiers or even demobilized rebels.   
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This victim focus leaves open the equally important question of the relationship between TRCs 
and the state.  Some of the tasks of a TRC relate to making changes in regimes, institutions and political 
culture to prevent the recurrence of conflicts.  The discovery or clarification of past abuses may help 
individuals to obtain closure or vindication, but they are also designed to allow a new regime to reflect 
back on the errors of previous regimes and to chart a path forward (Hayner, 2011, 23).  This can take the 
form of changes in the judicial system, police or the military to reduce human rights abuses, torture and 
disappearances and can lead to the development or support for the rule of law.  It also often takes the 
form of the creation of democratic institutions to allow citizens to participate in the governance of their 
country through political, rather than violent means.  In the literature there is a link to the impact of 
TRCs on the creation or consolidation of democracy and to the rule of law in post-conflict states but 
many of the scholars’ findings are of mixed value due to the split focus between the state and the 
individual.  Additionally, much of it is based on single or small case studies of a few TRCs, not larger 
studies of all TRCs.  This leads to a selection bias with a few TRCs such as the South African one providing 
the bulk of information on TRCs.  Despite this split, the literature does provide some guidance regarding 
the role of TRCs in healing states, not just individuals, after a conflict.  The focus here will be on the 
literature regarding state because the impacts on individuals are unlikely to have a major effect on 
democracy or the rule of law.  
 
The Role of TRCs in Improving Democracy 
There are four main focuses in the literature regarding TRCs and democracy.  The first concerns 
the issues of strength of a democracy and judges TRCs based primarily on procedural factors, such as 
whether they held public hearings, issued a public report, disseminated the report and made 
recommendations.  The second concerns whether improvement in democracy is related to the conduct 
of a TRC.  The third looks at whether the relationship is actually reversed, that the movement by a state 
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towards democracy causes a TRC.  The last looks at the need for empirical research to answer many of 
the criticisms regarding TRCs.  The literature is split between empiricists and theorists, with the theorists 
generally arguing there is a relationship between TRCs and democracy, while most empiricists argue 
there is no relationship. 
Much of the early discussion regarding TRCs involves which TRCs are stronger.  Hayner, who is 
the preeminent author in the area of TRCs, has devoted most of her work to this topic, classifying strong 
TRCs as those that complete their scheduled work, release a report and take steps toward implementing 
the recommendations of the commission.  Hayner’s (2011) five strongest TRCs, the ones South Africa, 
Peru, Timor-Leste, Morocco and Guatemala, all share these characteristics.    They were also all TRCs 
that were created due to domestic, rather than international pressure, although the international 
community was present in Timor-Leste when the commission was created and the Guatemalan 
commission had two non-Guatemalan commissioners.  Guatemala did not conduct public hearings, but 
Peru was the first Latin American TRC to conduct extensive public hearings and the others, including the 
Moroccan TRC, conducted public hearings that were broadcast domestically (27-44).   
 Hayner’s concept of strength combines the concepts of international or domestic motivation 
and of procedural due process.  However, she does not clearly define what is meant by strength or 
weakness.  In particular, there is no effort to tie strength to democratic transition and, in fact, of her five 
cases of TRCs, Guatemala saw virtually no prosecutions for crimes and experienced a rapid growth in 
impunity and criminality (35), Peru elected a president in 2006 who was implicated in some of the worst 
abuses (39) and East Timor has continued to experience civil upheavals (42).  Morocco at least paid 
reparations to victims in large amounts and fairly swiftly, but has not made any changes in its 
government to prevent future atrocities (44).  Only South Africa seems to have made strides toward 
democratic change after the TRC and even South Africa has been a mixed success, with its refusal to 
implement recommendations regarding reforms and its continued practice of pardoning ANC and Pan-
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African Congress members despite the refusal of the TRC to give them amnesty during its proceedings 
(31).  This experience shows that a strong TRC may not necessarily be one that leads to democratic 
change.  While they may have been strong enough to hold hearings and disseminate reports, they 
weren’t strong enough to effect positive change within their states.  The concept of the strong TRC 
implies that simply following correct procedure, having an acknowledgement and apology, a 
disseminated report and recommendations that are implemented is enough for success (Graybill and 
Lanegran, 2004, 3-4).  
Most other authors including Minow (1998), Gairdner (1999), Teitel (2000), Freeman and 
Hayner (2003), Quinn (2003), Brahm (2007) and Graybill and Lanegran (2004) analyze the effects of TRCs 
on post conflict states connect them positively to the growth of democracy.  Among the various 
rationales for TRCs are several that relate to democracy, including the building of institutions to 
promote democracy, such as an improved judicial system as well as the improvement in civil liberties 
that comes from confronting past abuses and violence and exposing the role of government in those 
abuses.  For example, Brahm (2007) argues that TRCs do help with democratization because they often 
target three institutions that are often targeted for reform by TRCs: the military, police, the legal system 
and in particular the leadership of those institutions that are critical for democracy.  The lack of 
transparency of and a strong judiciary allows impunity to grow and makes controlling imputing and 
corruption difficult to stop.  There is a need to strengthen these institutions to increase horizontal 
accountability in states making transitions to democracy.  According to Brahm: 
…the crimes often occurred (or rather there were no sanctions for them) because the judiciary 
was not independent of other organs of government.  Therefore, reforms strengthening the 
legal system are important. Commissioners also often note the need to dismiss the leadership of 
these institutions to make a break with the past. As a result, reforming these institutions and 
purging tainted leadership would go a long way toward building a more democratic system (24). 
 
He notes that case studies of states utilizing a TRC show that reforms in institutions following a TRC such 
as a civilian check on the military or at least the retirement of former authoritarian leaders, followed by 
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increasingly democratic leadership, do occur (26).  He argues, however, that existing studies do not 
demonstrate there is a causal link between TRCs and democratic institutions and that because TRCs are 
short term commissions and democratic change requires a long term and is subject to international and 
domestic pressure, a causal link may be difficult to establish (28-29). 
 Graybill and Lanegran (2004) also suggest that there is a connection between TRCs and 
democracy.  According to them “Political leaders and legal theorists have argued that learning the truth 
about past human rights violations and punishing those responsible for them are prerequisites for the 
establishment of democracy and respect for the rule of law” (2).  They reviewed specifically African TRCs 
and noted the possible connection between them and democracy, arguing that there has been “…’a 
paradigm shift’ in the means by which new leaders address their nations’ violent past” (2) and that the 
shift is to TRCs to promote democracy. 
Minow (1998) also explores the relationship between democracy and TRCs, although her work is 
more generally focused on all transitional justice methods, not just TRCs.  She points to twelve 
aspirations for TRCs including dignity for victims and creation of a record of abuses, but also the creation 
of institutions and justice systems that can lead to democracy and a respect for human rights.  She 
argues that TRCs are actually not just a second best alternative to war crimes tribunals: because they 
can achieve a broader variety of goals that tribunals may actually be more effective than trials (88). 
Brahm (2007) agrees with Hayner regarding the need for empirical testing and identifies at least 
part of the answer to the question of how TRCs contribute to democratization.  He notes several 
potential phenomenon that occur in TRCs: 1) they contribute to the loss of authoritarian power and help 
to create democratic alternatives by identifying problems and recommending institutional changes that 
promote accountability and increase civilian control over the military (23), 2) they allow several 
divergent groups to be heard regarding their concerns, 3) they are often created as part of a general 
movement within a state away from authoritarian values and toward democratic values , 4) they assist 
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in the removal of enclaves of non-democratic power by naming names of perpetrators (or at least 
exposing their actions) (23), and 5) they contribute to stability and the growth of democracy by 
“(re)building a sense of shared destiny among groups giving them a stake in the ‘national project’ and 
through shaming perpetrators, thereby depriving them of ` that might otherwise encourage them to 
protect their interests through extra-constitutional means”  (24).  His analysis begins to explore the 
process by which TRCs can contribute to democratization.   
So, whether there is a connection between TRCs and democracy is a key question.  Authors such 
as Gutmann and Thompson (2004) in their book Deliberative Democracy make the connection between 
democracy and TRCs, arguing that the hearings of a TRC, by requiring both sides to explain their points 
and justify their views, and by requiring the commissioners to create and conduct hearings with aspects 
of democratic process such as an open and public process shows to the public their commitment to 
democracy and encourages the growth of democratic institutions (181).   
The difficulty with many discussions of transitional justice and TRCs is that they are theoretical 
as opposed to empirical, looking at statements from TRCs and states about their goals and 
accomplishments and theorizing there is a connection to democratic transition.  A few closely examine 
one or two TRCs to support their arguments, most often the South African TRC, but fail to look at a 
broad range of cases. As noted by Graybill and Lanegran (2004) scholars make assertions about what 
transitional justice programs do, but don’t test their assertions.  They state that “Common wisdom 
asserts that truth commissions promote individual healing and reconciliation, which leads to national 
healing and reconciliation, which in turn provides a bedrock for democracy” (4).    
There is a consensus among the major writers in the field of TRCs, including Hayner, Olsen, 
Payne, and Reiter and Wibelhaus-Brahm, that there is a need for empirical testing of this relationship 
and the question of causality.  Hayner (2011) notes there are little quantitative data on the relationship 
between TRCs and democracy other than some anecdotal accounts and case studies of individual TRCs.  
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She also notes that “…studies are not directly assessing the impact in the specific areas that truth 
commissions usually define as their aims establishing truth, assisting victims, promoting justice, 
advancing reforms, and facilitating reconciliation…” (25), but rather they measure democratic change 
because, unlike these other aims, democratic change can be measured with current data and statistical 
methods, utilizing indexes of democracy such as Freedom House and Polity IV and can therefore be 
readily operationalized.   This is the same methodology that is used here. 
Recent authors such as Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010) and Olsen, Payne, and Reiter (2010) focus on 
the relationship between TRCs and democracy.  Both studies explore this topic extensively, with the 
Olsen, Payne, and Reiter also exploring the relationship to human rights.  Like those studies, there is a 
disagreement in the literature as to whether or not there is a relationship between this variable and the 
independent variable, TRCs.  A review of the literature shows there is some support for the argument 
that TRCs have a relationship to the growth of democracy in post conflict states but that the support is 
mixed and hard to compare since some of the support is based on single case studies.     
Two recent studies, one by Olsen, Payne, and Reiter entitled Transitional Justice in Balance: 
Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy and the other by Wiebelhaus-Brahm entitled Truth 
Commissions and Transitional States both look at the connection between TRCs and democracy.  The 
largest study, the Olsen, Payne, and Reiter (2010) study tests quantitatively the hypothesis that 
countries that utilize a TRC as opposed to other methods such as trials, amnesty or nothing experience 
an improvement in democracy as measured by Freedom House and Polity IV (136).  Their study involves 
all known TRCs including those in democracies.  Wiebelhaus-Brahm’s (2010) study focuses on the 
mechanism by which TRCs actually assist or fail to assist in democratic transition.  In addition to a large 
quantitative study of over thirty TRCs, he also conducted in depth case studies of four states that 
conducted a TRC.  Both studies find there is no relationship between TRCs and democracy or the 
relationship is negative. 
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The Olsen, Payne, and Reiter (2010) study views data from sixty different TRCs in fifty one 
countries and compare the relationship between trials, amnesties and TRCs and the growth of 
democracy in post conflict states. Their findings confirm Wiebelhaus-Brahm’s findings discussed below, 
although they studied all transitional justice methods rather than just TRCs.  Olsen, Payne, and Reiter’s 
expectation was that conducting a TRC rather than a trial would allow a state to have the benefit of 
accountability, coupled with the avoidance of an authoritarian backlash from members of the former 
regime that often occurs when war crimes tribunals are chosen as the method of transitional justice 
(134).  However, when they test the relationship between a variety of transitional justice methods, 
including TRCs and the growth of democracy using a multivariate regression analysis they conclude that 
states utilizing only TRCs experience a negative and significant impact on human rights and democracy 
(143-146). 4    
Olsen, Payne, and Reiter’s findings are concerning for TRC advocates.  They postulate that TRCs 
may fail to have a positive impact on democratic transition for a number of reasons, including that TRCs 
preserve a culture of impunity because offenders are not held criminally liable, may cause spoilers to 
reemerge or that the public becomes disenchanted with the state when it fails to meet the expectations 
that arose from the TRC and its report.  But since not all TRCs are organized in a similar fashion and 
different forces come to play in the formation and conduct of TRCs, it remains a question as to whether 
some forms of TRCs are more related to democracy than others.  For example, TRCs that do not issue a 
final report, do not conduct public hearings is less likely to assist in the growth of democracy because 
any effect on democracy is lessened by the lack of transparency for the TRC.  Similarly, TRCs whose 
recommendations are not adopted by the state 
Several authors, as noted above, have argued that some attributes of TRCs, such as 
transparency, domestic motivation, or international motivation may lead to more successful TRCs, 
                                                          
4
 Their study broadly reviewed all transitional justice methods, including amnesties, trials, lustrations and 
reparations and concludes that combinations of transitional justice methods may lead to democracy. 
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assuming that success is defined as leading to the growth of democracy.   This is particularly true in a 
case such as Liberia, where international involvement is encouraging a strong effort toward a transition 
to democracy.  The United Nations has stationed forces in Liberia since the end of the civil war in 2003 in 
an effort to provide security in the region, but also to bring about the rule of law, improve the legal 
system and support democratic elections (unliberia.org).  The UN points to the TRC in Liberia as an 
important component of this transition to democracy, so this is a good state to analyze to see if the 
international involvement, coupled with the TRC, has paved the way for a democratic transition in 
Liberia.   
The other major study conducted by Wiebelhaus-Brahm’s in 2010 focuses on the mechanism by 
which TRCs actually assist or fail to assist in democratic transition.  In addition to a large quantitative 
study of over thirty TRCs he also conducted in depth case studies of four states that conducted a TRC.  
He concludes that although TRCs may not have made a large difference in democracy and human rights, 
there were some advantages in terms of purges and war crimes trials of some perpetrators.  According 
to Wiebelhaus-Brahm  
In sum, the four truth commission cases have had real impacts...some changes appear unlikely 
to have occurred without the truth commission as part of the transition.  In other instances, 
while the changes may still have occurred, the truth commission shaped their timing, tone and 
form and thereby influenced how they were received (153). 
 
He also argues that TRCs may not actually improve democracy within post-conflict states is because 
institutions that affect democracy are established prior to the TRC and are therefore not typically 
altered by TRC recommendations (146-147).   Wiebelhaus-Brahm uses Freedom House data to measure 
democratic change because it offers data on both political rights and civil liberties (132). 
In a 2007 article that predated his 2010 book, Wiebelhaus-Brahm reviewed the universe of TRCs 
and notes that many recommendations from TRC reports suggest improvements should be made in 
institutions to provide for more accountability in government to facilitate the transition to democracy.  
According to Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2007) reports recommend increased civilian control of the military, 
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reforms in police and a stronger judicial system, particularly an independent judicial system.  He also 
notes that reforming these institutions, along with the removal from office of past leaders would assist 
in the building of democracy within states and that following these recommendations should assist a 
state in making the transition to a democracy (25).    
He argues that in practice, however, TRCs are not linked to democratization.  Along with his 
general criticism of the methodology of the various studies finding the link, he has some substantive 
points of contention.  One point concerns the lack of a relationship between TRCs and the construction 
of political systems after the cessation of a conflict.  He notes that critical portions of the system such as 
electoral rules and constraints on the executive branch are typically accomplished before the TRC is 
conducted (Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2007, 25).  Although TRCs in many states are proposed during peace 
negotiations and before the first election, their hearings and recommendations occur after the first 
president or prime minister had been elected and often at the behest of this elected official.  Therefore 
their impact on the creation and selection of these institutions would be minimal at best because TRCs 
are designed to be conducted outside of the traditional judicial process, not utilizing judges or attorneys 
for court personnel (Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2007, 25-26).   
Wiebelhaus-Brahm asserts that it is critical to analyze fully whether there is a causal link 
between TRCs and democratization.  He argues that: 
Using democracy as a means of assessment also has the benefit of providing clearly divergent 
outcomes should truth commission critics prove correct.  For instance, if truth commissions are 
destabilizing, one would expect them to have a negative relationship with democracy.  
Perpetrators who feel threatened by the commission may take extra-constitutional steps to 
protect themselves and their interest.  By contrast, should truth commissions in fact be weak 
and inconsequential, one would expect there to be no relationship between having engaged in 
truth-seeking and future prospects for democratization (26). 
 
Wiebelhaus-Brahm feels a complete analysis of the relationship, or lack of a relationship, is critical to the 
continued use of TRCs.  His concern, in particular, that they may be destabilizing is concerning and needs 
to be addressed. 
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This debate regarding the relationship between TRCs and democracy is a fairly new debate, with both of 
the major studies having been conducted in 2010.  Because there is a dispute in the literature as to 
whether or not the relationship exists the first hypothesis in this dissertation relates to the argument 
discussed above and states: There is a positive relationship between a state having conducted a TRC and 
an increase in democracy. 
Because there are so many aspects to democracy that may not be addressed by the use of a 
TRC, the focus of studies on transitional justice have turned to another concept, that of the rule of law.  
Rule of law has the advantage of being an aspect of democracy that is tied to directly to the focus of 
TRCs, the reduction of conflict by creating an atmosphere of impartiality and fair treatment for all 
people and particularly for victims of the human rights abuses by the state.  This focus will be explored 
in the next section. 
 
Rule of Law and TRCs 
The rule of law acts as a constraint on the power of government and on the power of the 
majority against the minority by insuring all people are treated equally before the law.  The rule of law is 
a subset of democracy, something that is required for a democracy to be fully consolidated.  It is 
impossible to have a fully consolidated democracy in a state where the majority of the population still 
fears and distrusts the government, police and judiciary. This leaves transitional justice to find methods 
to rebuild trust by rebuilding the rule of law, insuring that all citizens are treating equally and fairly.  Rule 
of law is a critical part of democracy where TRCs should be most expected to have an impact.   
There are three main focuses in the literature regarding TRCs and rule of law.  The first concerns 
whether states that were not democracies before their conflicts and have strong executive branches are 
able to make improvements in the rule of law.  The second is whether TRCs promote the rule of law, 
and, if so, how do they promote it.  In other words, what is it about TRCs that might lead to increased 
27 
 
. 
levels of rule of law?  The last looks at the need for empirical research to answer many of the criticisms 
regarding TRCs and the rule of law.  The literature, like that of democracy, is split between empiricists 
and theorists, with the theorists generally arguing there is a relationship between TRCs and rule of law, 
while the only comprehensive empirical study, conducted by Olsen, Payne, and Reiter (2010) argues 
there is one, but it is negative (144). 
Before addressing these focuses it is necessary to define rule of law.  There are a variety of 
definitions of rule of law. According to Mani (1997) there are minimalist and maximalist definitions of 
the concept.  The minimalist concept is that of a “…government that is subject to and operates within 
the law, and a situation where the individual is protected from the state” (148). This requires well 
known rules, a functioning judicial system and guarantees of certain freedoms.  A maximalist definition 
“…embraces democracy and good governance on the one hand and human rights on the other.  It 
establishes principles to constrain the power of government and it obliges the government to adhere to 
prescribed and publicly known rules” (148).  Mani notes that this maximalist definition is not conducive 
with Western or common law judicial systems because of its belief in universal values.  The most 
extreme maximalist position, one given by the International Commission of Jurists, extends the 
maximalist definition to include social and economic rights, which argues that the rule of law “…should 
be employed not only to safeguard and advance the civil and political rights of the individual in a free 
society, but also to establish social, economic, educational and cultural conditions under which his 
legitimate aspirations and dignity may be realized” (148-149).  Mani notes that human rights and the 
rule of law are often confused with each other, or use interchangeably but argues that they have 
different aspects and should be kept separate (149). A maximalist definition will be used here focusing 
on physical integrity rights, civil liberties, women’s empowerment and independence of the judiciary. 
 According to Mani there are four elements to the rule of law—an independent judiciary, an 
efficient and functioning police and prison system and administrative law with open and public 
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procedures (153-154).  She notes that context is also critical in establishing the rule of law, including 
“…the past, the political context, and the society and local culture” (154).  Regarding the context, the 
one most obviously related to TRCs is that of the past.  Justice cannot occur if there is not an operational 
justice system, public trust is needed to obtain public cooperation and support, and accountability 
shows that everyone is equal before the law and impunity will not be allowed (154-155).  The past 
actions in each country dictate, to a large extent, how the past abuses are dealt with or were not dealt 
with. 
Mani argues that transitional justice methods, if they are going to reinforce the rule of law, need 
to be within the country, be conducted in domestic institutions and not be internationalized (155).  She 
notes that Mozambique chose no mechanisms to deal with the past other than amnesties, while 
Rwanda tried the whole gambit of methods (155).  TRCs as defined in Chapter One meet these three 
criteria—they are always in the country, are conducted domestically and have limited amounts, if any, 
of international involvement other than funding.  
Post-conflict states have tried a variety of transitional justice methods to create the rule of law 
and gain or regain trust in government, but primarily have utilized war crimes tribunals, amnesties and 
TRCs.  The critical question is whether or not they lead to an increase in the rule of law, and if so, which 
method best fosters the growth. Because of their structure TRCs, may be contrary to the rule of law.  
Instead of enforcing the rule of law by prosecuting offenders of abuses, they may act as a vehicle to 
excuse them.  On the other hand, many theorists argue that they create a sense of justice in situations 
where, because of the massive number of victims and offenders, prosecution is not a realistic possibility.  
This sense of justice is a necessary, although not sufficient, for the rule of law to grow.  The literature on 
this topic, however, is primarily theoretical rather than empirical, showing the need for further empirical 
study of this crucial issue. 
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In some ways, the idea that a TRC, which does not adjudicate guilt or innocence or punish 
offenders, leads to justice is a challenging concept.  But Dimitrijević argues that by presenting all of the 
evidence at a TRC without censoring or limiting the “truth” being discussed, a universal sense of morality 
and justice can be established.  To him a TRC must do two things-clearly delineate the violations of the 
past regime and secondly, affirm the commitment of the new regime to adhering to values of justice, 
equality, dignity and concern for minority rights and interests (377).  
The United Nations (UN) in its 2004 report by the Secretary-General on the rule of law in 
transitional justice notes that TRCs help build rule of law by raising awareness of abuses and providing 
methods for reform.  They also noted that TRCs build institutional capacity by providing a safe 
environment for witnesses, victims and perpetrators to talk without fear.  According to the UN “Such 
non-judicial mechanisms as truth commissions can play a significant role in enhancing accountability for 
human rights abuses. They can signal a break with the past and assist in engendering trust and 
confidence in newly reconstituted justice and security institutions” (unrol.org). 
Dimitrijević (2006) also argues that dealing with the past in the concept of truth telling 
mechanisms such as a TRC is critical to improvement of the rule of law in post-conflict societies.  He 
looks at the dichotomy often established by these societies between forgetting the past and getting on 
with life versus establishing the truth of the past and summoning up hard feelings and feelings of 
injustice.  Looking at the mass human rights abuses of the twentieth century, such as Germany’s actions 
in World War II and Serbia’s actions in the Yugoslavian civil war, he argues that the actions of Germany 
and Serbia were: 
… kind of "ethics of evil" leaves as its most troublesome legacy a political culture in which there 
are too many people who remain incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong, good 
and bad. Therefore, after crimes committed in the name of false ethical claims, transition into a 
state of civilized democratic peace cannot be achieved solely by means of the replacement of 
the governing elites and setting up of a new institutional framework. After a moral catastrophe, 
a clear, radically new moral foundation of the community is needed.” (371).    
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Simply forgetting and moving on will not allow a state to create this new moral foundation because 
replacing one set of ruling elites with a new set, or new institutions in place of old ones, will not change 
attitudes about the rights of all people to be treated equally and fairly.  He argues that the role of TRCs 
should be less about their ability to bring about reconciliation or forgiveness and more about their 
ability to foster justice.  One of the problems, he points out, with reconciliation and forgiveness is that 
they are more functions of individuals than of a state.  No study of TRCs to date has been able to show 
categorically that reconciliation on the individual, family or group level has occurred.  But the 
connection with justice can be shown and the relationship between truth and justice is a justification for 
the use of TRCs. 
Not everyone believes that TRCs promote the growth of the rule of law.  Olsen, Payne, and 
Reiter (2010) conducted a quantitative study of three transitional justice methods, trials, amnesties and 
TRCs from 1970 to 2007 in all countries in the world.  In reviewing the three forms, they argue that trials 
are equivalent to a maximalist approach form of accountability, one that is most likely reduce violence, 
strengthen judicial institutions and rule of law and lead to democracy.  The maximalist approach rejects 
both amnesties and TRCs because they increase impunity by failing to build respect for the rule of law 
and allow perpetrators to escape without punishment (16-19).  They argue that amnesties are part of a 
minimalist approach, one that emphasizes the need for transition and postulates that any form of 
retributive justice, particularly trials, can interfere with transition.  Amnesties also, according to Olsen, 
Payne, and Reiter (2010) are a way to recognize the reality that trials cannot try all perpetrators and are 
therefore unlikely to build the rule of law since trials also allow most perpetrators to escape from justice 
and others to be acquitted, increasing, rather than decreasing the feeling of impunity (19-20).  They use 
an index for human rights known as the Cingranelli and Richards Index (CIRI) and the Political Terror 
Scale (PTS), an index that is also part of the CIRI index (42). 
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 However, the connection between TRCs and the growth of the rule of law is not necessarily 
clear.  Authors such as Allen (1999) argue that although TRCs are thought to spur the rule of law by 
breaking with the past of human rights abuses and impunity, they actually lack the due process rights of 
criminal trials and the ability to punish human rights violations.  This can, instead of encouraging the rule 
of law, lead to a lack of accountability and impunity.  He notes that this concern is exacerbated when a 
TRC is simply a substitute for any type of criminal prosecution or is done in private, rather than with 
public hearings and reports of its activities (319).  According to Allen, some of this conflict is inherent in 
the role that TRCs play in simultaneously promoting both justice and reconciliation, different concepts 
that have different effects (320).  According to Allen: 
…sensitivity to injustice can perhaps be restored over time by confronting the specific 
circumstances of injustice.  This is one of the reasons that the role of the TRC in producing a 
detailed record of suffering an of perpetrator’s statements is so significant.  Reflection on past 
injustices is an important basis for a democracy that aims to respect justice and the rule of 
law…although memory of past injustices does not necessarily enhance a sensitivity to the 
injustices borne by others, reflecting on the conceptual and psychological import of the evils 
involved in specific cases may alert us to the presence and likely effect of injustices (337). 
 
Allen postulates that TRCs can support the growth the rule of law bringing past injustices out in the 
open, making society sensitive to injustice, rather than accepting of it.  Support for the rule of law can 
only function when society values individual rights to equal treatment under the law, something that 
can be supported the educational functions of TRC public hearings and reports (337).   
Orentlicher (1991), is another critic of TRCs and the rule of law.  She argues that the failure to 
prosecute major crimes not only may violate international law, but that “Societies recently scourged by 
lawlessness need look no farther than their own past to discover the costs of impunity. Their history 
provides sobering cause to believe, with William Pitt, that tyranny begins where law ends” (2542).  The 
failure to prosecute offenders results in a society that does not trust the judicial system because other 
methods of transitional justice, including TRCs and amnesties deliver the wrong message, that of no 
consequences for crime on a massive scale.  To Orentlicher, “A complete failure of enforcement vitiates 
32 
 
. 
the authority of law itself, sapping its power to deter proscribed conduct” (2542).   While prosecution of 
all offenses may not be necessary, the failure to prosecute the worst offenses provides a justification for 
the lack of trust by the citizenry and a lack of concern for the consequences of their actions by the 
police, judiciary and military. 
Stanley (2001) also addresses the issue of the rule of law and its relationship to TRCs.  She 
argues that although the South African TRC incorporated three mandates 1) acknowledgment of past 
suffering, 2) promotion of future based on social justice and 3) the rule of law and reconciliation, it 
didn’t result in social transformation due to lack of will to do the necessary procedures and follow the 
recommendations of the TRC.  In particular she notes that the failures to prosecute perpetrators who 
either failed to request amnesty or were denied amnesty both victims and perpetrators were shown 
that the rule of law would not prevail in South Africa.  She notes that even after the TRC Johannesburg is 
the most dangerous city in the world, but because of criminal violence, not political violence.  However, 
Stanley argues “…the political violence of the past and the criminal violence of the present are ‘two sides 
of the same coin’; current criminal violence cannot be historically decontextualized from the past 
struggles against apartheid” (535).  The basic tenets of apartheid were not eliminated and the 
inequalities from it still persist in South Africa, leading to the current levels of criminal violence.  Former 
military, police and government officials and workers who were complicit in the abuses of apartheid 
continued in office, showing impunity and instilling a lack of trust in victims in particular and in the state.  
Stanley states “The continued impunity and lack of justice makes it increasingly difficult for people, 
already mistrustful of state personnel, to cooperate in building a new society based on the rule of law 
(Simpson 1998)” (536). 
Stanley, however, does not completely discount a relationship between TRCs and the rule of 
law.  She points out a link: most TRCs include some discussion of reparations for victims in their 
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mandates and in their final recommendations. 5  According to Stanley “While reparations promised a 
‘substantial impact’ on victim’s lives, progressive policies based on social justice could bring a sense of 
fairness and equality to a society based on socio-economic discrimination” (537).  A sense of justice and 
equality is a critical element of the rule of law, so in that way TRCs can contribute to the rule of law. 
The last major conflict is the difference between theorists and empiricists regarding the connection 
between TRCs and the rule of law.  There is only one major empirical study on this topic which was 
conducted in 2010 by Olsen Payne and Reiter; the rest are one or two country case studies. 6  They used 
a moderate approach to transitional justice and found that TRCs can restore faith in the justice system, a 
necessary component of the rule of law, by providing restorative justice through recommendations for 
financial reparations or symbolic reparations.  According to them, the public exposure of perpetrators 
through the TRC process allows them to be held up to scrutiny but does not risk the political upheaval 
that is commensurate with war crimes trials (24).  Their empirical findings, however, are that there is a 
negative, not positive relationship between TRCs and human rights, defined similarly to rule of law, as 
well as with democracy.  They also note that no other transitional justice methods have a negative 
relationship.  They provide no explanation for this negative relationship other than that it may be 
related to a general disappointment by both the public and perpetrators that they provide neither 
justice nor amnesty from prosecution (144-146).  This is an area that needs further empirical study to 
confirm or disprove their results.  Because there is a need for more empirical study of this relationship 
the fourth hypothesis for this dissertation will examine this relationship.  The fourth hypothesis states 
that there is a positive relationship between a state having conducted a TRC and an increase in rule of 
law. 
                                                          
5
 Sierra Leone, Bolivia, Liberia, South Africa, United States (Japanese Internment), Guatemala and El Salvador, 
among others. 
6
 See for example Kaye, M. (Oct., 1997).  “The Role of Truth Commissions in the Search for Justice, Reconciliation 
and Democratisation: The Salvadorean and Honduran Cases”, Journal of Latin American Studies, 29(3), 693-716 
and Gibson, J. (Jul., 2002).  “Truth, Justice and Reconciliation: Judging the Fairness of Amnesty in South Africa”, 
American Journal of Political Science, 46(3), 540-556. 
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As was discussed briefly above, war crimes trials and TRCs have not been the only methods of 
transitional justice used by states or analyzed by scholars.  Amnesties are often discussed as an 
alternative to TRCs and are at the other end of the spectrum from war crimes trials.  Because amnesties 
may have the advantage of not opening old wounds by trying violators or uncovering the truth regarding 
conflicts, amnesties are often attractive to states willing to adopt the “forgive and forget” method of 
transition.  Below is a discussion of the literature regarding amnesty as an alternative to other 
transitional justice methods. 
 
Amnesties and Their Role in Transitional Justice 
 If the lack of punishment or reproach destroys the foundations of justice, amnesty would appear 
to be contrary to the goals of justice.  The word amnesty comes from the Greek word amnestie, 
meaning oblivion or forgetting (dictionary.com).  Amnesty is often thought of as a minimal form of 
transitional justice, one that provides for the least amount of political strife in a transition.  Because 
trials or even TRCs can cause political unrest and make it difficult for members of the former regime to 
retire or move on, problems from the former regime continue to pose a threat to the new government.  
Amnesty allows society to move on and removes the possibility of reprisals by former members of the 
military, rebel groups or government who might otherwise feel compelled to defend themselves against 
prosecution by a continuation of military action. 
Although, as discussed in Chapter One, Freeman (2009) notes, we may be in the “fifth stage” of 
amnesties, with its opposition to amnesties due to the modern day global fight against impunity for 
perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, they are still used by states on a 
regular basis around the world (3).  In some cases, such as South Africa, TRCs may actually aid a TRC by 
encouraging the full disclosure of atrocities in return for amnesty of prosecution, establishing a clear and 
truthful record.  In other cases, amnesties, particularly general amnesties given without any 
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requirements of confession of guilt or provision of information, may defeat any positive efforts of a TRC 
by failing to provide incentives for information, or at worse encouraging impunity.   
Another difficulty in using amnesties as a form of transitional justice is noted by Freeman.  
Mallinder (2008) in her extensive study of amnesty documented hundreds of amnesties that occurred in 
the latter half of the twentieth century (18-22).  Many of those amnesties were granted in the place of 
prosecution or a TRC, such as occurred in Mozambique, but many, particularly de facto amnesties 
occurred in states also utilizing a TRC. 7  Freeman argues that the choice of amnesties or TRCs for states 
trying to resolve conflict depends less on the value of amnesty than it does on the power structure at 
the time the decision is made.  He notes that  
Where human rights violators are too weak to derail the strengthening of the rule of law, they 
can be put on trial.  But where they have the ability to lash out in renewed violations to try to 
reinforce their power, the international community faces a hard choice: either commit the 
resources to contain the backlash or offer the potential spoilers a deal that will leave them weak 
but secure (104-105).  
 
Freeman notes that the choice of transitional justice methods for states trying to resolve 
conflicts depends less on the value of amnesty than it does on the power structure at the time the 
decision is made.  He notes that:  
Where human rights violators are too weak to derail the strengthening of the rule of law, they 
can be put on trial.  But where they have the ability to lash out in renewed violations to try to 
reinforce their power, the international community faces a hard choice: either commit the 
resources to contain the backlash or offer the potential spoilers a deal that will leave them weak 
but secure (104-105).  
 
The problem with the choice is that states often discount the difficulty in setting aside 
amnesties, making it a permanent choice.  There tends to be an overestimation of the ability to set aside 
amnesties and an underestimation of how entrenched they are; most perpetrators will take the chance 
and states may offer them, thinking they are a short term fix that can be remedied later, but in fact most 
amnesties in the last 50 years are still in place and few are overturned by national legislatures or court 
                                                          
7
 South Africa and Liberia are examples of this-amnesty was given in both states despite a TRC being conducted. 
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(Roht-Arriaza and Gibson, 1998, 843).  Contestation of an amnesty could take years and most attempts, 
such as the one by the family of Steven Biko through its challenge in the case of AZAPO v. President of 
the Republic of South Africa failed to have it set aside. 8  The court in that case declared the amnesties 
constitutional and stated that amnesty was necessary for the state to be able to reveal the truth of the 
activities during apartheid.  According to the judge: 
The alternative to the grant of immunity from criminal prosecution of offenders is to keep intact 
the abstract right to such a prosecution for particular persons without the evidence to sustain 
the prosecution successfully, to continue to keep the dependants of such victims in many cases 
substantially ignorant about what precisely happened to their loved ones, to leave their 
yearning for the truth effectively unassuaged, to perpetuate their legitimate sense of 
resentment and grief and correspondingly to allow the culprits of such deeds to remain perhaps 
physically free but inhibited in their capacity to become active, full and creative members of the 
new order by a menacing combination of confused fear, guilt, uncertainty and sometimes even 
trepidation. (CCT 17/96 (July 1996) 
 
The judge also noted that amnesty was necessary for the peace process and that without it the 
transition from apartheid would not have occurred, a sort of balancing act of the rights of the individual 
versus the rights of the state (18-19). 
As noted by Freemen, types of amnesties have changed over time.  Blanket amnesties are 
utilized less by modern states but amnesties are still included in cease fire and peace agreements and 
used to negotiate the departure of elites from the previous regime.  There are several kinds of 
amnesties: general amnesties giving amnesty to all members of a particular group (such as child soldiers 
or minor members of the military), conditional amnesties which grant amnesty only if conditions such as 
testimony at a TRC are satisfied by the applicant and limited amnesties which usually only apply to lesser 
figures in a conflict such as enlisted soldiers, minor figures or applicants for amnesty accused of 
relatively minor crimes. 
                                                          
8
 Steven Biko was a black anti-apartheid leader in South Africa in the 1970’s who was arrested by police in 1977 
and died while in police custody under suspicious circumstances.   
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Freeman argues that amnesties are often cited as the lesser of two evils, the least bad solution 
of many bad solutions and points to the experiences of Somalia and Burma as examples.  According to 
Freeman: 
This lesser-evil argument is more than mere philosophy.  One can measure it in real lives and in 
pain.  Even a temporary lull in the fighting can be characterized legitimately, and experienced 
directly, as a huge gain.  The grim reality of many pretransitional justice settings, such as 
modern-day Somalia and Burma, is that there are no good options to choose from, only bad and 
worse ones.  Such options are mostly a function of the reigning balance of power at a particular 
period in time.  Where that balance of power is particularly unfavorable to the cause of justice, 
arguments focused only on the legality of proposed amnesty can seem remote, even indifferent 
to human suffering.  It is not surprising, therefore, for societies in such circumstances to ‘act on 
a prudent logic of consequences rather than a narrow logic of legal appropriateness’ (23-24). 
 
Justice may be better served through amnesty and putting an end to conflicts and suffering rather than 
a continuation of the conflict. 
There are other advantages to amnesty over trials or TRCs according to Freeman.  Many trials of 
war crimes or human rights abuses are conducted under international auspices and at least trials are 
often conducted in other countries, excluding people and groups to the political processes.  Trials can 
also lead to the destruction or hiding of evidence, making discovery of the truth regarding events even 
most difficult to uncover (24).  Acquittals can happen in trials, increasing the belief in impunity for 
offenders and TRC proceedings can be stymied by concerns about prosecution such as occurred in Sierra 
Leone when many involved in the conflict refused to testify at the TRC out of fear of having their 
statements used against them in the Special Court for Sierra Leone (Evenson, Apr., 2004, 755). 
Freeman also considered the various studies on amnesties and democratic consolidation and 
argues that amnesties shouldn’t be divided into amnesties on all offenses versus just minor, not 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity amnesties, or limited amnesties.  If amnesties are 
bad, then simply because they are limited doesn’t make them automatically acceptable or good.  He 
points out that the South African conditional amnesty did not exclude acts in violation of international 
law such as crimes against humanity and therefore could be considered bad, but should in fact be 
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considered better than amnesties such as the ones in Macedonia which did exclude violations of 
international law but did not require individual accountability for amnesty applicants (25). 
Lastly, Freeman argues that many of the studies that show amnesties lead to instability are 
flawed to one extent or the other.  In many of them, other methods were employed at the same time as 
amnesties, making a mixture of transitional justice methods that is hard to disaggregate.  He also argues 
there are selection biases in the choice of cases and in the perceptions of state conditions post-amnesty.  
He points to Spain and Mozambique as countries that utilized only amnesty after conflicts and that while 
they have not become paragons of stability certainly did not descend back into violence and civil war 
and in fact have made movement toward democracy after the use of amnesty (27). 
Like Freeman, Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003) also argue for the importance of amnesties in some 
situations, including in El Salvador and South Africa, particularly when coupled with TRCs.  They 
conducted a study of thirty-two countries between 1989 and 2003 that had experienced a civil war and 
conclude that amnesties are more likely to lead to long, stable peace agreements than TRCs or trials.  
They argue that justice does start with the creation of rules and laws.  Instead, it begins with striking 
bargains that diffuse groups that may make a peaceful transition impossible after a conflict 
Preventing atrocities and enhancing respect for the law will frequently depend on striking 
politically expedient bargains that create effective political coalitions to contain the power of 
potential perpetrators of abuses (or so-called spoilers).  Amnesty-or simply ignoring past abuses-
may be a necessary tool in this bargaining. Once such deals are struck, institutions based on the 
rule of law become more feasible.  Attempting to implement universal standards of criminal 
justice in the absence of these political and institutional preconditions risks weakening norms of 
justice by revealing their ineffectiveness and hindering necessary political bargaining (6). 
 
They contend that only after bargains are struck and the situation is stabilized can states begin to 
develop institutions to promote the rule of law.  Making changes in societal norms will not create an 
atmosphere of acceptance of human rights and peace because changes in normative thinking cannot 
happen through persuasion and examples.  They point out that although most people in third world 
countries agree that genocide and human rights abuses are wrong, the people answering this way are 
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not the primarily the people who were the perpetrators of criminal acts during the conflict.  While the 
majority of people in a country may agree to a set of norms, the people being committed to the cause 
are less likely to embrace norms regarding war crimes and are more likely to ignore attempts to change 
their behavior (11).  They also argue that trials are not a deterrent to future abuses since the chances of 
being tried for those abuses are so small and unpredictable and because perpetrators of mass abuses 
often are necessary actors in peacemaking during civil wars, making deterrence less vital in the 
international system than in domestic criminal law.  It requires neutralizing potential spoilers, having a 
functioning judicial system and a commitment to justice by society, difficult requirements for societies 
emerging from conflicts (12). 
Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003) argue that amnesty is a legitimate tool for transitional justice if it 
leads to the establishment or improvement in the rule of law.  They note that if there is no clear 
connection between a prosecution and rule of law and the strengthening of impartial, law-abiding 
institutions, prosecutions should not be used.  Prosecutions in circumstances where there are weak 
institutions and potential spoilers still strong, the chances of a return to violence and civil war are too 
great to allow for prosecution n (14-15).  In the absence of a decisive military victory, such as the allied 
victory over the Nazis at the end of World War II amnesty, a de facto amnesty by doing nothing is a 
better choice (18).  They also argue that TRCs only lead to democratic consolidation when there is 
already a movement toward democracy and the rule of law before the TRC occurs.  Absent this 
movement TRCs can actually exacerbate tensions and obscure further abuses by regimes, further 
destabilizing them and leading to more violence (20). 
The no-amnesty school is based primarily on two arguments-violation of universal values and 
norms and violation of international law.  There are several arguments regarding the violation of 
universal values, including the existence of a moral obligation to victims and their families, of a need to 
renew trust in the government and the judicial system, and of a political obligation to bring about the 
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rule of and the end of violence and vigilante justice.  Much of the discussion of these obligations is 
espoused by victims’ groups and victims’ advocacy groups, such as Human Rights Watch, but several 
scholars have also made moral arguments against amnesty.  For example, Moore (1990-1991) argues 
that amnesty is often used for political reasons rather than to bring about the reconciliation of society.  
She notes that in Nicaragua and El Salvador amnesties were used for political reasons by new regimes 
but were sold to the people with the promise that amnesty would allow them to forget the violence of 
the past and to move on to a new and better society.  She argues that instead of allowing society to 
move forward, it actually inhibited the creation of the rule of law.  She notes that 
Overlooking the past is incompatible with any society that purports to follow the rule of law. 
Law derives legitimacy from past events, inherits problems from the past and strives to fulfill 
past promises. When a law is reversed, through appellate review or legislative repeal, it should 
be done through formal recognition of past error or changed circumstances. When prisoners are 
released, or criminal investigations are closed, the law requires some explanation. Simply 
forgetting past offenses, or distorting the criminal record to suit a political strategy, manipulates 
history in ways that obscure the accounting required by the rule of law (773). 
 
By offering amnesties for one reason but using them for another, both states acted immorally to the 
victims and their families, violating their rights.  Beyond that specific case, Moore says more generally 
that amnesty that is done to appease a violator simply encourages, rather than discourages more abuses 
(733).  So not only does it betray the victim, it encourages the abuser. 
Lastly, there is a belief that if some of the more egregious crimes are forgiven and excused, 
rather than punished, then that would change the public trust in the government and undermine the 
growth of the rule of law.  This point of view is primarily espoused by victims’ groups and victims’ 
advocacy groups, such as Human Rights Watch.  For example, Human Rights Watch decried the National 
Stability and Reconciliation Act in Afghanistan which offered Taliban fighters immunity from prosecution 
if they agreed to reconcile with the government, arguing that the amnesty was an open invitation for 
future war crimes by the Taliban and allowed commanders to escape with impunity.  The fact the Act 
was signed by the Afghani parliament without protest by the international community led to their 
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conclusion that the international community and the government of Afghanistan were encouraging 
impunity (Human Rights Watch-Afghanistan).   
 The argument that amnesties do not bring about the end of violence and vigilante justice is 
made by several authors, including Akhaven (1998) and Bass (1998) who discuss amnesties in the 
context of the former Yugoslavia.  Akhaven argues that the failure to settle for amnesties in the former 
Yugoslavia and the decision to prosecute brought peace to Yugoslavia rather than the turmoil and 
deaths predicted by opponents of war crimes trials.  He argues that, contrary to most opinions, the 
possibility of arrest and conviction for war crimes for major actors in the war reduced the possibility of 
continued opposition to peace rather than encouraging further violence.  According to Akhaven, peace 
did not become problematic because of the refusal to grant amnesty, but rather when it became 
obvious that the international community would not take action to arrest perpetrators, encouraging 
further feelings of impunity (739).   
 Bass (2008), on the other hand, is more pragmatic in his arguments regarding amnesty.  He 
notes that authors such as Huntington argue that without amnesty virtually all transitions in the 
twentieth century from authoritarianism to democracy would not have occurred; without neutralizing 
former leaders by offering amnesty, they would continue to fight or interfere with the transition of the 
state.  He argues, instead, that although perpetrators can create problems for the new state without 
amnesty, victims can make problems for the new state if amnesties are granted.  Victims will be highly 
dissatisfied with seeing perpetrators walk free after conflicts and are unlikely to trust the new state or 
justice systems.  He cites the situation in Iraq where Shia victims of the Hussein regime were surveyed 
and commented that if Hussein were not tried as a war criminal they would take justice into their own 
hands.  98% of the Iraqis surveyed felt there should be some form of a trial and punishment.  While an 
amnesty may neutralize former elites, it invigorates opposition from victims and other citizens, also 
making a transition to democracy and the rule of law difficult (Chapter 13).  Because of this, he argues 
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amnesties are a mistake for a state after a conflict because the possible benefit of neutralizing 
perpetrators is outweighed by the impact of victims. 
The most frequent type of transitional justice in states after a conflict is an amnesty.  Amnesties 
are used In order to compare the ability of TRCs and amnesties to promote democracy and rule of law, 
two hypotheses are included in this dissertation.  Hypothesis Two relates to the ability of TRCs to 
improve democracy as compared to amnesties and states that there is a greater change in democracy in 
post conflict states that utilized a TRC as opposed to amnesties.  Hypothesis Four compares TRCs and 
amnesties and their ability to improve rule of law and states that there is a greater change in rule of law 
in post conflict states that utilized a TRC as opposed to amnesties.  The question of amnesties is also 
reviewed in the two case studies of Liberia and Mozambique to show the effect of an amnesty as 
opposed to a TRC. 
 
The Effect of Conflict Intensity 
There is very little in the literature that discusses the intensity of the conflict and its effect on 
transitional justice.  This section will discuss the small amount of existing literature on conflict intensity, 
most of which is related to peace building and choice of transitional justice methods, rather than 
directly to the objects of this study.  However, since it is relevant to the success in improvement in 
democracy and rule of law in post conflict states, the discussion is helpful in understanding the 
importance of this variable.  This section briefly reviews the literature that argues that conflict intensity 
can affect democracy and rule of law. 
The severity of the conflict was considered by Olsen, Payne, and Reiter (2010) who noted that 
not only could the severity of the conflict determine the methods of transitional justice that might be 
used by a state, it might also result in the mobilization of domestic and international groups to demand 
accountability.  They note that the severity of a conflict could influence the choice of transitional justice 
method because an intense conflict is less likely to be ignored and can force the adoption of transitional 
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justice.  They conclude that the severity of the battle actually results in the choice of amnesties and 
TRCs, rather than trials, indicating that when the conflicts are most severe the choice is to avoid 
accountability out of fear of the return of the conflict (126).  Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010) does not look at 
conflict intensity in his model. 
There is discussion from other authors of the effect of intense conflicts on peace building after a 
conflict rather than specifically democracy and rule of law, however since transitional justice methods 
have an effect on ability of states to heal and rebuild after a conflict, it follows that conflict intensity is 
relevant to the ability of a transitional justice method like a TRC or an amnesty to lead to democracy or 
the rule of law.   
Lounsbery and Pearson (2009) discuss conflict intensity extensively in relation to the resolution 
of civil wars and note that low intensity conflicts fought over a long period of time result in more 
successfully negotiated peace than conflicts that involve intense fighting.  This is logical since these low 
intensity wars tend to be  fought over issues other than ethnic identity and wars that tend to end due to 
a lack of commitment to further fighting rather than victory by one side (161).  This is consistent with 
the argument that an intense conflict will have less success with improving the rule of law after a 
conflict because there will be greater challenges to peace.   It may be that states with long, low intensity 
conflicts may also be more likely to reap democratic benefits of at TRC, but this remains to be studied. 
Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild’s (2001) work is consistent with Lounsbery and Pearson.  They 
note that intense conflicts are likely to result in the reoccurrence of war.  According to them, states that 
have recently used violence to control issues between groups find it difficult to return to peaceful 
relations after a conflict and will experience ongoing concerns regarding security.  They argue that the 
settlement environment affects the prospects for continued peace because there will be greater feelings 
of insecurity, memories and costs involved in the conflict that are hard to overcome for all sides.  They 
state that: 
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It appears that states that have experienced civil wars with a relatively higher number of battle 
deaths in each month of war, as reflected in our intensity variable, have a greater risk of their 
negotiated settlement failing than states that have emerged from less intense domestic wars. 
…We hypothesize that the importance of this variable is attributable to security concerns. The 
higher the casualty rate, and the greater the sunk costs, the more concerned groups will be 
about their safety; as a result, they will have more difficulty committing to a stable peace (198). 
 
 Hoddie and Hartzell (2005), also in the context of peace building after a conflict, note that more 
intense conflicts make the likelihood of holding a transition election less likely because cooperation is 
less likely and both sides are likely to overreact to any stress by fearing the return to the original conflict.  
Their study found that intense conflicts were not related to timely transition elections, meaning that 
having an intense conflict has a negative effect on the timing of a post conflict election.  Since elections 
are an integral part of democracy and can have an effect on rule of law this finding supports the concept 
that intense conflicts can be problematic for democracy and rule of law (100-101).   
  TRCs may ease this transition for states that have had intense conflicts by providing a vehicle to 
allow cooperation to occur, making elections more likely to occur sooner than in states that did not 
conduct a TRC.  The last two hypotheses relate to the question of conflict intensity and its effect on 
democracy.  According to Hypothesis Three states that experience intense conflicts with cumulative 
battle deaths in excess of one thousand and conduct a TRC experience higher democracy scores than 
states with intense conflicts who do not conduct a TRC while Hypothesis Six states that experience 
intense conflicts with cumulative battle deaths in excess of one thousand and conduct a TRC experience 
higher democracy scores than states with intense conflicts who do not conduct a TRC. 
The next chapter will look at the selection of cases for this dissertation and the methodology to 
be used in testing the relationship between democracy and rule of law and TRCs and amnesties.  An 
operational definition for TRCs will be discussed and the methods for measuring the two dependent 
variables, democracy and rule of law will be set out along with the two statistical tests used to analyze 
the six hypotheses discussed above.   
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CHAPTER THREE: DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This dissertation compares the experience with democracy and rule of law of thirty six non-
democratic states that held a total of forty Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) from 1981 to 
2010 to a group of fifty states that experienced a total of sixty three internal armed conflicts and did not 
conduct a TRC, although many did issue amnesties.  Both of the main empirical studies by Olsen, Payne, 
and Reiter (2010) and Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010) discussed in Chapter Two compared the states 
conducting TRCs to all states with populations in excess of one million citizens, rather than states that 
experienced an armed conflict.  The result is a comparison of states recently embroiled in civil wars to 
states such as Sweden and Austria that have been peaceful democracies for long periods of time.  It is 
critical to select appropriate states because the study of states with different types of experiences and 
institutions will result in comparing unlike things.  Democracies and non-democracies differ greatly in 
the ability of their institutions to govern due to resource differences but also the history of democratic 
institutional knowledge and experience.  States with established histories of democracy have, typically, a 
high level of the rule of law and any change in the rule of law would be minor regardless of any efforts at 
transitional justice such as a TRC.  States conducting different kinds of commissions with different 
procedures, objectives and methods will also result in different reactions, making it difficult to 
determine if the commission has caused the reaction or some other force has. 
The first necessary step is to select appropriate cases.  This is particularly difficult in the context 
of TRCs because there are several definitions of TRCs, all yielding a different universe of TRCs.  The 
broadest definitions generally include all types of commissions conducting an inquiry into an issue of 
human rights abuses or conflicts, whether entitled TRC or not.  The narrower definitions include only 
commissions that state in their charters the principles of TRCs, that of truth and reconciliation.  The 
definition of a TRC was included in Chapter One and stresses the temporary, non-judicial nature of TRCs 
and their contribution to regime transition.   
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As described in the previous chapter, the first acknowledged TRC was the 1974 Ugandan TRC, 
although the Pakistan Commission in 1971, which fits the definition of a TRC but was not called one, was 
probably the first TRC.  Between 1971 and 1995 there were twenty one TRCs in non-democracies; since 
the South African TRC in 1995 there has been an increased interest in TRCs with thirty two being 
conducted from 1996 to 2010. Several more were in progress as of 2012 and others have been proposed 
but not yet conducted.   
 
Case Selection 
A list of all TRCs conducted since 1971 was compiled from a variety of sources including the 
United States Institute of Peace, Justice in Perspective, and Olsen Payne, and Reiter (2010).  Out of the 
seventy nine TRCs that have been conducted or proposed since 1971, forty are included in this 
dissertation and thirty nine are excluded.  The forty TRCs that are included are set out below in Table 3.1 
along with their years of operation.  Thirty six are excluded for reasons set forth below in Table 3.2.  The 
forty TRCs included here were conducted between 1981 and 2010.  There is regional variety among the 
TRCs, with all continents other than North America and Antarctica being represented in the included 
cases.  The largest number of cases, sixteen, come from Latin America, followed closely by fourteen 
from Sub-Saharan Africa.  African states are divided between Sub-Saharan African states and Northern 
African states, with the Northern African states of Morocco and Algeria being included in the Middle-
Eastern region rather than Sub-Saharan Africa due to their geographic location and their heavily Muslim 
population. 
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Table 3.1: States with TRCs Included in Study-1981-2010 
Country Years of Operation 
Afghanistan 2004-2005 
Algeria 2003-2005 
Argentina 1983-1984 
Bolivia 1982-1984 
Burundi 1995-1996 
Central African Republic 2003 
Chad 1990-1992 
Chile I 1990-1991 
Chile II 2003-2005 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 2003-2007 
East Timor 2002-2005 
Ecuador I 1996-1997 
Ecuador II 2007-2009 
El Salvador 1993-1994 
Ghana 2003-2004 
Guatemala 1997-1999 
Haiti 1995-1996 
Honduras  1993-1994 
Lebanon I 2001-2002 
Lebanon II 2005 
Liberia 2006-2009 
Morocco 2004-2005 
Nepal 1990-1991 
Nigeria 1999-2002 
Panama 2001-2002 
Paraguay 2004-2008 
Peru  2001-2003 
Philippines 1986-1987 
Rwanda I 1993 
Rwanda II 2000 
Serbia and Montenegro 2001-2003 
Sierra Leone 2002-2004 
South Africa  1995-2002 
Sri Lanka I 1995-1997 
Sri Lanka II 2001-2002 
Togo 2009-2010 
Uganda  1986-1994 
Uruguay I 1985 
Uruguay II 2000-2002 
Zimbabwe 1983-1984 
Source:  usip.org, justiceinperspective.org, Olson, Payne and Reiter 
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As noted above, thirty six TRCs are excluded from this study.  The reasons for the exclusion of 
TRCs are explained below in Table 3.2.  Most of the TRCs that were excluded were excluded because 
they did not fit the definition of a TRC listed in Chapter One, usually because they involved a single issue 
or were conducted in a state already considered a democracy.  The year of 1981 was chosen as the 
commencement date for this dissertation since data on the rule of law is only available from 1981.  This 
results in the exclusion of just three TRCs in Pakistan, India and Uganda.  Only TRCs that completed their 
tasks by 2010, whether a report was released or not, were included to insure the rule of law data is 
available.  Also, TRCs that terminated after 2010 were less likely to have had a substantial effect on the 
rule of law by 2013, making measurement of change impossible.  Below is Table 3.2 showing the various 
excluded cases, the years of operation and the reason for the exclusion. 
TRCs that occurred in states that were established democracies, as measured by Polity IV as 
having a score of at least +6 out on a -10 (autocracy) to +10 (democracy) scale are not included in this 
study. These excluded cases include the United States, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Lithuania, Mexico, 
Mauritius, South Korea, Norway and Sweden.   While interesting, they do not fit the definition of TRCs as 
set forth in Chapter One, particularly factors four and five which require them to usually be created at a 
point of political transition and focus on the past, severe acts of repression and violence that were 
committed over a period of time.  Democracies are not making political transitions and do not typically 
have severe acts of repression and violence. Most of the TRCs in these states like the United States, 
focus on a single event such as the incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War II.  Thus, only 
TRCs occurring in states that were not democracies at the commencement of the TRC will be included 
with the exceptions of South Africa, 1995-2002 and Ghana, 2003-2004. 9     
                                                          
9
 South Africa’s Polity IV scores rose from a +5 in 1991 to a +9 shortly before the TRC was conducted.  Ghana’s 
Polity IV scores rose from a +2 in 2000- to a +6 in 2001, making it a democracy, in the year the TRC was announced.  
Because of the short amount of time between the transition to democracy and the commencement of the TRC 
both are included here. 
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Several other commissions have been cited as TRCs by other studies but are excluded here 
because they do not fit the definition of a TRC explained in Chapter One.  Most cases involve TRCs that 
involved a single issue or were not directed at the violations of the sponsoring state such as the Nigerian 
and first two South African commissions.  Several commissions that are often included in studies of TRCs 
are excluded from this dissertation because they involve a single issue. 10  The first, the Lumumba 
Commission considered the circumstances that led to the death of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo and 
the potential involvement of Belgium in the murder.  Although the commission is an interesting one 
politically for Belgium, it was a single issue commission and does not fit the operative definition of a TRC 
used here (Verdoolaege & Kerstens, 2004, 79).  The second, the Ivory Coast commission was concerned 
with only a few days of violence after the election (justiceinperspective.org).  The third, the Bosnian TRC 
regarding Srebrenica only considered the deaths of civilians during a nine day period in the Yugoslavian 
civil war (justiceinperspective.org/Bosnia) and was therefore a single issue commission.  The fourth, the 
Peruvian commission in 1986 was only concerned with the killing of prisoners in a single incident.  The 
fifth, the United States commission on Japanese Internment considered more than one issue, looking at 
the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II and the treatment of Alaskan Aluets.  
However, it is not included because the United States was a democracy at the time of the commission 
(justiceiperspective.org).  The sixth was the other United States TRC that is sometimes cited, including by 
Hayner (2011) is the Greensboro Truth Commission (62).  That commission was not an official 
commission, being organized instead by civil society and concerned a single issue regarding the killing of 
five people during a “Death to the Klan” march in 1979.  As such, it does not fit two parts of the 
definition of a TRC and it is also a sub-national commission which would not have national effect 
(justiceinperspective.org).   
                                                          
10
 Hayner (2011) and Olsen, Payne, and Reiter (2010) include several of these commissions in their discussions of 
TRCs. 
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A second set of TRCs that are excluded because they do not fit the definition include the 1992 
and 1993 South African TRCs and the Ethiopian Special Prosecutor’s Office from 1992 to present day.  
Both of the early South African TRCs were conducted by the African National Congress (ANC), not by 
South Africa and therefore had an effect only on ANC members, not on the larger state.  They, 
therefore, do not qualify as TRCs under the definition.  The Ethiopian commission was a judicial body, 
prosecuting people under Ethiopian law for violations of law and therefore does not qualify under 
requirement number three for a TRC although it is listed as a truth commission by the United States 
Institute of Peace database of truth commission (Special Prosecutor’s Office-Ethiopia).  
The last two groups of excluded cases include states that did not start or did not complete their 
TRC by 2010.  Because the focus here is on changes in the rule of law after TRCs are concluded, any 
ongoing TRCs or TRCs that were concluded in 2011 or 2012 will be excluded.  Only two TRCs were 
completed since 2010, the Solomon Islands TRC which was concluded in February of 2012 and the 
Thailand TRC which concluded in September of 2012.  The Solomon Islands TRC has released its final 
report only to the government, which has refused to act on it or to release it to the public.  As of early 
2013, no report has been released by the Thailand TRC.  Similarly, TRCs in Brazil, Canada, the Ivory 
Coast, Kenya, Mauritius and the United States (Maine Wabanaki-State Child Welfare TRC Process) are 
excluded because they were ongoing as of 2013 or had only recently commenced and/or because they 
fail to meet other criteria such as involving only local issues.  The rest of the excluded TRCs involve those 
which were proposed but never began at least as of December 2012.   
There are three generally acknowledged attempts at TRCs that have not yet begun or were 
cancelled, including Bangladesh, Fiji and Northern Ireland.  In the case of Northern Ireland a private 
organization has created a TRC called the Legacy Commission but no official TRC has been formed (The 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Ireland and Britain, PRLog).  In Bangladesh the proposed TRC 
was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court because it proposed to offer partial amnesty to 
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offenders and was created by the executive, not the judicial branch that had exclusive jurisdiction over 
crimes and punishments (Rahman, 2008).  In Fiji a military coup occurred after the TRC had been 
approved but before its commencement and the proceedings were canceled (Larson, 2008).  None of 
these will be included for the reasons discussed above.  See Table 3.2 below for the complete list of 
excluded cases. 
 
Table 3.2: Excluded TRC Cases  
State Years of Operation Reason for Exclusion 
    
Australia 1996-1997 Democracy 
Bangladesh 2008 Never begun 
Belgium 2001 Single issue 
Bosnia 2004 Single issue 
Brazil I 1979-1982 Pre-1981 
Brazil II May, 2012 Not completed 
Canada I 1991-1996 Democracy 
Canada II 2009-ongoing Democracy 
Estonia 2001 Democracy 
Ethiopia 1993-2007 Single issue 
Fiji 2006-never begun Never begun 
Germany I 1992-1994 Democracy 
Germany II 1995-1998 Democracy 
Grenada 2001 No Polity IV data 
Honduras II 2010-2011 Not completed 
India 1977 Pre-1981 
Ivory Coast I 2000-2001 Single issue 
Ivory Coast II 2011-ongoing Not completed 
Kenya 1983-1984 Single issue 
Kenya 2009-ongoing Not completed 
Lithuania 1998 Democracy 
Mauritius 2009-ongoing Not completed 
Mexico 2001 Democracy 
Nigeria II 2009 Not entire state 
Northern Ireland Not yet Private commission 
Pakistan 1971-1974 Pre-1981 
Peru I 1986-1988 Single issue 
Solomon Islands 2010-Feb. 2012 Not completed 
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State Years of Operation Reason for Exclusion 
   
South Africa I 1992 Not state action 
South Africa II 1993 Not state action 
South Korea I 2000-2002 Democracy 
South Korea II   Democracy 
Sri Lanka III 2010-2011 Not completed 
Thailand 2010-Sept. 2012 Not completed 
Uganda I 1974 Pre-1981 
United States-Greensboro 2004-2006 Democracy, not entire state 
United States-Japanese Internment 1980-1983 Democracy 
United States-Maine Wabanaki Not yet Democracy 
Zambia 1993 Single issue 
Source: justiceinperspective.org, usip.org, Olsen, Payne, and Reiter (2010) 
 
Control Group: States with Conflicts That Did Not Conduct a TRC 
 In order to determine whether changes in democracy and the rule of law that occur are related 
to the presence of a TRC rather than to other factors such as a general trend toward democracy in the 
world or in a region, it is necessary to compare countries that have had violent conflicts and TRCs to 
countries that had violent conflicts but no TRC.  If countries with and without TRCs made similar 
progress toward democratization and the rule of law, then improvements that are detected may be part 
of a general trend rather than any effect from the TRC. 
In order to examine this relationship all states that experienced violent conflict but did not 
utilize a TRC will be included in the model in order to compare their respective changes in democracy 
and the rule of law to those among the group of countries that conducted TRCs. 11  This group of cases 
was selected based on the nature of the conflict and the intensity of the conflict.  Almost all states in the 
world were involved in some form of violent conflict between 1981 and 2010.  For states like Japan, 
France, Italy and other first world countries most of those conflicts were interventions in states like Iraq 
and Afghanistan.  Extra-systemic conflicts where the purpose for involvement is an armed intervention 
                                                          
11
 Many of these states have issued an amnesty and that variable will be considered in Chapter Four. 
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are not usually wars that destabilize a state or cause human rights abuses against their own citizens.  
Other types of conflicts such as the Falkland Island conflict with the United Kingdom or the invasion of 
Panama by the United States in 1988 are typically driven by foreign policy concerns rather than conflicts 
within the state.  Non-democracies and states that may be considered electoral democracies but are not 
fully consolidated democracies are characterized by having armed internal conflicts or internationalized 
internal armed conflicts between the government and one or more opposition groups,  These conflicts 
are commonly called civil wars as opposed to interstate wars and tend to be greatly destabilizing to the 
state because of the need to control the violence, often resulting in repression, loss of civil and political 
rights and injuries to physical integrity such as extra-judicial killings, torture and killing (UCDP PRIO 
Armed Conflict Dataset,  Vol. 4, 2013).     
All of the states included in the group of states with conflicts that did not conduct a TRC 
experienced a violent conflict involving battle deaths in excess of twenty-five for at least a year in a 
conflict that was either an intrastate conflict or an internationalized intrastate conflict as defined by 
PRIO.  PRIO defines armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or 
territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of 
a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (PRIO Codebook, Version 4, 1).  The definition 
requires the use of arms to promote the parties’ position in the conflict that result in a minimum of 
twenty-five battle deaths within the dyad, although arms do not have to be weapons but can include 
things such as fire, stones and water.   The government of a state is always one of the parties and the 
other party or parties includes any opposition group or alliance of those groups that is non-
governmental, has an announced name, and is using force to influence the outcome of the conflict that 
either involves territory or government.  PRIO notes that it “only deals with formally organized 
opposition. The focus is on armed conflict involving consciously conducted and planned political 
campaigns rather than spontaneous violence (PRIO, Codebook, Version 4, 2).   
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The PRIO dataset uses a measure of conflict that looks at the number of battle deaths within a 
year, with a score of zero representing battle deaths between zero and twenty-four, one representing 
battle deaths between twenty-five and nine hundred ninety nine, and a score of two representing more 
than one thousand battle deaths within a given year.  There are many datasets regarding armed conflict 
that are available but the PRIO dataset has the advantage of calculating battle deaths from 1946 to 
2011, the longer than temporal distance of this dissertation.  It also calculates battle deaths of as few as 
twenty-five people in a given conflict in a calendar year.  Most other datasets have a higher threshold of 
battle deaths, making it difficult to measure low battle death civil wars.   
In order to capture the maximum number of states for this group, rather than just the most 
violent cases, all states experiencing battle deaths of twenty-five or more in a given year will be 
included.  This results in a few relatively peaceful countries, such as Spain, being included because of 
their fairly low level of violent internal conflict with Basque separatists but countries experiencing 
extensive civil unrest such as Pakistan, India and Israel are also included, making a good group to 
compare to the TRC countries (PRIO Codebook).  All states included in this dissertation experienced a 
conflict at some point between 1981 and 2010 that involved at least twenty five battle deaths during a 
given year.  States not experiencing an armed conflict were excluded from the study.   Forty four states 
with sixty-three conflicts from all regions of the world are included in this group.  See Table 3.3 below 
for the group of states with conflicts that ended from 1981 to 2010 and that not conduct a TRC. 
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Table 3.3: States Not Conducting a TRC but Experiencing a Conflict-1981-2010 
 
State Year Conflict Ended 
  
Angola 2008 
Armenia 1994 
Azerbaijan 1995 
Bangladesh I 1990 
Bangladesh II 2005 
Burkina Faso 1987 
Cambodia 1998 
Comoros I 1989 
Comoros II 1997 
Republic of the Congo 2002 
Croatia 1995 
Cuba 1989 
Djibouti 2008 
Egypt 1998 
Eritrea 2008 
The Gambia 1981 
Georgia I 1992 
Georgia II 2004 
Georgia III 2008 
Guinea 2000 
Guinea-Bissau 1999 
Indonesia I 1992 
Indonesia II 1998 
Indonesia III 2005 
Iran 1996 
Iraq I 1987 
Iraq II 1996 
Israel 1996 
Laos 1988 
Lesotho 1998 
Libya 1987 
Macedonia 2001 
Malaysia 1981 
Mali I 1985 
Mali II 1990 
Mali III 1994 
Mali IV 2009 
Mexico I 1994 
Mexico II 1996 
Moldova 1992 
Mozambique 1992 
Namibia 2002 
Niger I 1994 
Niger II 2000 
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State Year Conflict Ended 
  
Pakistan I 1990 
Pakistan II 1996 
Papua New Guinea 1996 
Senegal 2003 
Spain I 1982 
Spain II 1987 
Spain III 1992 
Syria 1982 
Tajikistan 1998 
Tanzania 1992 
Thailand I 1982 
Thailand II 1988 
Trinidad and Tobago 1990 
Uzbekistan I 1996 
Uzbekistan II 2000 
Uzbekistan III 2004 
Venezuela I 1982 
Venezuela II 1992 
Vietnam 1989 
       Source: PRIO 
Data Challenges 
There were two challenges in the compilation of empirical data for this analysis.  The first was 
that, ideally, data from before the TRC and after the TRC should be used to measure its impact on the 
state.  Since all of the TRCs considered in this dissertation were completed before it was written it was 
impossible to conduct a survey or interview government leaders or citizens before the TRC occurred.  
Additionally, survey data is only available for a handful of the states.  Because of this limitation, existing 
data from indexes on democracy and the rule of law were used.  
Second, those indexes were created for reasons unrelated to the question of TRCs but have the 
advantage of being comprehensive, both in terms of the temporal range of this dissertation and the 
states involved in the study.  Some factors that would ideally be included in the study have had to be 
eliminated because they are not available for all states.  For example, survey data on public opinion on 
the TRC and the rule of law is available for a few states only.  Survey data from Afrobarometer has been 
used, however, in the Liberia and Mozambique case studies because it is available and is comparable.  In 
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both cases survey data was used regarding citizen perceptions of corruption and in Liberia survey data 
was examined regarding perceptions of the TRC and amnesty or prosecution for human rights violators. 
 
 
Variables and Datasets Used 
The independent variables are the existence of a TRC, an amnesty regardless of the type, a TRC 
combined with an amnesty and the cumulative intensity of the conflict.  The dependent variables are 
level of democracy in the state as measure by Polity IV and measure of rule of law as measured by the 
Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) index.  The method for measuring these variables is discussed below.  
Intervening variables such as GDP per capita and population size were not included because they were 
found not to be significant in the Olsen, Payne, and Reiter (2010) and Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010) studies 
of this same issue.  Similarly, population is excluded as a variable because only Wiebelhaus-Brahm uses 
it and he argues it was relevant to human rights abuses, not rule of law or democracy.  Regional 
differences were also not included because, given the two groups being compared here, collinearity 
exists between the use of TRCs and amnesties and two of the regions, Latin America and Sub-Sahara 
Africa ( virtually all of the states in those regions conducted a TRC or an amnesty or both, leaving no 
possibility of variance).  Lastly, the intervening variable of war crimes trials is excluded as a variable 
because war crimes trials only occurred in a few cases.  Olsen, Payne, and Reiter used war crimes trials 
as a variable, but included trials that were primarily domestic trials conducted by authoritarian states to 
legitimate the new regime with trials held with international assistance used to provide justice.  Because 
of this lack of a standard definition of war crimes trials this variable was excluded. 
There are two datasets used in this dissertation to measure the two dependent variables—
democracy and the rule of law.  The data regarding democracy used for this dissertation comes from 
Polity IV and is expressed in terms of scores from -10 to +10 for the level of democracy in each state 
from 1981 to 2010.  The relation between a Polity IV score and the level of democracy in a state is clear, 
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the higher the positive score the more democratic a state is.  The democracy score is based on four 
composite indices, looking at the competitiveness of executive recruitment, the openness of executive 
recruitment, constraint on the executive and the competitiveness of political participation.  A -10 score 
connotes an institutional autocracy, with the same four factors plus one additional one, regulation of 
political participation (Polity IV, 2010, 15-16).  The Polity2, or adjusted Polity score, which is used here, is 
calculated by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score and adjusting three special 
situations that can occur in conflicted states, namely foreign interruption, anarchy and transition, so 
scores can be used for statistical analysis.  Without these adjustments the scores cannot be compared 
since the adjustments are coded as 66, 77 or 88 and will skew calculations of scores which range from -
10 to +10.  The adjustments are done by Polity IV and according to their Codebook are done for the 
purpose of allowing the conversion of these unusual scores to the conventional Polity IV scale (Polity IV 
Codebook, 17).   
According to the Adjusted Polity IV measure, states with high democracy scores are 
characterized by having executives recruited through elections rather than by force or designation by 
political elites, who are chosen in elections with two or more competition parties or are openly recruited 
by elites.  The executive is subordinate or equal to a legislature, chosen by an accountability group 
(parliamentary systems), with an unstable cabinet composition and competitive and enduring political 
parties (Polity IV Codebook, 2010, 20-27).  Parliamentary and presidential systems are equally 
acceptable. 
States with high autocracy scores tend to have the opposite characteristics of states with high 
democracy scores.  They tend to have executives selected by rigged elections or deposed during their 
term of office, executives who achieve office through hereditary succession, little restraint on the power 
of the executive with a weak or non-existent legislature, factionalization in political participation 
combined with the exclusion of some groups and repressed or suppressed political participation outside 
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of the ruling party or regime. (Polity IV Codebook, 2010, 20-28).  Many of these political systems are 
monarchies, military juntas, dictatorships, theocratic republics or states with single party systems.  Polity 
IV notes that some governments are a mixture of democratic and autocratic tendencies, often allowing 
more relaxed participation or political competition while retaining a strong executive.  Although they 
may have different types of political system, states with high autocracy scores share some things in 
common-low executive constraint, low or restricted political participation and fraudulent or controlled 
elections that do not reflect the public will. 
Polity IV data is not available for all states in the world and for some states it is unavailable 
during times of conflict.  All states with TRCs that include in this dissertation have Polity IV data for at 
least part of the time, although several states do not have data before 1991 because they were 
originally part of the Soviet Union and were not independent states in 1981.  All of the states in the non-
TRC control group had data from Polity IV for at least part of the period (except Bosnia Herzegovina).  
Many of them were also former Soviet bloc states that were not independent until 1991.  Bosnia 
Herzegovina is included in the statistical analysis of democracy only and is excluded from the dataset for 
rule of law.  Otherwise, all existing data from 1981 to 2010 is used for most states, for a total over two 
thousand cases are included in the dataset from thirty four states conducting TRCs and fifty states with 
violent conflicts and without a TRC. 12  Several states are excluded from the analysis of changes in mean 
in Chapter Four because they did not have a Polity IV or CIRI score prior to the TRC or end of conflict.  
The data regarding the rule of law comes from the CIRI Human Rights Dataset.  This dataset 
includes data from 1981 to 2010, therefore encompassing most of the years that TRCs have been 
utilized and all of the years of the TRCs included in this dissertation.  It also includes information from all 
states conducting TRCs which is an advantage over other datasets such as the Freedom House sub-
                                                          
12
 A case is a single year for a state in either the study group or control group.  Since most states have thirty years 
of data, most states are thirty cases for the dataset. 
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scores on rule of law, which are only available from 2006 and the World Justice Project which has data 
from a few states since 2008 but none before then (worldjusticeproject.org).  CIRI takes its data from 
the United States State Department Reports on Country Practices and from Amnesty International, 
giving the data a distinctly westernized aspect.  This can be problematic since the states involved in this 
dissertation are not western states, but it is currently the best, comprehensive dataset available.  This 
westernized aspect is particularly apparent in the dataset’s inclusion of two indexes involving exclusively 
women’s rights which include six points out of the total score for rule of law of thirty points, making 
women’s rights one-fifth of the total score. Women’s rights are of course important and because of the 
incidence of rape, sexual violence, sexual slavery and domestic violence during times of conflict, are 
particularly important in post-conflict states.  However, they tend to be lower in most Middle Eastern, 
Asian and African states.  In comparison, the factors normally associated with human rights such as 
torture, imprisonment, extrajudicial killing and disappearances are given a maximum score of eight out 
of thirty, only two points more than women’s rights.     
The CIRI database has scores from zero to thirty, with the higher score indicating a higher level 
of rule of law within the state.  Various sets of data were combined into composite indexes.  Scores of 
zero for all factors in the physical integrity composite index represent the practice being used 
frequently, one indicates occasionally and two indicates it did occur during the year. 13 The 
empowerment rights, such as freedom of speech and religion are given a score of zero when there is 
complete restriction of the right, one indicates some restriction of the right and two indicates no 
restriction of the right. 14   
 Women’s rights include such rights as the rights to vote, hold public office, receive equal pay for 
equal work, have job security, be free from sexual harassment in employment, the right to be free from 
                                                          
13
 The codebook indicates, however, that in situations where one or two violations were seen during a year and 
the violators were prosecuted, it should still be coded as a two.  CIRI Codebook, 2010, 6. 
14
 The codebook indicates, however, that in all states, even those with a score of two, some restrictions do occur.  
CIRI Codebook, 2010, 29. 
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discrimination, the right to work at night, and the right to work in the police or military.  Scores of zero 
indicate women have no political or economic rights or only men have political and economic rights, 
scores of one indicate there may be no laws discriminating against women but in fact they are 
extensively discriminated against at work or in government, scores of two indicate there are some legal 
protections for women but they are still less than thirty percent of the legislature or government jobs or 
some low level amounts of economic discrimination, while a score of three represents a state where 
women hold thirty percent or more of the seats in the legislature or parliament or are granted economic 
rights by law and those rights are enforced (CIRI Codebook, 2010, 65-76).  See Table 3.4 below for a list 
of the various factors and their relative weight.   
 
Table 3.4: CIRI Factors and Relative Weight 
Factor Composite Index Relative Weight 
   
Disappearance Physical Integrity 0-2 
Extrajudicial killings Physical Integrity 0-2 
Political imprisonment Physical Integrity 0-2 
Torture Physical Integrity 0-2 
Freedom of assembly and association Empowerment Rights Index 0-2 
Freedom of foreign movement Empowerment Rights Index 0-2 
Freedom of domestic movement Empowerment Rights Index 0-2 
Freedom of speech Empowerment Rights Index 0-2 
Electoral self-determination Empowerment Rights Index 0-2 
Freedom of religion Empowerment Rights Index 0-2 
Worker’s rights Empowerment Rights Index 0-2 
Women’s economic rights No composite 0-3 
Women’s political rights No composite 0-3 
Independence of judiciary No composite 0-2 
   
Total  0-30 
      Source:  CIRI Variable’s List and Short Descriptions 
 
 CIRI provides data for all of the states that conducted a TRC and the control regarding the rule of 
law during a portion of the temporal period.  Some states, primarily post Soviet Union states, only have 
data from 1991 and a few are missing data for selected years that fall during times of conflict.  This 
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missing data is excluded from the analysis but given that over two thousand cases (as defined in 
footnote 7 above) are included in this study, it has no effect on the analysis. 
 
Cumulative Intensity of Conflict 
The last variable is the intensity of the conflict for both the states conducting TRCs and the 
group of states with conflicts that did not conduct a TRC.  All states, even fully consolidated 
democracies, experience some form of armed conflicts in their histories.  The intensity of the conflict is 
what distinguishes minor conflicts from violent conflicts that threaten the stability of the government 
and the security of the people.  The expectation is that states which experience intense conflicts and 
conduct a TRC will have a greater improvement in democracy and rule of law than states that do not 
conduct a TRC. 
Here, states are coded "zero for each year until reaching a threshold of one thousand conflict-
related deaths, then are coded "one" for every year thereafter until the conflict is concluded.  PRIO 
calculates this measure by looking at the cumulative number of battle deaths from the beginning of an 
armed conflict to the end.  For example, Afghanistan has been involved in an internal conflict or an 
internationalized internal conflict since 1978 and has been given a score of one continuously since 1978. 
15  On the other hand, Algeria had a conflict that began as a low intensity conflict in 1991 with less than 
one thousand battle deaths, but by 1993 had accumulated enough battle deaths to have more than one 
thousand.  In 1994 the yearly total of battle deaths exceeded one thousand and stayed at that level with 
an intense conflict continuing thereafter.   
 
  
                                                          
15
 Only data from 1981 is used here, however. 
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Quantitative Tests 
Means Tests 
 There are two quantitative tests used in this dissertation.  The first test, a test of means, 
compares the mean democracy and rule of law scores before a TRC was conducted and compares that 
mean score to the next five years’ scores.  All states included in the study, whether having conducted a 
TRC or not, were included with the exception of states which did not have at least two years of data 
before the TRC or the end of the conflict.  16  Most states had five years of democracy or rule of law data 
after the TRC or conflict, but all had at least three except the third Malian conflict that ended in 2009. 
 After the means were established before and after the TRC or the conflict, the difference in 
scores was compared for both independent variables and states were divided into three groups-positive 
change in score, no change in score and negative change in score.  States experiencing less than a one 
point difference were included in the no change in score group.  The percentage of cases in each group 
of states conducting a TRC was then compared to the percentage of states not conducting a TRC. 
 An additional analysis of means was conducted, following the same format, to determine the 
differences in mean scores between states conducting different forms of transitional justice: a TRC and 
an amnesty, a TRC and no amnesty, no TRC and an amnesty, and no TRC and no amnesty.  The 
percentage of mean scores for each of the forms of transitional justice are then compared to determine 
which of the forms of transitional justice has the greatest percentage of states experiencing a positive 
change in democracy and rule of law. 
 The last test of means considered the independent variable of cumulative intensity.  Because 
the hypothesis only considers whether states that conducted TRC and experienced intense conflicts had 
higher democracy and rule of law scores, only the means for states with intense conflicts were 
                                                          
16
TRC states were only missing data for rule of law, with Afghanistan, East Timor, Lebanon and Serbia & 
Montenegro having insufficient rule of law data.  States not conducting a TRC also only missed data for rule of law, 
with Georgia, Comoros and Moldova having insufficient rule of law data. 
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compared.  Twenty seven states that conducted a TRC had intense conflicts, while thirty two states with 
a conflict that did not conduct a TRC had intense conflicts.  Like with the two variables above, states 
were divided into three groups, those with positive changes, no changes and negative changes in scores. 
Multivariate Regression Analysis Tests 
 The second form of statistical testing that was conducted consisted of a multivariate regression 
analysis of all forty TRCs and sixty three conflicts.  Data regarding the one hundred and three conflicts 
from 1981 to 2010 for the dependent and independent variables.  Each year from 1981 to 2010 was 
coded as a state/year.  A standard regression analysis with an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) conducted 
to test three hypotheses for each dependent variable, with the independent variables of TRC, amnesty, 
a combination of TRC and amnesty, and cumulative intensity used for the democracy variable.  An 
additional independent variable of revised Polity IV score was used for the rule of law variable.  Both 
regression models (democracy and rule of law as the respective dependent variables) were also 
subjected to a series of regression diagnostics, including tests for unusual and influential data points, 
normality of the residuals, multicollinearity, and homoscedasticity.  Tests for unusual or influential data 
points included checking the studentized residual and the leverage of each of the observations. No 
individual case had a studentized residual in excess of the recommended level of 2.5.   
In order to test the normality of the residuals kernel density plots were used, the results of 
which closely approximated the standard normal distribution. Finally the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality 
was used, confirming the normality of the data (Prob > z = .43). 
 To rule out multicollinearity two tools were used. The first was a correlation matrix of the 
variables which gave no indication of collinearity problems. The second was looking at the variance 
inflation factors which were acceptably low (mean VIF = 1.42 and 1.23 respectively).   To test for 
homoskedasticity White’s general test statistic was used. It produced a p-value of .371 well above the 
critical value of .05 required for rejection of the null hypothesis of constant variance.  
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 Case Studies-Liberia and Mozambique 
 Two case studies follow in addition to the quantitative testing of all states conducting TRCs and 
the control group of states.  Liberia and Mozambique were chosen as case studies because Liberia 
conducted a TRC and is part of that group while Mozambique is part of the control group.  Liberia 
conducted both a TRC and has had a de facto amnesty while Mozambique deliberately chose to make no 
formal efforts to seek transitional justice and issued both a blanket amnesty and has taken no action to 
conduct war crimes trials or a TRC.  Additionally, both Liberia and Mozambique suffered from similar 
civil wars, with massive fatalities and other casualties as well as internally displaced populations and 
refugees who fled to neighboring states.  There is one major difference between the two states, 
however.  The Liberian civil war was primarily caused by ethnic divisions while the Mozambican civil war 
was caused primarily by political and ideological differences.  The cause of the war may affect the ability 
of a state to improve democracy and the rule of law so the causes of the war will be discussed in the 
case studies as they relate to the efforts to bring about democracy and the rule of law. 
 For both case studies data from the same sources used in the quantitative study will be used-
Polity IV and CIRI.  However, the subscores, when available for both datasets will be utilized.  
Additionally, data on both democracy and rule of law from Freedom House and the Bertlesman’s 
Transformation Index will be utilized along with data regarding corruption from Transparency 
International.  Additionally, field research data from an October, 2011 trip to Liberia will be utilized 
along with Afrobarometer survey data and survey data from the Berkley Human Rights Center.  When 
possible, identical data sources will be used to make the best comparison possible.  When identical 
sources are not available the differences are noted.  The history of democracy in both states will be 
analyzed, using historical Polity IV and elections data, where available.  Very little historical data on rule 
of law is available but BTI has some historical information on rule on law, particularly regarding civil and 
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criminal justice and freedom of speech and association.  Where available, that historical data will be 
used to provide information about both states before their respective civil wars. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: DO TRCS WORK? 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the relationship between Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions (TRCs) and improvements in democracy and rule of law, using statistical analysis and to 
compare that relationship to states that experienced a conflict but either used amnesties instead of 
TRCs or used neither method of transitional justice.  I also test whether the intensity of the conflict 
affects changes in democracy and rule of law.  The ability of TRCs, amnesties or both TRCs and 
amnesties to promote democracy and the rule of law will be analyzed using data from both groups of 
states and comparing their experiences in democracy and rule of law since the TRC or the end of the 
conflicts. 
The data cover states that conducted a TRC between 1981 and 2010 or experienced a conflict 
that was concluded by 2010.  I examine the differences in democracy and rule of law scores before and 
after the TRC or the conflict to determine if there was an improvement or deterioration in democracy or 
rule of law scores after the TRC or end of the conflict.  As explained in detail in Chapter 3, data regarding 
democracy was derived from the Polity IV data set which scores democracy levels within a state from a -
10 to a +10.  Data regarding rule of law was derived from the CIRI index which looks at various factors of 
rule of law including physical integrity rights, empowerment, women’s political and social issues and the 
independence of the judiciary and scores the rule of law on a 0 to 30 point scale.  The data regarding 
conflict intensity comes from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) which looked at the cumulative 
level of battle deaths for individual conflicts from 1981 to 2010 and scored them as being either not 
intense if battle deaths were 0 to 999 and intense if battle deaths exceeded 1,000. 
The analysis was conducted to determine if states had a larger gain in democracy and the rule of 
law if they utilized one of the three forms of transitional justice:  TRCs alone, TRCs with amnesties, 
amnesties alone, or neither of the forms of transitional justice.  The TRC or the conflict must have ended 
by 2010 for there to be any data showing change since both the Polity IV and CIRI data are available 
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from 1981 to 2010 and are used here.  That fact that a state experienced gains in democracy does not 
show that the form of transitional justice was necessarily the cause of the gain, just that there is a 
relationship.  This issue will be explored in more depth in Chapters Five and Six in the case studies of 
Liberia and Mozambique. 
Table 4.1 below provides an overview of the data, including the descriptive statistics for both 
democracy and rule of law showing the number of cases and the minimum and maximum range for the 
variables tested in this dissertation.  I include data for thirty four states that conducted a total of forty 
TRCs and forty four states that had a total of sixty two conflicts and did not conduct a TRC from 1981-
2010, as described in Chapter Three.  A state/year is coded as 0 for TRC for the years prior to a TRC or if 
no TRC occurred and 1 from the year a TRC commenced to 2010.  Similarly, a state/year is coded as 0 for 
amnesty the years prior to an amnesty or three years after an amnesty and 1 for amnesty for the year 
an amnesty was issued and for the next three years.  A state/year is coded as 0 for cumulative intensity 
for the years prior to the total number of battle deaths in a conflict exceeding 1,000 and a 1 for the year 
battle deaths exceeded 1,000 to 2010.  The unit of analysis is a state/year, so most states have thirty 
years of data.   
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics  
 Number of cases 
(state/years) 
Minimum value Maximum value 
TRC Only  124 0 1 
Amnesty Only  787 0 1 
Both TRC and Amnesty  1110 0 1 
No Transitional Justice  213 0 1 
No Data  46 0 0 
Total Rule of Law (CIRI) 2268 0 30 
Total Polity IV 1975 -10 10 
Cumulative Intensity (data source) 2157 0 1 
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The empirical section that follows analyzes the relationship between the independent variable 
of TRCs as compared to amnesty or combinations of amnesties and TRC for both the democracy and rule 
of law dependent variables.  Six hypotheses, as set forth in Chapter Two, are tested first using an 
analysis of the changes in mean scores for democracy and rule of law scores five years from the date of 
the TRC or the end of the conflict to 2010 for each state individually and second using a multivariate 
regression analysis of all states that conducted a TRC or had a violent conflict for each variable to 
determine if a relationship exists between the independent and dependent variables.   
More states had more years of CIRI data on rule of law than Polity IV data but all states had 
some data available for either democracy or rule of law.  Most states had some form of transitional 
justice with the combination of a TRC and an amnesty being the most common form, followed by 
amnesty alone, no transitional justice method and lastly just a TRC.   
 
The Relationship between TRCs and Democracy 
 The first hypothesis relates to the relationship between TRCs and improvements in democracy.  
All cases in the group of states conducting a TRC and the group of states with conflicts that did not 
conduct a TRC are included and the unit of analysis is state/year.  The independent variable is the 
conduct of a TRC (whether in conjunction with an amnesty or not) and the dependent variable is the 
Polity IV democracy score.  The hypothesis and data analysis are below.  It is expected, based on the 
review of the literature, that states which utilized a TRC should have higher levels of democracy than 
states that did not conduct a TRC.  Expectations and the data regarding the variables of amnesty and 
cumulative intensity will be discussed below in the analysis of hypotheses two and three. 
  
Hypothesis One:  There is a positive relationship between a state having conducted a TRC and an 
increase in democracy. 
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As discussed in chapter two, many authors argue that the use of a TRC increases the level of 
democracy in states after a conflict has ended.  It is argued this occurs by the TRC assisting in the 
development of democratic institutions, trust in government, and a record of the offenses of the 
previous regime, or the truth, so the state can move toward a more open and responsive government.   
To test this hypothesis Polity IV democracy data from all countries experiencing a TRC were 
compared to the same data from states that had a violent conflict and did not conduct a TRC.  It is useful 
to examine the means of the individual states to see if there is a difference in means before the TRC and 
after the TRC in states that conducted a TRC, then compare that to the changes in means for states that 
did not conduct a TRC but had a violent conflict.  If TRCs had a positive impact on democracy, states 
conducting a TRC should experience a higher mean democracy score after the TRC than before the TRC.  
Two tests were conducted to analyze this relationship: an analysis of the means of all states before the 
TRC or end of the conflict and five years after the end of the TRC or conflict and a multivariate 
regression analysis. The five year period was chosen because arguably the biggest impact of a TRC 
occurs shortly after it occurred, while states are making efforts to implement recommendations and 
publication of the final report allows citizen access to information on the TRC.  For states that did not 
conduct a TRC the years immediately after the end of a conflict are most critical as states demobilize 
rebel groups, rebuild judicial institutions and remove members of the previous regime from power. 
For the first test, the various cases were individually analyzed to see if there were changes in 
democracy five years after the TRC or conflict ended.  The summary of the means for the group of states 
conducting a TRC and the group of states with conflicts not conducting a TRC is below as Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2 shows the percentage of states that experienced positive or negative change or no change 
within five years after a TRC was commenced or the conflict ended.  Most states conducting a TRC 
experienced either a positive change in democracy within five years of the beginning of the TRC or no 
change in democracy scores, with a total of 57.5% of states that conducted a TRC experiencing a positive 
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change while 20.0% of states that conducted a TRC experienced a negative change in democracy scores 
within five years of the TRC.  States in the group of states with conflicts that did not conduct a TRC 
experienced a substantially lower percentage of positive changes in democracy over the five year 
period, with 39.7% of the cases experiencing a positive change.  Most states (44.4%) not conducting a 
TRC experienced no change in democracy over the five year period.  This shows that in addition to the 
general trend toward higher democracy scores among states that conducted TRCs, states that did not 
conduct a TRC are more likely to experience no change in democracy after violent conflicts.  A t-test was 
conducted regarding the significance of the difference in means between states that conducted a TRC 
and those that did not.  The difference between the two groups was statistically significant at .000.  
   
Table 4.2: Change in Democracy in TRC States after the TRC and in 
States with Conflicts after the End of the Conflict 
 
                    
 
 
 
 
 
               Source:  Polity IV 
Below are Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 showing the distribution of those means among the states 
conducting a TRC and the group of states with conflicts that did not conduct a TRC.  A discussion of the 
states experiencing the highest and lowest changes in democracy scores and the effect of amnesties and 
the intensity of a conflict is included in the conclusions regarding democracy. 
  
 TRC Conducting 
States 
States Not 
Conducting a TRC 
Positive Change 0-5 Years After TRC  
or End of Conflict 
57.5% 39.7% 
No Change 0-5 Years After TRC  
or End of Conflict 
22.5% 44.4% 
Negative Change 0-5 Years After   
TRC or End of Conflict 
  20.0% 15.9% 
No Data   0.0%   0.0% 
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Figure 4.1:  Mean Changes in Democracy after 
TRC for States Conducting a TRC 17 
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 States with no data omitted from the figure. 
Figure 4.2:  Mean Changes in Democracy for 
Non-TRC States and a Violent Conflict 18 
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 States with no data omitted from the figure. 
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Lastly, a multivariate regression analysis was conducted regarding the relationship between 
some form of transitional justice and states conducting a TRC and states not conducting a TRC.  In coding 
the independent variable of a TRC, years prior to a TRC or years in states without a TRC were coded with 
a zero, while years with a TRC or after a TRC were coded as a one. All states which had Polity IV data 
were compared from 1981 to 2010.  It is expected, based on a review of the literature, that states which 
utilized a TRC should have higher levels of democracy than states that did not conduct a TRC.  
Expectations and the data regarding the variables of amnesty and cumulative intensity will be discussed 
below in the discussion on hypotheses two and three.  All states which conducted a TRC or had a conflict 
and Polity IV data were compared from 1981 to 2010.     
A multivariate regression analysis was used to compare the independent variables of the use of 
a TRC, amnesty only, the use of a TRC and amnesty together, or none of the forms of transitional justice, 
along with the cumulative intensity of the conflict, to determine if the independent variables 
significantly predicted the level of democracy of a state.  The results of the regression analysis indicate 
there is a positive relationship between democracy and TRC, although all of the variables included in this 
analysis only explain 3% of the variance (R2=.030, F(15.425).  They are significant at .000.  See Table 4.3 
below. 
States in the group of states that had conflicts and did not utilize any of the transitional justice 
methods had average Polity IV scores of .360 while states that conducted a TRC had Polity IV scores 
3.485 points higher.  The difference was statistically significant.  This regression shows that states that 
used a TRC experience dramatically higher and statistically significant levels of democracy as opposed to 
states without a TRC.  Although this shows a strong positive relationship between TRCs and increases in 
Polity IV democracy scores, it only provides 3% of the total explanation of the variation, leaving other 
variables not included in the model having more influence on the Polity IV score.  Democracy is a 
complex variable, affected by a variety of factors including the type of governmental system, levels of 
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ethnic fractionalization within the state, economic conditions, history of previous attempts at 
democracy, quality of institutions, and political culture of the state, among other variables.  TRCs have a 
limited effect on most of these factors. 
 
Table 4.3: Regression Analysis of TRCs, Amnesty,  
Cumulative Intensity and Democracy-TRC and non-TRC States 
 
Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .180 .032 .030 6.335 
a. Dependent variable: Corrected Polity Score 
b. Predictors:  (Constant) Both TRC and Amnesty, Cumulative Intensity, TRCOnly, AmnestyOnly 
 
ANOVA 
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares 
 
Df 
 
Mean Square 
 
F 
 
Sig. 
1             Regression 
               Residual 
               Total 
2476.493 
73972.260 
76448.753 
4 
1843 
1847 
619.123 
40.137 
15.425 .000 * 
a. Dependent variable: Corrected Polity Score 
b. Predictors:  (Constant) Both TRC and Amnesty, Cumulative Intensity, TRCOnly, AmnestyOnly 
 
Coefficents 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
 
 
T 
 
 
Sig. 
 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
1       (Constant) 
Cum. Intensity 
TRCOnly 
AmnestyOnly 
TRC and Amnesty 
.360 
-1.672 
3.485 
-.329 
1.225 
.444 
.348 
.930 
.505 
.505 
 
-.113 
.096 
-.025 
.097 
.810 
-4.808 
3.745 
-.651 
2.484 
      .418 
.000* 
.000* 
   .515 
   .013 
 
.953 
.799 
.352 
.345 
 
1.050 
1.252 
2.845 
2.902 
a. Dependent variable: Corrected Polity Score 
b. Predictors:  (Constant) Cumulative Intensity, TRCOnly, AmnestyOnly TRC and Amnesty 
  
Although the regression analysis appears to provide support for the hypothesis, other variables such 
as amnesties and cumulative intensity are included in the analysis and provide part of the explanation 
for the difference in democracy scores between states that conduct a TRC and states that experience 
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conflicts and do not conduct a TRC.  The discussion regarding the relationship between these variables 
and democracy is below. 
 
Comparison of TRCs and Amnesties and Improvement in Democracy 
The second hypothesis relates to the comparison of TRCs and amnesties and their relationship to 
improvements in democracy.  All cases in the group of states conducting a TRC and the group of states 
with conflicts that did not conduct a TRC are included and the unit of analysis is state/year.  The 
independent variable is in the conduct of a TRC or an amnesty or both and the dependent variable is the 
Polity IV democracy score.  It is expected, based on a review of the literature that states which utilized 
an amnesty should have lower levels of democracy than states that did not.  The hypothesis and data 
analysis are below. 
 
Hypothesis Two:  There is a greater change in democracy in post conflict states that utilized a TRC as 
opposed to amnesties. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, many authors state that states that conduct a TRC as compared to 
issuing an amnesty experience higher levels of democracy after a conflict has ended.  TRCs can promote 
democracy by providing for accountability for perpetrators of abuses during the previous regime and by 
allowing the removal of members of the previous regime.  It also allows for the spread of public 
knowledge of the actions of the previous regime.  When amnesties are issued instead of a TRC being 
conducted, no record is made of the abuses and perpetrators are freed from any accountability for their 
actions and often stay in office in the new regime. 
To test this hypothesis Polity IV data from all states conducting a TRC and from states not 
conducting a TRC but having experienced a conflict were compared to the same data from states that 
conducted a TRC and an amnesty and states that either just issued an amnesty or did neither an 
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amnesty nor a TRC.  Like with Hypothesis One it is useful to examine the means of the individual states 
to see if there is a difference in means before the TRC or the end of the conflict and after.  If TRCs have a 
positive impact on democracy, states conducing a TRC and no amnesty should experience a higher mean 
democracy score after the TRC than before.  States issuing an amnesty should experience lower mean 
democracy scores after the end of their conflicts or a negative change in democracy scores.  Two tests 
were conducted to analyze this relationship: an analysis of the means of all states before and five years 
after the TRC or end of the conflict and a multivariate regression analysis. 
For the first test, the means of all states were calculated five years after the TRC or the end of 
the conflict and compared to the means to the beginning.  Most amnesties are issued in an effort to 
bring closure to the violence and to allow the state to neutralize former rebels and their leaders by 
offering them amnesty from prosecution, usually within this five year period because that is the time 
when the demand for accountability is strongest and the new regime wants to neutralize former 
opponents.  States that conducted a TRC and issued an amnesty have the highest positive changes in 
Polity IV scores over this five year period with 68.2% of states experiencing positive change.  These 
states also experienced the lowest percentage of negative scores (4.5%) followed by states that did not 
conduct a TRC but did issue an amnesty (6.5%).  States that conduct a TRC and do not issue an amnesty 
also do very well, with 61.1% of those states experiencing a positive growth in democracy although 
16.7% of these states had negative changes in their democracy scores.   
By contrast, states that do not conduct a TRC and do not issue an amnesty have the lowest level 
of positive scores (28.1%) and the highest level of negative scores with 25.0% while states that do not 
conduct a TRC but do issue an amnesty having the third highest scores at (51.6%).  This shows that over 
this five year period states may have a greater improvement in democracy scores if they use one of the 
forms of transitional justice-either a TRC, amnesty or the combination of a TRC and amnesty.  States that 
use none of the methods have the lowest percentage of states experiencing a positive change and the 
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highest number of states experiencing a negative change.  States using TRCs, whether in conjunction 
with an amnesty or not, are also less likely to experience no change.  The difference between the two 
groups was not statistically significant, however, probably because states that do not conduct a TRC but 
do issue an amnesty are almost as likely to experience an improvement in democracy as states that do 
conduct a TRC. 
 
Table 4.4: Changes in Means for Democracy Five Years After the TRC and or the End of the Conflict for 
States Issuing or Not Issuing an Amnesty 
 
 
         Source: Polity IV, Olsen, Payne, and Reiter (2010) 
Over the five year period the means are highest if a TRC is conducted whether the state an 
amnesty or not.  This does provide support for Hypothesis Two.  However, the more important point 
may be that states that utilize one of the forms of transitional justice are more likely to see positive 
changes in democracy score than states that use none of the forms since states using none of the forms 
of transitional justice experience the lowest improvement in democracy scores and the highest negative 
change in scores of the four groups.  See Table 4.4 below.        
The second test was a multivariate analysis that was conducted regarding the relationship 
between amnesties and Polity IV scores and is set forth above in Table 4.3.  The dependent variable of 
amnesty is negatively related to the Polity IV democracy scores with a score of -.329 but the relationship 
is not statistically significant.  This is consistent with the means tests above which showed for states with 
 Conducted a 
TRC-No 
Amnesty 
Conducted a 
TRC-
Amnesty 
Did Not 
Conduct a 
TRC-No 
Amnesty 
Did Not 
Conduct a 
TRC-
Amnesty 
Positive change 0-5 years 
After TRC or End of Conflict 
61.1% 68.2% 28.1% 51.6% 
No Change 0-5 Years After 
TRC or End of Conflict 
5.6% 18.2% 46.9% 41.9% 
Negative Change 0-5 Years 
After TRC or End of Conflict 
16.7% 4.5% 25.0% 6.5% 
No Data 16.7% 9.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
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TRCs there was little difference whether an amnesty was issued or not but is inconsistent with the 
finding that states without a TRC experience higher positive change if they issue amnesty.  This may be 
partially explained by the fact that states issued amnesties at different time after their conflicts and that 
some amnesties were specific and some were general.  This is logical since amnesties, particularly 
general amnesties, can cause a backlash of hard feelings toward perpetrators who were not held 
accountable, a feeling that may lessen with time.  This finding is also subject to the note mentioned 
above regarding the low level of overall explanation of the analysis since TRCs, amnesties, and 
cumulative intensity together only explain 3% of the variation in scores.   
The variable of the combination of conducting a TRC and issuing an amnesty was also examined 
in this regression and that variable is also statistically insignificant although the score (1.225) is in a 
positive direction.  This is consistent with the both tests of means which showed that there is little 
difference in Polity IV scores between states that issued amnesties and conducted a TRC and those that 
did not issue an amnesty, but because it is statistically insignificant is does not support the hypothesis. 
 
The Effect of the Intensity of the Conflict on Democracy Scores 
 The third hypothesis relates to the effect of the intensity of a conflict on democracy.  All cases in 
the group of states conducting a TRC and the group of states with a conflict that did not conduct a TRC 
are included and the unit of analysis is state/year.  The independent variable is the level of intensity of a 
conflict and the dependent variable is the Polity IV democracy score.  It is expected, based on the 
literature, that states that had intense conflicts and conducted a TRC would experience higher 
democracy scores than states with intense conflicts who do not conduct a TRC.  The hypothesis and data 
analysis are below. 
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Hypothesis Three: States that experience intense conflicts with cumulative battle deaths in excess of 
one thousand and conduct a TRC experience higher democracy scores than states with intense 
conflicts who do not conduct a TRC. 
 As discussed in Chapter Two, authors argue that states that experience an intense conflict and 
conduct a TRC experience higher democracy scores than states that do not.  It is argued this occurs by 
providing accountability for the abuses that occurred during a conflict but avoids the exacerbation of 
tensions that a war crimes tribunal could cause after an intense civil war or a series of human right 
abuses.  Based on the literature it is expected that states that conduct a TRC will have higher democracy 
scores after an intense conflict than those who do not. 
 To test this hypothesis Polity IV democracy data from all states conducting a TRC were 
compared to all states not conducting a TRC, with cumulative intensity as the independent variable and 
Polity IV democracy score as the dependent variable.  Like with the previous two hypotheses, it is useful 
to examine the means of the of the democracy scores of the various states to determine if there is a 
difference in means before the TRC or the end of the conflict and after the TRC or end of the conflict.  In 
this hypothesis states fall into two groups: states that conducted a TRC and had intense conflicts and 
states that did not conduct a TRC and had intense conflicts.  The same tests of means and multivariate 
regression analysis were conducted for these groups of states. 
As with Hypothesis One and Hypothesis Two, the first analysis examines the mean of all states 
five years after the TRC or end of the conflict.  Data regarding that analysis are shown below in Table 4.5  
over the first five years states that experienced intense conflicts and conducted a TRC have a greater 
level of positive change in Polity IV scores (61.5%) as compared to states that experienced an intense 
conflict and did not conduct a TRC (40.6%).  States that conducted a TRC were also less likely to have a 
negative change (7.7%) than states that did not conduct a TRC (18.8%).  This supports the hypothesis 
that states experiencing intense conflicts are more likely to experience positive changes in democracy 
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scores if they conduct a TRC.  See Table 4.5 below.  However, the difference between the two groups 
was not statistically significant.  
 
Table 4.5: Comparison of Changes in Democracy in TRC States after the TRC  
and in States not Conducting a TRC Five Years After an Intense Conflict 
 
 TRC State and Intense 
Conflict 
Non-TRC State and Intense 
Conflict 
Positive change 0-5 years 
After TRC or End of Conflict 
61.5% 40.6% 
No Change 0-5 Years After 
TRC or End of Conflict 
15.4% 40.6% 
Negative Change 0-5 Years 
After TRC or End of Conflict 
7.7% 18.8% 
No Data 15.4% 0.0% 
        Source: Polity IV, PRIO 
 Finally a multivariate regression analysis was conducted regarding the effect of cumulative 
intensity on democracy.  Table 4.3 above shows the analysis that was conducted regarding the 
relationship between the independent variable of cumulative intensity and the dependent variable of 
Polity IV democracy score.  Cumulative intensity is negatively related to Polity IV democracy scores, with 
a score of -1.672 and the relationship is statistically significant at .000.  This is consistent with the 
expectation that more intense conflicts would result in lower Polity IV democracy scores and coupled 
with the positive change in democracy experienced by states that conduct TRCs is consistent with the 
tests of means above and therefore supports the hypothesis.  This finding is also subject to the note 
mentioned above regarding the low level of overall explanation of the analysis since these factors 
together explain only 3.0% of the variation in scores. 
 
Conclusions Regarding the Relationship Between TRCs and Democracy 
 TRCs are positively related to improvements in democracy in states after conflicts and have a 
greater impact than amnesties or the combination of amnesties and TRCs.  This remains true even if the 
conflict is intense.  The comparison of means to the multivariate regression analysis shows one potential 
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problem with a regression analysis alone-since states conduct TRCs and experience conflicts at different 
times, the fact that change in democracy may occur differently over a short period of time, such as the 
five years used here, opposed to longer terms creates an issue with interpretation.  Several states 
concluded their TRCs or conflicts within the past five years, the time period when the effects of a TRC or 
amnesty may be smaller than it is over the longer period of time.  This may result in a lower relationship 
between TRCs, amnesties, and conflict intensity and democracy being shown.  Therefore, a comparison 
of the means and the regression analysis provides a more comprehensive view of the relationship. 
 Both the test of means and the regression show that states that conduct a TRC experience 
higher democracy scores than states that do not conduct them.  This improvement in democracy scores 
occurs whether states issue an amnesty or have an intense conflict.  According to the regression 
analysis, the only significant factor is the conduct of a TRC and it is a robust and positive relationship.  
This is consistent with the test of means which shows over 18% of states conducting a TRC experience 
higher democracy scores than states without a TRC.   
It is helpful to understanding this relationship to examine in more depth states that experienced 
either positive improvements in scores or negative changes in scores for both groups of states. The two 
states that conducted a TRC and experienced the worst or lowest democracy scores after the TRC were 
Zimbabwe (1983) and Uganda (1986) both of which are in Sub-Saharan Africa and were early examples 
of TRCs. These cases, two of the earliest TRCs, were held before best practices for TRCs could become 
established.  The Zimbabwean TRC never released an official final report and the government issued a 
general amnesty for the perpetrators of the human rights violations, both of which could have affected 
the ability of the TRC to positively impact democracy scores.  Government human rights abuses were 
not fully investigated and no recommendations of the commission were followed by the government 
(Commission of Inquiry-Zimbabwe). The Ugandan TRC in 1986 followed an earlier TRC in 1974 that was 
conducted by Idi Amin and was used primarily to identify enemies of Amin’s administration (Truth 
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Commission-Uganda, 1974).  The 1986 TRC was somewhat better but the report was not widely 
disseminated and the recommendations were not adopted by the Ugandan government.  The United 
States Institute of Peace reports that the commission may have been used to legitimate the new regime, 
not investigate the truth of abuses (United States Institute of Peace-Uganda 1986).   
Both Uganda and Zimbabwe issued amnesties.  The Zimbabwean amnesties simply released 
perpetrators from any accountability for their actions.  Zimbabwe's failure to disseminate a final report 
or follow any of the recommendations of the commission also lessened any accountability (Transitional 
Justice Database-Zimbabwe).  The Ugandan amnesty gave an amnesty to former rebels and political 
prisoners, including member of the Uganda People’s Democratic Movement (UPDM), a precursor to the 
Lord’s Resistance Army that remains a rebel group in Uganda today (Transitional Justice Database-
Uganda).  In both cases, the amnesty coupled with an inadequate TRC process that did not unveil the 
truth about the conflict and did not disseminate information to the public is related to the failure to 
improve democracy within a state. 
The biggest gains in democracy among the states that conducted a TRC occurred in three Latin 
American states, Argentina (1983), Bolivia (1982), and Uruguay (1985).  These states were among the 
earliest to conduct a TRC and conducted them around same time as Uganda and Zimbabwe TRCs but 
with very different results in terms of democracy.  All three states experienced strongly positive changes 
in democracy scores after the TRC with Argentina having experienced a change in Polity IV scores from -
8 to +8 and Bolivia and Uruguay I having an increase from -7 to +9.  These three states had twenty five 
to twenty seven years since the TRC to improve democracy but all three saw dramatic improvements 
within the first five years after the TRC and sustained positive democracy scores.  Argentina’s report was 
published and widely disseminated although its hearings were not public.  Many of the 
recommendations were acted on and reparations were made to some victims (USIP-TRC-Argentina).   
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Unlike Argentina, in Bolivia the commission did not complete its work and no final report was 
issued.19  Some human remains were discovered but most of the work was not completed.  After the 
TRC halted, war crimes trials were held of some of the former government officials and non-
governmental agents which may have assisted in the transition to democracy in Bolivia (USIP-TRC-
Bolivia).  The first Uruguayan TRC did issue a final report but there was little official follow-up on its 
recommendations and it only considered a few cases of disappearances.  A trial of Tupamaros leaders 
was held in 1982 but no government officials or military were tried (Horvitz and Catherwood, 2006, 
450).   
Of the states with the biggest gains in democracy, Argentina (1983), Bolivia (1982), and Uruguay 
(1985) both Argentina and Uruguay issued amnesties.  Uruguay’s amnesty was for members of the 
armed forces while rebel forces were tried for war crimes (Transitional Justice Database-Uruguay).  
Argentina issued an amnesty for both former rebels and members of the military but the amnesty was 
later repealed in 2003 (Transitional Justice Database-Argentina).  However, Bolivia did not issue an 
amnesty until 1993 and still achieved a sixteen point increase in democracy scores over the five year 
period (Transitional Justice Database-Bolivia).  The presence of amnesties in these states that made 
substantial improvements in democracy after a TRC demonstrates that issuing an amnesty is not 
negatively related to democracy when a TRC is conducted (or at least started).  The last independent 
variable, the intensity of the conflict will be considered below in the discussion of states that did not 
conduct TRCs.   
 In the group of states that did not conduct a TRC and had a violent conflict, the states with the 
largest negative changes in democracy scores were Armenia (1994) with a negative score from +1 to -6 
and Azerbaijan (1995) with a negative score from +7 to +1.  Both Armenia and Azerbaijan had previously 
been part of the Soviet Union and gained independence in 1991.  After independence a separatist 
                                                          
19
 In fact the location of the records from the TRC is not known. 
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group, the Nagorno-Karabakh fought with Azerbaijan to join with Armenia.  The ongoing conflict brought 
down the government of Azerbaijan and destabilized Armenia with both states having committed war 
crimes and human rights abuses during the conflict (Human Rights Watch, 1994, xii).  Azerbaijan 
continues to have low Polity IV scores in 2010 while Armenia has scores that have improved to a +5 by 
2010.   At least in the case of Azerbaijan a TRC might have been able to resolve the conflict between the 
Azeri and Armenian populations, a problem which continues to this day because of the presence of both 
ethnicities in large portions of the state.   Armenia (1994) did not issue an amnesty while Azerbaijan 
issued several amnesties after the conflict but they were primarily for those involved in the coup 
attempt (Transitional Justice Project-Azerbaijan).   
The highest improvements in scores for states without a TRC were for the first Pakistan conflict 
in 1990 with an improvement of 11 points from a -3 to a +8 and the second Indonesian conflict in 1998 
with an improvement of 11 points from a -4 to +7.  Despite having not used a TRC these states had 
improvements similar to those of the highest performing states that conducted a TRC.  20 However, 
shortly after this five year period Pakistan experienced a military coup and its Polity IV scores 
deteriorated to a -5 in 2000.  Indonesia’s conflict that ended in 1998 with independence for East Timor 
was the conflict between Indonesia and the Revolutionary Front for a Free East Timor (Fretilin).  
Indonesia has maintained high democracy scores despite a conflict that ended in 2005 with the Free 
Aceh Movement (GAM), with scores improving from +5 to +8 after that conflict.  Indonesia has recently 
considered conducting a TRC regarding the conflict with GAM (Human Rights Watch, 2013, 9).  Pakistan 
did not issue an amnesty and while Indonesia did issue an amnesty in 1998 for the East Timor insurgents 
(Transitional Justice Database-Pakistan and Indonesia).  It should be noted that despite the 
                                                          
20
Indonesia returned to violent conflict after the period of improvement in democracy scores with the Tuareg 
Rebellion which is an ongoing conflict (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13881978). Pakistan experienced  
a military coup in 1996. 
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improvement in democracy scores both Indonesia and Pakistan later experienced another violent 
conflict. 
Finally, the fact that the independent variables of TRCs, amnesties, TRCs and amnesties, and 
cumulative intensity provide only 3.0% of the explanation for democracy shows there are a number of 
other variables that need to be considered.  Despite the amount of money being spent on TRCs to 
promote democracy it appears their real effect may be relatively small and that money should be 
directed toward other methods of transitional justice or improvements in the economy or governmental 
institutions. 
 
The Relationship Between TRCs and Rule of Law 
 The fourth hypothesis relates to the relationship between TRCs and improvements in rule of 
law.  All cases in the group of states conducting a TRC and the group of states with conflicts that did not 
conduct a TRC are included and the unit of analysis is state/year.  The independent variable is in the 
conduct of a TRC (whether in conjunction with an amnesty or not) and the dependent variable is the CIRI 
rule of law score.  The hypothesis and data analysis are below.  It is expected, based on the review of the 
literature, that states which utilized a TRC should have higher levels of rule of law than states that did 
not conduct a TRC.  Expectations and the data regarding the variables of amnesty and cumulative 
intensity will be discussed below in the analysis of hypotheses five and six. 
  
Hypothesis Four:  There is a positive relationship between a state having conducted a TRC and an 
increase in rule of law. 
As discussed in chapter two, many authors argue that the use of a TRC increases the level of rule 
of law in states after a conflict has ended.  It is argued this occurs by the TRC assisting in the creating 
institutions, creating trust in judicial institutions, and bringing out the truth about attacks on physical 
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integrity rights such as torture, extrajudicial killings and disappearances in previous regimes.  Detractors 
argue that TRCs can actually detract from the rule of law because they advocate impunity and lack of 
accountability by offering a TRC in the place of prosecution for human rights violations and war crimes.   
To test this hypothesis Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) rule of law data from all countries conducting a 
TRC were compared to the same data from states that had a violent conflict and did not conduct a TRC.  
Like with Hypothesis One it is useful to examine the means of the individual states to see if there is a 
difference in means before the TRC and after the TRC in states that conducted a TRC, then compare that 
to the changes in means for states that did not conduct a TRC but had a violent conflict.  If TRCs had a 
positive impact on rule of law, states conducting a TRC should experience a higher mean rule of law 
score after the TRC than before the TRC.  The same two tests were conducted to analyze this 
relationship: an analysis of the means of all states before the TRC or end of the conflict five years after 
the end of the TRC or conflict and a multivariate regression analysis.  
For the first test, the various cases were individually analyzed to see if there were changes in 
rule of law five years after the TRC or conflict ended.  The summary of the means for the group of states 
conducting a TRC and the group of states with conflicts not conducting a TRC is below as Table 4.6.  
Table 4.6 shows the percentage of states that experienced positive or negative change or no change 
within five years after a TRC was commenced or the conflict ended.  Most states conducting a TRC 
experienced either a positive change in rule of law within five years of the beginning of the TRC or no 
change in rule of law scores, with a total of 57.5% of states that conducted a TRC experiencing a positive 
change and 20.0% experiencing a negative change in rule of law scores within five years of the TRC.  
States in the group of states with conflicts that did not conduct a TRC experienced lower positive 
changes in rule of law scores over the five year period, with only 44.4% of the cases experiencing a 
positive change as opposed to 57.5% for states that conducted a TRC. Both groups of states had 
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comparable levels of states with negative changes with states conducting TRCs having 20.0% and states 
not conducting a TRC having 19.0% of the states experiencing negative changes in rule of law scores.   
 This demonstrates that although the general trend is toward higher rule of law scores 
among states that conducted TRCs, individual states experienced similar negative changes in rule of law 
scores compared to the group of states that did not conduct a TRC.  This supports Hypothesis Four 
because states conducting TRCs have overall more positive gains in rule of law scores over the five year 
period from the date of the TRC or the end of the conflict.  See Table 4.6 below.  The difference between 
the two groups was statistically significant at .000.  
 
Table 4.6: Change in Means for Rule of Law Five Years After the TRC or the End of the Conflict 
 
 TRC Conducting 
States 
States Not 
Conducting a TRC 
Positive Change 0-5 Years After TRC  
or End of Conflict 
57.5% 44.4% 
No Change 0-5 Years After TRC  
or End of Conflict 
22.5% 33.3% 
Negative Change 0-5 Years After   
TRC or End of Conflict 
  20.0% 19.0% 
No Data   0.0%   3.2% 
                   Source:  CIRI 
 
Below are Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 showing the distribution of those means among the states 
conducting a TRC and the group of states with conflicts that did not conduct a TRC.  A discussion of the 
states experiencing the highest and lowest changes in rule of law scores and the effect of amnesties and 
the intensity of a conflict is included in the conclusions regarding democracy. 
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Figure 4.3:  Mean Changes in Rule of Law After 
TRC for States Conducting a TRC 21 
 
 
 
                                                          
21
 States with no data omitted from the figure. 
Figure 4.4:  Mean Changes in Rule of Law For 
Non-TRC States and a Violent Conflict 22 
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 States with no data omitted from the figure. 
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Iraq II 
Macedonia 
Uzbekistan I 
Uzbekistan II 
Bangladesh II 
Mali IV 
Thailand II 
Burkina Faso 
Trin. & Tobago 
Uzbekistan III 
Venezuela I 
Egypt 
Mexico I 
Pakistan II 
P. New Guinea 
Senegal 
Syria 
Bangladesh I 
Comoros I  
The Gambia 
Georgia II 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Iran 
Iraq I 
Israel 
Niger I   
Pakistan I 
Spain III 
Angola 
Azerbaijan 
Croatia 
Georgia III 
Indonesia II 
Libya 
Malaysia 
Mali I 
Spain I 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Spain II 
Rep. of the Congo 
Cuba 
Djibouti 
Mali II 
Mexico II 
Thailand I 
Indonesia III 
Mali III 
Vietnam 
Laos 
Namibia 
Niger II 
Mozambique 
Cambodia 
Lesotho 
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Lastly, a multivariate regression analysis was conducted regarding the relationship between 
some form of transitional justice and states conducting a TRC and states not conducting a TRC.  In coding 
the independent variable of a TRC, years prior to a TRC or years in states without a TRC were coded with 
a zero, while years with a TRC or after a TRC were coded as a one. All states which had CIRI data were 
compared from 1981 to 2010.  It is expected, based on a review of the literature, that states which 
utilized a TRC should have higher levels of rule of law than states that did not conduct a TRC.  
Expectations and the data regarding the variables of amnesty and cumulative intensity will be discussed 
below in the discussion on hypotheses five and six.  Factors such as GDP per capita, population size and 
regional differences were not included for the same reasons they were excluded from the analysis of 
democracy.  
A multivariate regression analysis was used to compare the independent variables of the use of 
a TRC, amnesty only, the use of a TRC and amnesty together, or none of the forms of transitional justice, 
along with the cumulative intensity of the conflict, to determine if the independent variables 
significantly predicted the level of democracy of a state.  The results of the regression indicate there is a 
positive relationship between rule of law and TRC, with all of the variables included in this analysis 
explaining nearly 45% of the variance (R2=.447, F(297.901).  They are significant at .000.  See Table 4.7 
below. 
States in the group of states that had conflicts and did not utilize any of the transitional justice 
methods had average CIRI scores of 12.520 out of a possible 30 points, while states that conducted a 
TRC had CIRI scores 4.085 points higher.  The difference was statistically significant at .000.  This 
regression shows that states that used a TRC experience higher and statistically significant levels of rule 
of law as opposed to states without a TRC.  This explanation of the variance, along with amnesty, a 
combination of TRC and amnesty, cumulative intensity and corrected Polity IV scores provide nearly one 
half, substantially better than the democracy variable did.  It appears that TRCs may have a greater 
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effect on rule of law than on democracy, which is expected since much of the work of a TRC is related to 
providing at least a modicum of accountability and exposure of abuses that led to a conflict. 
 
Table 4.7: Regression Analysis of TRCs, Amnesty, Cumulative Intensity and  
Rule of Law-TRC and non-TRC States 
 
Model Summary b 
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .669 .448 .447 4.740 
a. Predictors:  (Constant) Corrected Polity IV score, Both TRC and Amnesty, Cumulative Intensity, TRCOnly, 
AmnestyOnly 
b. Dependent variable: Total Rule of Law 
 
ANOVAa 
 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares 
 
Df 
 
Mean Square 
 
F 
 
Sig. 
1             Regression 
               Residual 
               Total 
33468.973 
41209.670 
74678.643 
5 
1834 
1839 
6693.795 
22.470 
297.901 .000 * 
a. Dependent variable: Total Rule of Law 
b. Predictors:  (Constant) Corrected Polity IV score, Both TRC and Amnesty, Cumulative Intensity, TRCOnly, AmnestyOnly 
 
Coefficents a 
 
a. Dependent variable: Total Rule of Law 
b. Predictors:  (Constant) Corrected Polity IV score, Both TRC and Amnesty, Cumulative Intensity, TRCOnly, AmnestyOnly 
 
Although the regression analysis appears to provide support for the hypothesis, other variables such 
as amnesties and cumulative intensity are included in the analysis and provide part of the explanation 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
 
 
T 
 
 
Sig. 
 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
1       (Constant) 
Cum. Intensity 
TRCOnly 
AmnestyOnly 
TRC and Amnesty 
Corrected Polity IV 
Score 
12.520 
-4.015 
4.085 
2.789 
2.968 
.562 
.333 
.263 
.699 
.379 
.380 
.017 
 
-.273 
.114 
.216 
.231 
.568 
37.609 
-15.281 
    5.842 
7.368 
7.821 
32.226 
.000* 
.000* 
.000* 
.000* 
  .000* 
.000* 
 
 
.942 
.792 
.351 
.344 
.968 
 
1.062 
1.263 
2.848 
2.910 
1.033 
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for the difference in democracy scores between states that conduct a TRC and states that experience 
conflicts and do not conduct a TRC.  The discussion regarding the relationship between these variables 
and rule of law is below. 
 
Comparison of TRCs and Amnesties and Improvement in Rule of Law 
The fifth hypothesis relates to the comparison of TRCs and amnesties and their relationship to 
improvements in rule of law.  All cases in the group of states conducting a TRC and the group of states 
with conflicts that did not conduct a TRC are included and the unit of analysis is state/year.  The 
independent variable is in the conduct of a TRC or an amnesty or both and the dependent variable is the 
CIRI rule of law score.  It is expected, based on a review of the literature that states which utilized an 
amnesty should have lower levels of rule of law than states that did not.  The hypothesis and data 
analysis are below. 
 
Hypothesis Five:  There is a greater change in rule of law in post conflict states that utilized a TRC as 
opposed to amnesties. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, many authors state that states that conduct a TRC as compared to 
issuing an amnesty experience higher levels of rule of law after a conflict has ended.  TRCs can promote 
rule of law by providing for accountability for perpetrators of abuse, spreading public knowledge of the 
actions of the previous regime, particularly those that were threats to physical integrity by exposing the 
killings, kidnappings, extrajudicial killings, and torture that occurred.  It can also rebuild trust in 
government and the judicial system and empower groups.  When amnesties are issued instead of a TRC 
being conducted, no record is made of the abuses and perpetrators are freed from any accountability 
reducing the ability to increase trust and reduce corruption. 
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To test this hypothesis CIRI data from all states conducting a TRC and from states not conducting 
a TRC but having experienced a conflict were compared to the same data from states that conducted a 
TRC and an amnesty and states that either just issued an amnesty or did neither an amnesty nor a TRC.  
Like with the discussion of democracy above, it is useful to examine the means of the individual states to 
see if there is a difference in means before the TRC or the end of the conflict and after.  If TRCs have a 
positive impact on rule of law, states conducing a TRC and no amnesty should experience a higher mean 
rule of law score after the TRC than before.  States issuing an amnesty should experience lower mean 
rule of law scores after the end of their conflicts.  The same tests were conducted for rule of law as were 
conducted for democracy:  an analysis of the means of all states before and five years after the TRC or 
end of the conflict and a multivariate regression analysis. 
For the first test, the means of all states were calculated five years after the TRC or the end of 
the conflict and compared to the means to the beginning.  Most amnesties are issued in an effort to 
bring closure to the violence and to allow the state to neutralize former rebels and their leaders by 
offering them amnesty from prosecution, usually within this five year period.  States that conducted a 
TRC have positive changes in Polity IV scores over this five year period, but states that conducted a TRC 
and did not issue an amnesty experienced a lower percentage of positive scores (50.0%) compared to 
states that did issue an amnesty (63.6%).  States that do not conduct a TRC had the lowest percentage of 
positive scores with states issuing an amnesty having slightly higher scores (45.2%) than states that did 
not issue an amnesty (40.6%).  States that did not conduct a TRC also had a much higher percentage of 
negative scores with states not using any of the three methods of transitional justice having the highest 
percentage of negative scores (34.4%) and states issuing an amnesty having a slightly lower percentage 
(32.3%)   
Unlike with the democracy scores where states that used neither a TRC nor an amnesty 
experienced the most positive changes in scores, states that conduct a TRC and issue an amnesty 
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experience the highest percentage of positive changes.  However, states that use a TRC and issue an 
amnesty also had the highest percentage of negative changes in CIRI scores with 36.4% of state 
experiencing negative changes in CIRI scores.  The states experiencing the lowest percentage of changes 
in CIRI scores were states that did not conduct a TRC but did issue an amnesty.  See Table 4.8 below.  
Unlike with the democracy test of means, the differences here is statistically significant at .036.  This 
may be because amnesties are more related to the rule of law than democracies.   
 
Table 4.8: Changes in Means for Rule of Law Five Years after the TRC and or the End of the Conflict  
for States Issuing or not Issuing an Amnesty 
 
 Conducted a 
TRC-No 
Amnesty 
Conducted a 
TRC-
Amnesty 
Did Not 
Conduct a 
TRC-No 
Amnesty 
Did Not 
Conduct a 
TRC-
Amnesty 
Positive change 0-5 years 
After TRC or End of Conflict 
50.0% 63.6% 43.8% 40.6% 
No Change 0-5 Years After 
TRC or End of Conflict 
27.8% 18.2% 18.8% 19.4% 
Negative Change 0-5 Years 
After TRC or End of Conflict 
22.2% 18.2% 34.4% 32.3% 
No Data 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 6.3% 
         Source: CIRI 
 
 The last test was a multivariate analysis that was conducted regarding the relationship between 
amnesties and CIRI scores and is set forth above in Table 4.7.  The dependent variable of amnesty alone 
is positively related to the CIRI rule of law scores with a score of 2.789 and the relationship is statistically 
significant.  The variable of amnesty coupled with a TRC is also positively related to the rule of law with a 
score of 2.968 and the relationship is also statistically significant.  The relationship is not as strong as the 
independent variable of TRC only which had a score of 4.085 as discussed above regarding Hypothesis 
Four. 
This is consistent with the means tests above which showed that states that utilized a TRC or an 
amnesty or both a TRC and an amnesty experienced higher positive scores that states which used none 
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of the methods of transitional justice.  However, it is not consistent with the means tests which show 
that states that conducted a TRC and issued an amnesty experienced the highest mean rule of law 
scores.  The regression analysis illustrates there is a higher positive relationship between TRCs and rule 
of law than amnesties.  The differences may be related to the different types of amnesties issued.  It 
may also be a reflection of the fact that, as noted with regard to Hypothesis Two, attitudes towards 
amnesties may change for the positive over time, particularly if a state does not return to a violent 
conflict.  Because the regression analysis does not reflect this change over time, this could partially 
explain these differences. 
 The variable of the combination of conducting a TRC and issuing an amnesty was also examined 
in this regression and that variable is statistically significant with a positive score of 2.968.  This is 
consistent with the test of means over the five year period show showed states that conducted a TRC 
and issued an amnesty had the highest percentage of states experiencing positive changes in rule of law 
scores although the regression analysis shows that states that just conduct a TRC experience higher rule 
of law scores.  Both the test of means and the regression analysis show improvement in rule of law 
scores occurs whether states issue an amnesty or not.   
 
The Effect of the Intensity of the Conflict on Rule of Law Scores 
 The sixth hypothesis relates to the effect of the intensity of a conflict on rule of law.  All cases in 
the group of states conducting a TRC and the group of states with a conflict that did not conduct a TRC 
are included and the unit of analysis is state/year.  The independent variable is the level of intensity of a 
conflict and the dependent variable is the CIRI rule of law score.  It is expected, based on the literature, 
that states that had intense conflicts and conducted a TRC would experience higher rule of law scores 
than states with intense conflicts who do not conduct a TRC.  The hypothesis and data analysis are 
below. 
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Hypothesis Six: States that experience intense conflicts with cumulative battle deaths in excess of one 
thousand and conduct a TRC experience higher rule of law scores than states with intense conflicts 
who do not conduct a TRC. 
 As discussed in Chapter Two, authors argue that states that experience an intense conflict and 
conduct a TRC experience higher rule of law scores than states that do not.  The rationale for the 
relationship is the same as the rationale for the relationship between democracy and cumulative 
intensity. 
 To test this hypothesis CIRI rule of law data from all states conducting a TRC were compared to 
all states not conducting a TRC, with cumulative intensity as the independent variable the and CIRI rule 
of law score as the dependent variable.  Like with the previous hypotheses, it is useful to examine the 
means of the of the rule of law scores of the various states to determine if there is a difference in means 
before the TRC or the end of the conflict and after the TRC or end of the conflict.  In this hypothesis 
states fall into two groups: states that conducted a TRC and had intense conflicts and states that did not 
conduct a TRC and had intense conflicts.  The same tests of means and multivariate regression analysis 
were conducted for these groups of states. 
The first analysis examines the mean of all states five years after the TRC or end of the conflict.  
Data regarding that analysis are shown below in Table 4.9.  over the first five years states that conduct a 
TRC have a greater level of positive change in CIRI rule of law scores (52.0%) as compared to states that 
do not conduct a TRC (21.9%).  However, states that conducted a TRC were more likely to have either a 
negative change (36.0%) than states that did not conduct a TRC (18.8%).  See Table 4.9 below.  The 
difference between the two groups was not statistically significant, however. 
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Table 4.9: Comparison of Changes in Rule of law in TRC States and in States  
not Conducting a TRC Five Years After an Intense Conflict 
 
 TRC State and Intense 
Conflict 
Non-TRC State and Intense 
Conflict 
Positive change 0-5 years 
After TRC or End of Conflict 
52.0% 21.9% 
No Change 0-5 Years After 
TRC or End of Conflict 
12.0% 59.4% 
Negative Change 0-5 Years 
After TRC or End of Conflict 
 36.0% 18.8% 
No Data  0.0%  0.0% 
        Source: CIRI, PRIO 
 Finally a multivariate regression analysis was conducted regarding the effect of cumulative 
intensity on rule of law.  Table 4.7 above shows the analysis that was conducted regarding the 
relationship between the independent variable of cumulative intensity and the dependent variable of 
CIRI rule of law score.  Like with democracy, intense conflicts are negatively related to CIRI rule of law 
scores, but the relationship is much greater with a score of -4.105 for rule of law, compared to -1.672 for 
the democracy variable.  The relationship is statistically significant at .000.  This is consistent with the 
expectation that more intense conflicts would result in lower CIRI rule of law scores and, coupled with 
the robust score for TRCs and rule of law, is consistent with the hypothesis.   
 
The Effect of Corrected Polity IV Democracy Score on Rule of Law 
The last independent variable included in the multivariate regression analysis was the corrected 
Polity IV democracy score.  It is expected that states with higher Polity IV democracy scores that conduct 
a TRC would experience higher rule of law scores.  One explanation for this relationship may be that 
many states choose a TRC as a transitional justice method because they are making a general 
movement toward democracy at the same time as the TRC. 23  The corrected Polity IV score, which 
is significant and has an effect on the rule of law scores shows that for every one point increase in Polity 
                                                          
23
 No states that were democracies at the time of the TRC are included in this study other than South Africa and 
Ghana as explained in Chapter Three. 
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IV score there is a .562 increase in the rule of law score.  See Table 4.7 above for the regression analysis 
that shows this relationship.  This reflects the fact that although rule of law and democracy are related, 
they are measuring other things as well.  In the case of rule of law, the factors involving empowerment, 
judicial independence and women’s rights would clearly be related to democracy, but the physical 
integrity factors would not normally be part of an index of factors for democracy, making the two 
measures different.  A state with a higher level of democracy would have an increased level of rule of 
law, but it is not equal.  If democracy and rule of law were perfectly related there would be a 1.5 point 
increase in rule of law for every point increase in democracy since Polity IV is on a 21 point scale and 
CIRI is on a 30 point scale.  Instead of 1.5 the gain is only .562, showing that although they are related 
they are still reflecting other factors.   
 
Conclusions Regarding the Relationship Between TRCs and Rule of Law 
 TRCs are positively related to improvements in rule of law in states after conflicts and have a 
greater impact than amnesties or the combination of amnesties and TRCs.  This remains true even if the 
conflict is intense, although intense conflicts have a greater negative effect on rule of law scores than on 
democracy scores where cumulative intensity is not statistically significant as a variable.  The 
comparison of means to the multivariate regression analysis shows similar findings for both tests.   
There is a difference in states regarding their experience in gains in rule of law than in 
democracy.  Bolivia (1982) had a large increase for both democracy and rule of law, but South Africa 
(1995) had the greatest improvement, from 9 to 23, of all states that conducted a TRC.  South Africa’s 
improvement for democracy, by comparison, was only 4 points.  As noted in the discussion of 
democracy, Bolivia is a state that conducted its TRC twenty eight years ago, before best practices for 
TRCs were established, but was able to achieve substantial increases in both democracy and rule of law 
within a five year period.  It is possible that Bolivia’s choice to conduct war crimes trials in addition to 
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the TRC improved their democracy and rule of law scores.  There may also be other factors not 
considered here that contributed to their improvement. 
South Africa’s improvement in rule of law is easier to explain.  Its TRC was started in 1995, after 
best practices were established and is the most commented on TRC in the literature.  Although South 
Africa made improvements in all the rule of law categories, the greatest improvements occurred in the 
area of empowerment where rights such as freedom of speech and assembly were extended to the 
black population after the end of apartheid (CIRI-South Africa).  South Africa also received considerable 
international support for the improvement of these empowerment rights.  South Africa is probably best 
known, however, for its controversial amnesty program in its TRC which allowed perpetrators to receive 
amnesty if they appeared at the TRC and admitted to their actions (Gibson, 2005, 324). 
In the group of states that did not conduct a TRC and had a violent conflict, the states with the 
greatest improvement in democracy scores were states that had conflicts from 1997 to present day.  
The highest improvements in scores were for Lesotho (1998) and Cambodia (1998).  Despite having not 
used a TRC these states had improvements similar to those of the highest performing states that 
conducted a TRC, with Lesotho experiencing a 9 point increase, and Cambodia a 7 point increase.  
 Lesotho’s violent conflict in 1998 was caused by allegations of fraudulent elections and the 
inability of the winning party to control the state after the election.  Lesotho had experienced several 
suspect elections during its history, including an election with the results overturned by the courts and a 
second election where the losing party refused to leave office.  After an intervention by South Africa and 
Botswana peace was restored and the electoral system was amended to provide for broader 
representative for groups in Lesotho (Southall, 2003, 274).  Lesotho improved in both physical integrity 
and empowerment rights after the intervention and amendment to the electoral and their rule of law 
scores have remained high since 1998.  Cambodia had been involved in a twenty year civil war that 
ended in 1998 with the election of a coalition government following a coup against the prime minister 
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(Freedom in the World-2013-Cambodia).  Most of the improvement in rule of law scores for Cambodia 
relate to the improvement of empowerment rights such as freedom of speech and association while 
physical integrity rights have remained lower.  While Cambodia did see a substantial increase in their 
rule of law scores between 1998 and 2004, since 2005 their scores have deteriorated due to decreasing 
physical integrity and empowerment scores (CIRI-Cambodia).  Both Lesotho and Cambodia also 
experienced improvements in democracy after their conflicts but were not the states with the largest 
improvements.   
Cambodia issued a blanket amnesty for all Khmer Rouge leaders and for all crimes committed 
during the civil war.  However, in 1997 the Extraordinary Chamber for the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) 
was created to try five Khmer Rouge leaders for war crimes committed despite the amnesty.  The law 
establishing the ECCC required that the ECCC not issue an amnesty or pardon and left the issue of the 
previous amnesty to be decided by the court (ECCC Laws on the Establishment, 2001).  Lesotho did not 
issue an amnesty around the time of the coup attempt in 1998 but an amnesty was granted in 2007. 
The state experiencing the greatest negative change in democracy was Eritrea (2008) with rule 
of law scores deteriorating from a thirteen to a four.  Eritrea achieved independence from Ethiopia in 
1991 and its leader was chosen in 1991 by a transitional government.  In 2008 Eritrea had a conflict with 
Djibouti which was resolved.  To date Eritrea has not held a national election and repression of 
empowerment rights have continued from 2001 to date.  Physical integrity rights have also continued to 
deteriorate (Freedom House-2013-Eritrea).  Because the reason for the deterioration of rule of law 
relate to repression of rights related to independence and the authoritarian government a TRC might 
help Eritrea once the current government leaves office, but until then would probably not be of 
assistance in improving rule of law.   
Armenia (1994), the state with the one of the lowest democracy scores, also has negative rule of 
law scores with a -4.  Armenia’s physical integrity scores have remained fairly high, with a six out of a 
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possible eight points, but their scores for empowerment rights continue to deteriorate.  The 
deterioration is probably due to continued electoral conflicts within the state.  Armenia could be a state 
that would benefit from a TRC which could explore the electoral violence and subsequent government 
repression.  Azerbaijan (1995), the other state with the highest negative scores in democracy, had a 
positive score in rule of law over this five year period but its rule of law scores have deteriorated since 
2002 as more disputes with the Armenian portion of the population have occurred (Freedom House-
2013-Azerbaijan).  Like Armenia, Azerbaijan could benefit from a TRC to address the ethnic issues that 
lead to continued repression.  Neither Eritrea nor Armenia has issued amnesties (Transitional Justice 
Database-Eritrea, Armenia). 
 Both the test of means and the regression show that states that conduct a TRC experience 
higher rule of law scores than states that do not conduct them.  This improvement in rule of law scores 
occurs whether states issue an amnesty or have an intense conflict.  According to the regression 
analysis, all of the factors are significant and TRCs have the highest impact with a positive score of 4.085.  
Like with democracy, the conduct of a TRC has a robust and positive relationship with rule of law.  This is 
consistent with the test of means which shows over 13% of states conducting a TRC experience higher 
rule of law scores than states without a TRC.   
 Finally, unlike for democracy where all of the independent variables only provided 3.0% of the 
explanation for democracy, the variables for rule of law are all statistically significant and provide almost 
45% of the explanation.   For states considering a TRC to affect an increase in rule of law this is a positive 
result.  Both the test of means and the regression show that states that conduct a TRC experience higher 
rule of law scores than states that do not conduct them.  This improvement in rule of law scores occurs 
whether states issue an amnesty or have an intense conflict.   
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CHAPTER FIVE: LIBERIA AND THE STRUGGLE TO FIND BALANCE                                                       
The people of Liberia suffered through two of the worst civil wars in modern times from 1989 to 
1996 and from 1999 to 2003, with over 250,000 deaths and over a million Liberians becoming internally 
displaced, out of a population of less than four million.  During the wars, several hundred thousand 
Liberians also fled Liberia to neighboring countries and to the West to escape the violence, destabilizing 
the neighboring countries with the influx of refugees.  The violence in Liberia was not confined to 
soldiers and rebel forces; most civilians suffered as well, with children forced to become soldiers being 
particularly impacted.  Children as young as six were forced to become soldiers and in many cases were 
forced into sexual slavery, prostitution, drug use, cannibalism and torture (TRC of Liberia-Preliminary 
Report, 44).  Twenty eight per cent of the violations the violations reported to the TRC conducted from 
2005 to 2009 were committed against women, a number that probably underestimates the true extent 
of gender-based violence due to the historically unreported nature of rape and sexual abuse (TRC of 
Liberia-Preliminary Report, 44-45).   The country was also economically devastated with many 
businesses damaged, foreign concerns nationalized and exploited for personal gain by President Taylor 
(1997-2003), much of the infrastructure damaged or destroyed and the youngest part of the population 
suffering from stunted growth brought on by malnutrition caused by the interruptions in agricultural 
output.      
Liberia emerged from the second civil war in 2003 in horrific condition, with its governmental 
institutions, infrastructure and judicial systems in tatters and as one of the poorest countries in the 
world.  It also had extremely high levels of unemployment, infectious diseases, child malnutrition, and a 
low life expectancy (CIA World Fact Book-Liberia).  More critically, it needed the largest United Nations 
(UN) peacekeeping mission in the world to keep the peace and bring security to the country, with over 
fifteen thousand military personnel and over one thousand police officers being sent to Liberia by the 
UN in 2003 (Security Council Resolution 1509, 2003).  The effects of the war have not ended yet; forty 
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two percent of the population remained malnourished in 2011 and both infants and pregnant women 
suffer very high rates of anemia (Poverty Reduction Strategy Final Report 2008-2011, 30).  In 2012 was 
Liberia was 182th out of 187 countries in the world in human development, illustrating the long-lasting 
impacts of the war (Report on the Situation of Infant and Small Child Feeding in Liberia). 
This case study of the Liberian TRC will analyze the questions of whether the TRC has aided 
Liberia in making the transition to democracy it has been attempting since 2003 and whether it is 
leading to improvements in the rule of law.  There are several conclusions regarding the relationship 
between the Liberian TRC and democracy that are reached in this case study.  The first conclusion is that 
in the case of Liberia there does not appear to be a clear relationship between the TRC and the growth 
of democracy, with most improvements in democracy occurring before the TRC in 2006.  Second, there 
have been some improvements in the rule of law in Liberia, particularly in terms of improvements in 
corruption and physical integrity, but like with democracy the relationship with the TRC is unclear.   
Lastly, although there have been improvements in the rule of law since the end of the civil war, the 
failure to lustrate or prosecute perpetrators of the worst abusers during the civil war has limited 
accountability and the rule of law in Liberia.   
In order to determine the relationship between the Liberian TRC and democracy and rule of law, 
this case study of Liberia reviews the political history of Liberia, particularly the history that relates to 
the ongoing ethnic division between the indigenous population and the Americo-Liberians who trace 
their ancestry to freed slaves brought to Liberia (or in later cases who traveled voluntarily to Liberia) to 
establish a free state.  This ethnic division has persisted since the beginning migration of freed slaves 
and has impacted the ability of Liberia to both make the transition to democracy and to establish the 
rule of law.  This case study then looks at the TRC conducted in Liberia which was designed, in part, to 
bring about democracy and the rule of law and analyzes the TRC’s effectiveness in achieving these 
objectives. It also describes and considers the impact of the de facto amnesty for alleged war criminals 
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on democracy and the rule of law.  The next chapter, a case study of Mozambique, will compare the 
findings in Liberia to Mozambique, a state that did not utilize a TRC but did use extensive amnesties, to 
compare and contrast the two states relative movement toward democracy and the rule of law. 
 
Background-Liberia 
Liberia is a West African nation slightly larger in size than Tennessee.  It is a small country, with a 
population in 2013 of almost four million people.   Most of its population is African, with tiny minority 
populations of Syrians and Lebanese residents who are not citizens but are doing business in the 
country, plus a few groups tracing their origins back to Barbados and the United States.  Most Liberians 
are Christians, with a minority population of Muslims (approximately 12%) and a small number of 
indigenous religions.  Liberia has a long coastline and claims territorial jurisdiction out to two hundred 
nautical miles.  Despite its long coastline, farming is the most common occupation because of the cost 
involved in commercial fishing (CIA World Factbook-Liberia).  Life expectancy is only 57.41 years, one of 
the lowest in the world.  Unlike many other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, like Botswana and South Africa, 
this is not due to its HIV/AIDS rate which is only 1.5%, but is due to the risk of exposure to infectious 
disease, including malaria, hepatitis, yellow fever and rabies. Only 4% of the rural population and 25% of 
urban dwellers have access to sanitation, exacerbating health issues.  Over 20% of children under the 
age of five are underweight and infant and maternal death rates are high (CIA World Factbook-Liberia).  
There are limited medical facilities and Liberia has only one licensed psychiatrist for the entire country, 
although the Ministry of Health is attempting to train psychiatric nurses and assistants (voanews.com).   
Unemployment in Liberia is reported at 85%, the third highest rate in the world and 80% of the 
population are reported to live below the poverty line with many employed in the informal sector of 
petty trading to make enough money to feed their families.  Liberia’s GDP per capita of $700 is the fifth 
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lowest in the world (CIA World Factbook-Liberia). 24  However, Liberia’s economy is growing at a fast 9% 
per year as of 2012, indicating that current poverty and unemployment rates may actually be lower than 
reported (indexmundi.com). 
Liberia is currently peaceful and has undergone two elections, one in 2005 and a second in 2011, 
since the peace agreement was signed.  Despite allegations of fraud made by the losing party in both 
elections and a boycott by the rival Congress for Democratic Change (CDC) party of the runoff election in 
2011, international observers believe both elections were relatively free and fair.  The first elected 
African female head of state, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, of the Unity Party, was elected in 2005 and re-
elected in 2011.  There was some sporadic violence after the election results were announced in 2011, 
with one death and the burning of some party property, as well as demonstrations and protests before 
the run-off election which resulted in injuries and unconfirmed deaths, but the violence was limited 
(Akam and Schmall, 2011).  As of 2012 the United Nations (UN) maintains approximately nine thousand 
armed personnel and another fifteen hundred volunteers and civilian personnel (Security Council 
Resolution 2066, 2012).   
 
History of the Conflict 
Prior to the American intervention in Liberia in 1822 Liberia was settled by a variety of ethnic 
groups from the surrounding areas, including groups from modern day Guinea, Sierra Leone and Côte 
d’Ivoire.  This diverse settlement is reflected in modern day Liberian demographics: there are at least 
twenty eight ethnic groups according to the CIA World Fact Book, including the Kpelle 20.3%, Bassa 
13.4%, Grebo 10%, Gio 8%, Mano 7.9%, Kru 6%, Lorma 5.1%, Kissi 4.8% and the Gola 4.4% (CIA World 
Fact Book-Liberia).  About 2.5% of the population is Americo-Liberia, or descendants of American slaves 
brought to Liberia from the United States.  There are also some non-Liberian tribal groups including the 
                                                          
24
 These figures are somewhat misleading since it has not been updated since 2000 for poverty and since 2003 for 
unemployment, both while the second civil war was still in progress.  
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Mandingo who are Muslim traders and the Fanti fisherman who are from Ghana and two non-African 
groups made up of Syrians and Lebanese who mainly trade and run businesses in Liberia (Ethnic-Groups 
Liberia). 
Due to its location on the coast of West Africa Liberia was the subject of early European 
exploration, including from early Spanish in the thirteenth century, Normans in the fourteenth century 
and Portuguese in the fifteenth century.  None of these groups settled or colonized Liberia, however, 
although later Portuguese and British groups took slaves as part of the Atlantic slave trade.  Later 
exploration by the Dutch, French and Swedes resulted in more trade, but not colonization 
(Massachusetts Colonization Society, 1831). 
Interest in colonizing Liberia began It after the slave uprising in Santo Domingo in 1791.  Groups 
became concerned about the possibility of a slave uprising in the United States and the American 
Colonization Society (ACS) was formed by American slaveholders and Quakers for the purpose of 
returning free blacks to Africa to quell the possibility of revolt.  In 1820 the ACS sent its first group of 
free blacks to Liberia and purchased land to build a colony first in Sierra Leone, and then in Liberia when 
it was determined Sierra Leone was too “unhealthy” for the new settlers.  Cape Mersurado was forcibly 
purchased in the area of modern Monrovia from the local king and after a period of turmoil within the 
group, the colony was successfully established.  Groups other than the ACS also sent free blacks to 
Liberia to lessen their political and social impact in the United States.  The colony was originally ruled by 
appointees by the ACS but eventually appointed a black governor from among the settlers.  In 1846 the 
colony declared its independence.  After the American Civil War some freed slaves moved to Liberia 
along with some immigrants from Barbados (American Memory from the Library of Congress). 
The importation of free blacks from the United States and Barbados set up a two tiered system 
of political and social rights within the new country of Liberia.  Immigrants felt themselves superior to 
the indigenous population and the same segregation methods used against blacks in the United States 
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were used to keep the Liberian indigenous populations in a lower class.  All of the early presidents of 
Liberia were born in the United States, with Hilary Richard Wright Johnson (1884-1892) being the first 
Liberian born president, although both of his parents were born in the United States.  President Arthur 
Barclay (1904-1912) was the last president to be born outside of Liberia; he was born in Barbados.  
Regardless of place of birth, all presidents of Liberia were Americo-Liberians until Samuel K. Doe became 
president in 1980 after a coup d'état conducted against President William R. Tolbert, Jr.  Moses Blah, 
who completed Charles Taylor’s 2003 presidential term, was the second indigenous president 
(Liberiapastandpresent.org).  
This continual marginalization of the vast majority of the population by a tiny minority created 
problems for Liberia that persist today.  Dennis (2008), himself Liberian and a social psychologist, 
explains this marginalization as a process whereby free blacks, rejected and without status in their own 
country of the United States, but also rejected by the indigenous population and Liberia, did not fit into 
either the white or black world and therefore came to reform and reinvent Liberia into an American 
African country, not to become part of the country.  They were able to retain power only by virtue of 
being placed in power by white colonial powers and by dint of receiving foreign loans and the assistance 
of Christian organizations (11). 
This power continued throughout the history of Liberia, with the Americo-Liberians staying in 
power through their control of the political process, schools and jobs.  Only Americo-Liberians were 
accepted into the True Whig Party, the ruling party of Liberia from 1878 to the coup in 1980.  Non-
Americo-Liberians were not allowed to work in government or in the military until the 1970’s and 
weren’t even recognized as citizens until 1904.  Education, infrastructure and services were not 
extended into the non-coastal areas of Liberia, where most indigenous Liberians lived, until well into the 
twentieth century and there remains today a distinct imbalance between the inland areas and the 
coastal areas.   
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This difference in opportunities between the two groups continues to this day to be a source of 
conflict in Liberia and led, in part, to the civil wars.  The Liberia Project, conducted by the Berkeley 
Human Rights Center in November and December of 2010 polled Liberians on their priorities and 
priorities the government should have and 69%, particularly in rural areas, cite education as the top 
priority for government (Berkeley Human Rights Center, 2011, 27).  This reflects the perception of this 
continuing imbalance between the largely indigenous rural areas and Americo-Liberian urban areas.  
Many Liberians also cite the need for government to improve infrastructure (39%), access to health 
services (42%), and jobs (56%), while only 8% think the government should improve the rule of law and 
only 6% think it should strengthen justice.  The most remote counties of Maryland and Grand Kru 
support infrastructure as a priority by 63% and 72% respectively (Human Rights Center, 2011, 28).  The 
same problems caused by the inequality between the groups in the nineteenth century continue to this 
day in Liberia. 
 
The Beginning of the Civil Wars 
Prior to the coup d'état in 1980 by Samuel Doe, Liberia had had a succession of presidential 
elections and successful alternations of power when each elected president took office.  However, first 
the Republican Party and then the True Whig Party were so dominant in Liberian politics that most 
elections until 1955 were single party elections, and the multi-party elections after 1955 saw the True 
Whig Party garner over 95% of the vote, making elections not really multi-party.  For example, in the 
1959 election, the losing independent candidate William O. Davies-Bright only earned a total of 55 votes 
out of 530,621 votes (Elections in Liberia).   
After the coup in 1980 the first truly multi-party election occurred in 1985, which allowed 
parties from all ethnic groups to compete, but was won in the highly suspect election by Samuel Doe 
and the National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL).  Doe had previously banned two candidates, 
108 
 
. 
Baccus Mathews and Amos Sawyer from the election and imprisoned or detained a number of his 
opponents until after the election.  He also removed all of the members of the elections commissions 
and replaced them with his associates.  After it appeared he was losing the election he closed the 
counting and had the remaining ballots counted secretly, winning with a small margin (50.9%) to make it 
appear to be a fair election (Adebajo, 2002, 29).  The NDPL also won twenty two out of twenty six seats 
in the parliament.  The election results were supported by the United States, which also provided 
extensive financial aid to Liberia, as part of the general support for non-Communist states as part of the 
Cold War (pbs.org). 
Doe’s regime originally started out as a protest against Americo-Liberian rule but needed the 
cooperation of the Americo-Liberians to run the country due to his and his followers’ lack of political or 
bureaucratic experience.  As he ceded more power to the Americo-Liberians, his hold over Liberia was 
weakened and he was brutally executed in 1990 by Prince Johnson. 25  Both Johnson and Charles Taylor 
laid siege to Monrovia and most opponents of Taylor fled Liberia, including Amos Sawyer who was to 
become the interim president of Liberia after the death of Doe in 1990 to 1994.  Sawyer was an 
educated man who went on to obtain a PhD from Northwestern University and teach in the United 
States after making an effort to confront and stop some of the worst abuses of the Doe regime as 
president.  Sawyer was made the interim president as a compromise between the Economic Community 
of African States (ECOWAS) and the rebels, but was unable to control the country because much of 
Liberia was in the hands of Charles Taylor and Prince Johnson, leaving Sawyer able to control only the 
capital city of Monrovia (answers.com/Amos_Sawyer). 
Unfortunately for Liberia, this led to the rise of Charles Taylor as president in 1997 after Sawyer 
stepped down in 1994 and after three years of upheaval.  Charles Taylor was the son of an Americo-
Liberian father and a mother who was a member of the Gola tribe.  Despite his mixed heritage, Taylor 
                                                          
25 Prince Johnson is currently a member of the Liberian Senate because he was a leader of one of the warring factions and committed the 
offenses of killing, extortion, massacre, destruction of property, force recruitment, assault, abduction, torture & forced labor, and rape.  As of 
August of 2013 he is still a member of the Senate and no prosecution has been attempted. 
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was primarily aligned with the Americo-Liberians, having studied economics at Bentley College in the 
United States and being the president of a radical Liberian student group that demonstrated in the 
United States against President Tolbert in 1979.  When he returned to Liberia he joined with Samuel Doe 
but fled Liberia in 1983 after allegations were made regarding embezzlement by Taylor.  In 1989 he 
invaded Liberia from the Cote d’Ivoire and became involved in the civil war, supported by many 
Americo-Liberians, including at one point the current president of Liberia, Johnson-Sirleaf, in the conflict 
against president Doe. Taylor used his power to extract diamonds and other resources and to attack 
neighboring Sierra Leone and seize control of the country.  Taylor was elected president in 1997 and his 
rule of Liberia was as destructive or more so than Doe’s with the death and mutilation of thousands of 
people, embezzlement of large amounts of money, war crimes, use of child soldiers, and cannibalism 
(President Charles Ghankay Taylor).   
Elections are not necessarily the solution to civil war and violence and Liberia’s experience with 
Taylor after the election is an example of this.  Taylor used his position immediately after the election to 
punish his former opponents in the civil war and strip the country of assets for his personal gain.  He was 
able to use his position as president to benefit personally from foreign businesses doing business in 
Liberia, particularly the mineral industry (Sessay, Ukeje, Gbia and Ismail, 2009, 41-42).  Taylor was 
considered an Americo-Liberian and favored people from that class initially, only to eventually use 
people from the Gio and Mano tribes along with soldiers from Burkina Faso.  Taylor left Liberia in a 
political, cultural and economic shambles (43-44).  When he left office in 2003 and went into exile and 
then into custody in the Hague, Liberia experienced a transitional government and then the elected 
government of President Johnson-Sirleaf.  However, Sessay, Ukeje, Gbia and Ismail note that the current 
president and everyone who ran against her for office in 2005 and 2011, with the exception of George 
Weah who had no political experience (he was a professional soccer player), had extensive connections 
to the Americo-Liberian group that had ruled Liberian since its inception.  For example, although 
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President Johnson-Sirleaf has both Americo-Liberian and indigenous parents, she was part of the ruling 
Americo-Liberian class, serving as a minister of the True Whig Party and fleeing Liberia in 1980 when 
Doe, the first non-Americo-Liberian, took office (47-48).  This makes it difficult for groups other than 
Americo-Liberians to develop trust regarding the president’s ability to reconcile groups in Liberia.  This 
lack of trust impacts on the ability of the state to improve rule of law and the continued marginalization 
of the indigenous population of Liberia also affects the ability of the state to make the transition to 
democracy. 
 
History of Liberian Democracy 
Prior to the peace agreement in 2003 Liberia had never been a democracy and in fact during 
most of its history was virtually a one-party authoritarian state. Immediately after independence in 
1846, although it was not a democracy Liberia had some aspects of democracy, with its executive having 
significant restraints from the legislature rather than from their own choice.  During this time, although 
Liberia was under the control of the Americo-Liberian group, the executive was constrained.  Political 
participation was restricted, primarily because only one group was allowed to vote and there was 
limited political competitiveness but there were some vestiges of democracy. 
From 1884 to 1980 the constraints on the executive fell, with the power of the legislature 
becoming limited but still able to pass some legislation and limit some executive actions.  It also had an 
independent judiciary and periodic attempts to change the rules of the game by changing constitutional 
provisions to provide for executive power were defeated.  Liberia was a one-party state during the 
entire period and politics were dominated by the Americo-Liberians.  Political participation by other 
groups was severely restricted but did exist for the ruling group.  Although Liberia still had some of the 
aspects of a democracy, the emphasis on a strong executive and limited political participation kept it 
from becoming a consolidated democracy.    
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In 1980, with the coup d'état by Doe, executive restraint changed to unlimited authority, 
characterized by the ignorance of limitations in the constitution, suspension of constitutional provisions 
at the discretion of the executive, no legislature or one without any real power, no real measures of 
accountability, no power by the legislature over the executive and rule by decree.  The same restrictions 
applied to political participation, but given the power of the executive, political participation was of less 
value.   Participating by voting for a legislator or asking for the help of a legislator would have been of 
little value given the strength and almost total control of the executive.  The power of the executive led 
to the repression of competitiveness and all opponents were dealt with harshly.  Liberia moved from 
some aspects of democracy before 1980 to a fully autocratic state under Doe’s regime (Polity IV-Liberia). 
The first civil war ended in 1996 with the Abuja Peace Accords and in 1997 the country held 
national elections for the first time since 1985.  The presidential election was won by Charles Taylor with 
75% of the vote and the election was accepted as being somewhat legitimate by international observers, 
including the Carter Center.  The Center “…concluded that the 1997 Liberia Special Elections must be 
assessed in the context of the broader peace process.  Given the recent years of conflict and pervasive 
fear that Charles Taylor would return to war if not elected, many Liberians made a calculated choice that 
they hoped would promote peace and stability” (Observing the 1997 Liberian Special Elections Process 
in Liberia).  The international peacekeepers withdrew from Liberia and most of the armed factions 
withdrew.   Executive constraint improved slightly from the Doe administration, to an intermediate 
category showing some slight control by either the legislature or groups of the executive.  Participation, 
however, was sectarian and the various groups within Liberia were unable to work together.  Taylor 
continued to stress the ethnic barriers among the various ethnic groups and to favor his own tribal 
group, eliminating educated people and anyone who could challenge his rule.  His regime also had a high 
level of factionalism, with ethnic backed political factions that ignored and repressed other groups and 
pursued their own agendas rather than common agendas.  Taylor finally resigned as president of Liberia 
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in 2003, leaving his vice president to negotiate peace (Liberiapastandpresent.org).  The judiciary 
remained weak under Taylor’s rule and its independence was interfered with by the executive, leading 
to little judicial independence (Polity IV).  The second civil war ended in 2003 and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf 
was elected in 2005 in a free and fair election to serve as president.  Legislative elections were also held.  
Although there were some slight improvements during President Taylor’s regime, the lack of political 
participation and the continued strength of the Presidency kept Liberia an autocracy.  At the time of the 
peace agreement and President Taylor’s resignation in 2003 Liberia had made strides toward democracy 
which were completed by the successful election of President Johnson-Sirleaf in 2005.  The Liberian TRC 
was negotiated and agreed upon by the government and two belligerent groups, the Liberians United 
for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MDM) in the 
General Peace Agreement in 2003 to provide for peace and reconciliation and to bring about 
accountability for the human rights abuses and violations of the laws of war during the two civil wars.   
 
The Decision to Conduct a TRC in Liberia 
 
Liberia’s TRC was ordered by the National Transitional Government of Liberia in an effort to 
bring closure to the problems from the two civil wars and years of ethnic and class conflict.  Liberia 
turned to a TRC in 2005, rejecting calls for a war crimes tribunal similar to the one in neighboring Sierra 
Leone; as a result, the only Liberian to be tried for war crimes was the former president of Liberia, 
Charles Taylor, who was tried by the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SC-SL), not a Liberian court only for 
offenses that occurred in Sierra Leone (Mandate Special Court for Sierra Leone).   
The 2005 peace agreement stated that the TRC was being conducted to address impunity and to 
allow victims and perpetrators to share experiences and promote healing and reconciliation.  The TRC 
was organized to explore the causes of the civil wars and provide restitution for victims of the war 
(Article XIII Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians 
United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) 
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and Political Parties).  It began its proceedings in 2006 and ended in 2009.  Although the international 
community had an influence on the TRC, providing funding and through the International Technical 
Advisory Committee (ITAC) assistance with implementing the mandate, the TRC was primarily domestic 
with nine Liberian commissioners of diverse professional and regional backgrounds were chosen by the 
transitional commissioner, including four women, who were given the responsibility  to conduct 
hearings and prepare a report regarding violations of human rights and international humanitarian law 
from 1979 to 2003 in Liberia (Institute of Peace-Truth Commission-Liberia).   
Liberia’s TRC was mandated to make recommendations that would promote peace, justice and 
reconciliation in Liberia, not specifically to improve democracy.  However, the goals of the TRC to bridge 
the gap between the Americo-Liberians and indigenous population and to provide for accountability for 
abuses are related to democracy.  The final report was issued in 2009 and included widely publicized 
recommendations for prosecution and for lustration, both of which were highly controversial.  Two 
commissioners refused to sign the final report in protest of those two recommendations.  The TRC’s 
recommendations have remained unpopular in Liberia among the groups involved in the war and 
generally in government, particularly the lustration provisions (James-Allen, Weah and Goodfriend, 
2010, 7-10).  The TRC’s recommendations to the government of Liberia in their final report show an 
attempt to promote democracy on the part of the TRC but the question that remains is how the TRC 
promotes democracy.    
Liberia’s TRC, conducted eleven years after the well-known South African TRC, was different 
from South Africa’s in its design; there was no effort to provide an amnesty for offenders who came 
forward to provide testimony during public hearings and confessed to human rights abuses and 
violations of the law.  In fact the Liberian TRC recommended prosecution and lustration of a large 
numbers of Liberians it concluded had committed crimes during the civil war.  The TRC provided a 
certain amount of due process by conducting public hearings, a publicly released report and widespread 
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dissemination of the report, allowing the population to be aware of its findings and recommendations 
and is therefore, a good example of a state conducted TRC that satisfies criticisms of the lack of due 
process of earlier TRCs and the fact of amnesty for offenders in the South African TRC.   
However, one constraint on the effect of the TRC on democracy is the fact that the principal 
recommendations regarding lustration and prosecution were never implemented.  One of the major 
controversies from the TRC was the recommendation regarding lustration for certain political figures, 
including the current president, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf for a period of thirty years (Final Report of TRC, 
14.3).  The failure of Johnson-Sirleaf to either resign or adopt the recommendation and order the 
lustration of other political figures may have reduced confidence in the government.   
In addition to the president, the TRC report also recommended the prosecution of over one-
hundred leaders of warring factions and perpetrators of the egregious violations including Prince 
Johnson, current senator in the Liberian Senate (Final Report of TRC, Annex 3).  Not only was Prince 
Johnson not prosecuted, he finished third in the 2011 presidential election (Lean and Gerring, 2012).   To 
date, there have been no prosecutions of offenders in the civil wars, domestic or international, other 
than Charles Taylor who was prosecuted as a result of the SC-SL and international pressure rather than 
from the efforts of Liberia.  Sierra Leone, which was involved in many of the same events as Liberia, 
prosecuted eleven Sierra Leoneans in addition to the Liberian Charles Taylor, including members of two 
rebel groups and one group that supported the Sierra Leonean government in the war. Three of the 
defendants died during the trial but eight, plus Charles Taylor, were convicted of various war crimes 
(Special Court for Sierra Leone, Fourth Annual Report and Ninth Annual Report).    
In 2012 a member of Liberia’s House of Representatives proposed a bill to have a war crimes 
court in Liberia to prosecute people bearing the greatest responsibility for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law and Liberian law committed since December, 1989 but as of 2013 no 
action had occurred on the bill (Twenty-fourth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United 
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Nations Mission in Liberia-S/2012/641).  Human Rights Watch has issued a briefing paper suggesting 
that a war crimes tribunal similar to the Sierra Leonean one might be set up by the Security Council, but 
that has not yet occurred (Human Rights Watch, 2009, 1). 
 
Measures of Democracy in Liberia 
This section utilizes the detailed country report data from Polity IV and the explanation of the 
various numerical scores from 1847 to 2012 to examine the evidence of democracy in Liberia.  Polity IV 
data discussed in Chapter Three and Four in the context of the data for the cross national analysis is also 
available historically for individual states (Polity IV-Liberia).  Additionally election data and data from 
field research conducted by the author in 2011 in Liberia will be utilized.   
Polity IV’s analysis of democracy goes back to 1847 for Liberia, the year it declared its 
independence.  Liberia had never been a democracy during its history until 2006, according to Polity IV 
and from 1884 to 1980, the year of the coup, had scores from a -4 to a -6, making it considered a 
profoundly authoritarian state.  Its scores from 1981 to 2012 are shown below in Figure 5.1 and reflect 
the turmoil of the two civil wars and Doe’s reign followed by the slow recovery with the peace 
agreement in 2003 to 2012. From 1884 to 1980 the constraints on the executive fell from a seven to a 
three, indicating slight to moderate limitations on executive authority.  This indicates a time when the 
power of the legislature was limited but they are able to pass some legislation and limit some executive 
actions, there is an independent judiciary and attempts to change the rules of the game by changing 
constitutional provisions to provide for executive power were defeated.   
Liberia scored a 1, making it slightly more democratic than authoritarian in 2003 and since has 
progressed to a score of 6, showing the country to be considered democratic, although not fully 
consolidated.  The improvement from a -6 to a zero that occurred in 1990 reflects the relative stability of 
Amos Sawyer’s presidency from 1990 to 1994 and the election in 1997 of Charles Taylor which was 
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assessed as a passable election, particularly as compared to Doe’s take over by force previously (The 
Democracy Project, 1997, 7). Liberia had begun the movement toward democracy shortly after the end 
of the second civil war in 2003 and reached a positive six the same year as the commencement of the 
TRC.  Its Polity IV score has been stable at positive six since 2006, showing no change in democracy from 
end of the TRC in 2009 to 2012.  See Figure 5.1 below. 
 
Figure 5.1:  Polity IV scores for Liberia-1981-2012.  
Lines show the beginning and end of the TRC 26 
 
 
Source:  Polity IV-Liberia 
 
The Relationship Between the TRC and Democracy in Liberia 
 
This section on democracy will explore the goals set out in the TRC final report and their effect 
on democracy in Liberia, looking at the Polity IV index in more detail for Liberia along with survey data 
from the Human Rights Center of the University of California at Berkeley on Liberian responses to the 
TRC and efforts toward democratization.  Brahm (2010) suggested five phenomenon that link TRCs to 
improvements in democracy.  They are:  1) they contribute to the loss of authoritarian power and help 
to create democratic alternatives by identifying problems and recommending institutional changes that 
promote accountability and increase civilian control over the military, 2) they allow several divergent 
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groups to be heard regarding their concerns, 3) they are often created as part of a general movement 
within a state to democratic values, 4) they assist in the removal of enclaves of non-democratic power 
by naming names of perpetrators (or at least exposing their actions (23), and 5) they contribute to 
stability and the growth of democracy by “(re)building a sense of shared destiny among groups giving 
them a stake in the ‘national project’ and through shaming perpetrators, thereby depriving them of 
support that might otherwise encourage them to protect their interests through extra-constitutional 
means”  (23-24).    
All five of Brahms’ phenomenon appear to at least have been goals of the Liberian TRC 
recommendation although they were achieved to greater or lesser extent in places and in others may 
still be desires that were not accomplished by the TRC. First, the TRC recommended that military and 
civil service personnel not be allowed to campaign for candidates or be members of political parties to 
lessen their influence over the various parties (18.1). This was not carried out.  They also recommended  
the creation of the Independent National Human Rights Commission (INHRC) to insure accountability 
and to promote human rights (18.7) and that people holding public office in Liberia be free from 
corruption, competent and have a good human rights record (18.10).  The INHRC was created but has 
been ineffective due to its inability to enforce the two provisions in the TRC final report calling for 
lustration and criminal prosecution.  This aspect of the TRC recommendations would assist with 
promoting accountability and lessening of authoritarian power. 
Second, the TRC recommended construction of a political culture that would be tolerant of all 
groups, including opposition political groups (18.1), women (18.5), children (18.6) and the poor (18.9.1).  
The commission not only recommended tolerance but also that civil society be used to give a voice to 
those groups, including public funding for political parties (18.2).  The TRC itself conducted hearings 
throughout the country and in several places in the world which allowed various groups to be heard.  
The recommendations bring together a variety of groups to be involved in the future of Liberia, 
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particularly women’s groups and also tries to address the class differences between the Americo-
Liberians and the indigenous groups. 
Third, the TRC was created as part of the general movement toward democracy in Liberia.  It 
was made part of the negotiations in the peace agreement and Liberia, according to Polity IV, had 
started a movement toward democracy with the signing of the peace agreement in 2003 and become a 
democracy in 2006 after its successful election in 2005.  The TRC started its work in 2006 and was part of 
this general movement toward democracy and reflects a commitment on Liberia’s part toward 
democracy and away from its authoritarian past. 
Fourth, because the Liberian TRC named names of perpetrators and recommended prosecution 
and lustration, the fourth and fifth goals were clearly intended by the Liberian TRC although not realized 
by the TRC.  The failure to prosecute and lustrate perpetrators indicates a failure to meet these two 
goals.  The fact that no prosecutions or lustrations have occurred, particularly in view of the fact that 
lustration was recommended for the sitting President Johnson-Sirleaf who not only continued in office 
after the report and recommendations were released but was also reelected in 2011, shows this 
recommendation was clearly not followed.  The lustration recommendation was later declared 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Liberia because the provision was made without providing any 
process for people who were lustrated to contest the lustration.  Another recommendation, that for 
prosecution of various rebels involved in the war, including Prince Johnson who is currently a Senator in 
Liberia, has not been found unconstitutional but given the extremely poor condition of the Liberian 
justice system it is unlikely war crimes prosecutions will occur in the next few years, if at all (Raddatz, 
2013, 187).  If accountability for violent actions and violations of human rights is necessary for TRCs to 
lead to the growth of democracy, as argued by Brahm, it appears Liberia may not have made progress 
with the TRC that is sufficient to increase the level of democracy.     
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It is still early to see changes in democracy in Liberia that may be the result of the TRC since it 
ended so recently, but the peaceful election of 2011, which like the 2005 election was viewed by 
international observers as fair and free and for the most part free of violence, is a sign democracy is 
moving toward consolidation in Liberia.  The continued presence of so many UN troops in Liberia, 
however, may indicate that the movement is contingent on a large international presence in Liberia. 
At the commencement of the Liberian TRC there was a clear understanding that the relationship 
between the minority of Liberians in the Americo-Liberian group and the majority of Liberians who are 
considered indigenous Liberians needed to be addressed.  According to the first volume of the report, 
the problem resulted not from a natural conflict between the groups but from the favoritism of the 
Americo-Liberian group by the American Colonization Society (ACS) and the cultural insensitivity by the 
United States government and members of the ACS to the traditions and customs of native Liberians 
which resulted in social and political inequalities that caused strife from 1847 and 2003 (Volume 1, Final 
Report, 49-50).  It also led to the use of government institutions to maintain the superiority of one group 
over the other and to the disenfranchisement of native Liberians by allowing voting only by their tribal 
leaders rather than all adult Liberians (Volume 1, Final Report, 52).  This was corrected in 1946 but in 
spite of the provision for universal suffrage Liberia continued to be governed by members of the True 
Whig Party, comprised only of Americo-Liberians until the coup d’état by Samuel Doe in 1980.   
The final report also noted efforts to achieve Brahms’ goal two, that of allowing divergent 
groups to be involved.  According to the final report: 
There were grave concerns that the TRC, like other national institutions before it, would be 
Monrovia-biased, and as such, many Liberians at the TRC’s inception, did not take active roles in 
the process because they did not believe in the process, did not trust national organizations, or 
they simply did not understand the goals of the TRC (Final Report of the Liberian TRC, Volume 2, 
203). 
 
Hearings were held in all fifteen counties of Liberia, something that was difficult due to the lack 
of adequate roads and infrastructure.  The TRC worked with existing NGOs to make this possible and 
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succeeded in holding hearings that were not confined to the capital.  They also were unique in its efforts 
to achieve this goal, going to the extent of involving the Liberians of the diaspora, those living outside of 
Liberia at the time of the TRC, holding meetings with Liberians in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Ghana and Sierra Leone (Final Report of the Liberian TRC, Volume 2, 210).  
Despite these efforts by the TRC, or possibly because of the nature of their recommendations 
for war crimes trials and lustration, democracy in Liberia has not been substantially improved by the 
TRC, at least in the short term.  Its long term effect may be different but can’t be measured at this time. 
Continuing challenges for democracy in Liberia are discussed below in the context of two indices of 
democracy, Polity IV and Freedom House along with some observations from the International Center 
for Transitional Justice. Among other things, executive constraint remains problematic with the country 
being in an intermediate position between substantial limitations on executive authority and executive 
parity or subordination.  Since the 2005 election there have been improvements in the power of the 
legislature to place restraints on the executive-the president’s party, the Unity Party (UP) only received 
four out of thirty Senate seats and eight out of sixty four seats in the House in the 2005 election.  In the 
2011 election the UP only received ten out of thirty Senate seats and twenty four out of seventy three 
seats in the House (Elections in Liberia).  This limited legislative control by the president’s party would 
be more constraining if Liberia had only two main parties or had coalitions, but to date the various 
parties have struggled to form coalitions, leaving no party or coalition in the majority in either house of 
the legislature.   
The unitary nature of the government also leads to the lack of executive restraint.  Liberia has 
fifteen counties (similar to US states) governed by superintendents appointed by the president, subject 
to the advice and consent of the Senate.  The president is also able to appoint the justices of the 
Supreme Court and the lower courts as well as marshals, sheriffs and magistrates.  Although Liberia has 
elections, most local positions such as superintendent are appointed by the federal government rather 
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than by the people at the local level (Freedom House-Liberia-Country Reports, 2013).  This results in an 
inequality in power between the federal government and the lower components of the state and an 
ability by the executive to use the appointment of superintendents, sheriffs, marshals and other 
government positions to strengthen her control over the government.  
 It is also includes the ability to use government jobs to reward supporters with government 
jobs.  In interviews with members of the president’s Unity Party and the opposition Citizens for 
Democratic Change Party in Liberia in October of 2011 all rank and file party members who were 
interviewed mentioned their belief that their support for the party would result in a job with the 
government. 27  One interviewee, Johnny Koroma, an amputee who is a member of the Liberian 
Amputee Soccer team, mentioned his desire to attend college to obtain a degree in computer science 
and explained that in order to get a scholarship for college (the only way he could attend the university), 
prospective students had to become party supporters.  He noted that most people accepted to the 
university were from the president’s party and that all receiving scholarships were.  Whether these 
beliefs were true or not, the perception of favoritism is certainly present in Liberian politics.   The UN 
progress report to the Secretary General in 2012 showed there was some credence to this belief, noting 
that only eleven out of four hundred forty seven cabinet and other government positions after the 2011 
election were given to non-Unity Party people (Twenty-fourth progress report of the Secretary-General 
on the United Nations Mission in Liberia).   
The final report of the TRC identified patronage, privilege and politiczation of the military as one 
of the root causes of the conflict in Liberia (TRC Final Report-Volume 2, 2009, 16).  The TRC addressed 
this concern by recommending changes in the political culture and the reform of all Liberian institutions 
to insure the fair and equal treatment of all citizens that is necessary for democracy (TRC Final Report-
Volume 2, 384).  Despite these recommendations it is clear that Liberia continues to struggle with the 
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 Personal interviews with members of the Unity Party and Citizens for Democratic Change Party in Monrovia, 
Liberia, October 8, 2011. 
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strong central nature of their government which allows corruption, patronage and privilege to still exist.  
This struggle prevents Liberia from making the transition to a fully consolidated democracy and reduces 
trust in government on the part of citizens.  
The effect of the TRC on democracy in Liberia is uncertain for several reasons.   First, it can only 
have an effect if there is knowledge of its existence and at least a general understanding of its findings 
as noted by Gibson (2004, 21-22).  In a survey of Liberian citizens conducted by the Human Rights Center 
at the University of California, Berkley School of Law 45% of Liberians surveyed indicated they had no 
knowledge of the TRC and 46% said they had little knowledge of it.  Only 8% said they had an average or 
higher knowledge of it (Human Rights Center, 2001, 70).  This is very disturbing given the fact the TRC 
concluded two years prior to the survey and a public report was issued and widely disseminated.  73% of 
those surveyed indicated, however, that they had heard of the TRC, leading to the conclusion that most 
Liberians had heard about it but 92% of them knew little or nothing about it other than its existence.  In 
comparison to the 92% who knew about the SC-SL trial of Charles Taylor, however, this number seems 
low.  Additionally, although 76% said that truth in general was important to them, only 44% said that 
truth about the war was now known to them, seven years after the end of the war. Despite the fact that 
92% said they had no or little knowledge of the TRC, 42% said they had heard about the TRC 
recommendations.  Only 39% believed that the TRC helped peace and 38% agreed it helped with unity.  
The county with the highest percentage of people who knew about the TRC was, not surprisingly, the 
capital of Liberia, Monrovia, where 90% of the people were aware of it and 74% of the people knew at 
least a little or an average amount or higher about it, as opposed to 54% in the country generally.  They 
also had a greater belief in the connection between the TRC and peace and unity than the rest of the 
country (Human Rights Center, 2011, 69-71). 
This lack of knowledge of and faith in the TRC process is disturbing, particularly the difference 
between Monrovia and the rest of the country.  Hearings for the TRC were held throughout the country, 
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although the majority were centered in Monrovia, in an effort to involve the entire citizenry which was 
apparently unsuccessful.  Video of many of the TRC hearings is available online and a written report was 
submitted to the National Assembly and publicly released (Liberian TRC Final Report, Volume One, 16-
17).  Despite these efforts, awareness and understanding of the TRC is still sorely lacking in Liberia.  This 
could be due to two factors, the high level of illiteracy in Liberia and the lack of access to methods of 
communication such as the internet, newspapers and television.  This lack of literacy affects the ability 
to read the TRC report, but more critically to read the more common method of accessing the report, 
the newspaper accounts of the TRC.  For the rest of the country, radio and word of mouth are the main 
methods of communication, reducing access to information about the TRC (Human Rights Center, 2011, 
24). 
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) issued a report entitled “Beyond the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission: Transitional Justice Options in Liberia” in May of 2010, approximately a 
year after the final TRC report was released.  That report cites some good aspects of the TRC report but 
notes also some major deficiencies.  First, the ICTF report notes there is no citation of facts in the TRC 
final report which supported its recommendations, other than a general statement that over five 
hundred primary sources were used.  Without a connection between the facts and the 
recommendations there is no way to test the validity of their conclusions; they have to be taken at face 
value, which is something that so far has been rejected by Liberians.  It also does not show that due 
process, other than public hearings, was used in arriving at the conclusions and recommendations, 
making them not up to legal standards (ICTJ Report-Liberia, 2010, 14).  For example, people 
recommended for lustration or prosecution were not given notice before the hearings that the 
recommendation might be made and few of them testified at or participated in the hearings. 
Second, there is a weak link between the historical narrative within the report and the 
conclusions and findings of the TRC.  Many of the findings and recommendations contradict each other 
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and sections citing actions by outside actors don’t match up with recommendations regarding those 
actors (ICTJ Report-Liberia, 2010, 15).  If the message of the TRC and its findings are not consistent the 
TRC is likely to fail in factors four and five of Brahms’ five factors since cannot remove “enclaves of non-
democratic power by naming names of perpetrators” and cannot create a sense of shared destiny or 
deprive perpetrators of support and remove their influences if a consistent message is not found and 
published. 
Third, and most critically, the recommendations are not related to what can be carried out in 
Liberia given current resources and infrastructure.  The ICTJ notes that: 
The viability of a recommendation not only pertains to evidentiary support and linkages to 
findings, but also whether it can be carried out given available resources and capacities.  In best 
practices, every truth commission recommendation should be directed to a specific 
implementing agent and contain sufficient specificity, direction and guidance.  Few, if any, of the 
recommendations meet all of these basic criteria.  Many are quite vague and not directed 
towards actor more specific than the “Government of Liberia” and the “international 
community” (ICTJ Report-Liberia, 2010, 15). 
By making recommendations that could not be carried out, the report failed the people of Liberia, 
creating expectations for lustration, prosecution, reparations and modifications to the “business as 
usual” of government in Liberia.  When these expectations are not met, particularly with regard to the 
recommendation for the lustration of the sitting president of the country, it is difficult to further 
consolidate the democracy in Liberia. 
One recommendation from the TRC report has been carried out, although not without difficulty.  
An Independent Human Rights Commission (IHRC) was finally created and commissioners appointed in 
2010 and the commission has begun listening to complaints regarding human rights violations.  The IHRC 
planned to create a “Palava Hut” program, a traditional dispute resolution method.  The commissioners 
understood their obligation to carry out the TRC recommendations, including reparations but 
acknowledged the difficulty in carrying out that recommendation due to lack of finances in Liberia and 
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the impossibility of carrying out criminal prosecutions in the current political environment. 28  According 
to the UN, Palava Hut committees have been set up in all fifteen counties but no hearings had been held 
as of 2012 (UN Special Report, 2012, 1).  The effect of the Palava Hut program when it begins is 
impossible to predict but if it is conducted fairly and comprehensively it may have an impact because 
the program will result in the exposing of the action of perpetrators and will rebuild the sense of shared 
destiny that is critical to make groups feel involved in the making of Liberia as a cohesive nation (2324).    
Lastly, to date, no reparations have been paid to victims of abuses although former soldiers and 
rebels have received some funding through the UN as a result of a UN initiative, not because of the TRC 
recommendations.  Demobilizing soldiers were given the option of cash payments of $300 USD or a 
retraining program, with most electing the cash payments due to uncertainty regarding the retraining 
programs.  This created a great deal of animosity with victims of the violence who saw the rebels who 
tortured, murdered and stole receiving payments, while victims received nothing (ICTJ-Transitional 
Justice and the DDR).   
Democracy had already begun to improve before the TRC hearings, with the 2005 presidential 
and legislative election being judged by the international community as a free and fair election.  When 
the CDC candidate did not win the 2005 run-off election against Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf there was a real 
possibility of the return to anarchy and chaos in Liberia.  This did not happen and a second successful 
election was held in 2011, albeit another controversial one due to the boycott of that year’s runoff 
election by the CDC.  Between 2006 and 2010 Liberia has maintained a fairly good score of positive six, 
making it a democracy according to Polity IV scale.   
However, there are several things that continue to constrain Liberia’s democracy.  First, there is 
a continued sectarian divide between the Americo-Liberians and the indigenous populations of Liberia.  
Its inhibiting effect on political participation is seen in the Polity IV scores for Liberia.  Liberia has both 
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the past exclusion of indigenous citizens from political participation, with only two presidents in the 
history of the country being from an ethnic group other than the tiny minority group of Americo-
Liberians and current exclusions of groups from cabinet and other governmental positions based on the 
political favoritism accorded to members of the president’s Unity Party over other parties.  The failure of 
the TRC in particular or other Liberian institutions to reduce these sectarian tensions is critical to Liberia 
since they have historically been the basis of much of the civil unrest and both civil wars, and will 
continue to do so unless addressed.  The current president, Johnson-Sirleaf, argues she is not an 
Americo-Liberian because her father was from an indigenous family. But her history is one of support for 
Americo-Liberian policies and her background of Harvard education speaks of an elite, not indigenous, 
connection (Biography Brief of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf).  Nothing has occurred since the TRC to change the 
balance of power between the two groups. 
Second, the failure on the part of the government to address adequately the recommendations 
of the TRC has reduced dramatically its ability to bring marginalized groups into participation in Liberia.  
Although the most controversial provision, calling for the lustration of a number of Liberians, including 
the sitting president, was declared unconstitutional by the Liberian Supreme Court, the failure to follow 
other recommendations such as war crimes trials, reparations and the Palava Hut program have reduced 
the citizens’ faith in the government and its ability to bring about change. 
Citizen's lack of knowledge of the activities, findings and recommendations of the TRCs has an 
impact on the ability of the TRC to impact democratic consolidation and support for the rule of law.  It 
obviously cannot support those endeavors if people aren’t aware of it.  As Gibson points out, acceptance 
and confidence in the TRC can only occur if there is knowledge of the proceedings (2004, 21-22).  This 
has affected public confidence in the TRC and acceptance of its role in resolving the conflict in Liberia.  
45% of survey respondents were pessimistic that the recommendations of the TRC would be carried out, 
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while 31% believed they would only be partially carried out (Human Rights Center, 2011, 71).  This 
shows a general lack of confidence in the TRC and affects its power to effect change. 
 
The Relationship Between the TRC and Rule of Law In Liberia 
 Many of the same things that constrain democracy in Liberia function as restraints on the rule of 
law as well.  Dimitrijević (2006) argues that the use of a TRC is critical for post conflict societies to 
achieving the rule of law because it allows a state to establish a new moral foundation, to move away 
from the old institutions and methods of addressing conflicts in a state.  He compares this to states, such 
as Germany during World War II that had a legacy of immorality and evil that need to be replaced by a 
new moral foundation rather than just a new set of leaders.  The role of a TRC is to expose immorality 
and evil in order for a new environment to flourish and the connection between truth and justice 
justifies the use of a TRC (371).    
The TRC in Liberia attempted to expose the immorality and evil of perpetrators during the civil 
war, but because the TRC has been ignored and devalued in Liberia through the failure to adopt and 
implement its recommendations, the ability of the TRC to address these concerns was greatly reduced.  
Instead, many of the perpetrators of the worst abuses in Liberia remain in power or have come to 
power, reducing the creation of a new moral foundation.  Although Charles Taylor has been ousted from 
office and convicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC), many of his followers remain in power in 
Liberia, including his wife Senator Jewel Taylor, described in 2012 by Newsweek Magazine as the second 
most powerful woman in Liberia (“Life After Charles Taylor”, 2012). Several former warlords including   
Prince Johnson, Sando Johnson, and J. Jonathan Banney serve as senators in the Liberian Senate despite 
being listed as “most notorious perpetrators” by the Liberian TRC report and being recommended for 
prosecution (TRC, Consolidated Final Report, Vol. 2, 350). 
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As was seen in Chapter Two, there are various definitions of the rule of law that could be 
applied.  According to Mani rule of law requires a functioning, independent and efficient police and 
judicial system, open and public procedures and accountability to create and maintain trust.  Also as 
noted in Chapter Four there are a variety of indexes used to measure rule of law, including the CIRI 
index used in this dissertation.   For this case study the individual indexes of CIRI, along with the 
aggregate scores will be used because they provide more information about the various aspects of rule 
of law, including physical integrity and independence of the judiciary.  Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception index (CPI) will also be analyzed since corruption is a part of rule of law and has 
been historically problematic in Liberia.  Additionally survey data will be utilized regarding Liberian’s 
perceptions of the rule of law, including corruption and the judicial system in general.  
 The TRC has been identified as a key institution to assist in the development of the rule of law in 
Liberia.  According to the Chairperson of the TRC, Jerome Verdier, Sr.:  
The Commissioners of the TRC feel very strongly that the future of Liberia rests with Liberians. 
While the international community has and will continue to play a role in assisting Liberia 
develop a sustainable democracy, only Liberians can establish a durable human rights-based 
culture where peace, development and the rule of law are permanent features of its political 
heritage. 
The Commission is convinced, as all Liberians are that the TRC framework provides the best 
opportunity yet, to review the past, learn from the past and lay the foundations for sustainable 
peace, justice and national reconciliation (TRC, Preliminary Findings and Determination, Vol. 1, 
3). 
While the need to establish the rule of law may have been clear to the commissioners of the 
TRC and the international community, the methods to establish it are less clear.  According to the CIRI 
index, the rule of law has improved since the end of the civil war in 2003 although most increases were 
from 2003 to 2004, before the 2005 election, and well before the TRC.  In 2004 Liberia had a score of 21 
out of 30 in rule of law, which was a dramatic improvement over 2003.  The biggest change was in 
physical integrity rights, which includes torture, extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment and 
disappearances.  This isn’t surprising since the end of the civil war brought a lessening of many of these 
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problems, particularly given the presence of a huge international force.  There were also improvements 
in the empowerment index, which includes respect for civil liberties such as freedom of speech, freedom 
of association, freedom of movement and freedom of religion.  These improvements were more closely 
related to the actions of the government.  Civil liberties have remained relatively high or have increased 
since 2004 but the physical integrity index has shown a decrease since then from a high of seven out of a 
possible eight in 2004 to a five out of eight in 2010.  The independence of the judiciary, a critical feature 
of rule of law, has not improved according to CIRI since the civil war, which is reflection on the strongly 
centralized nature of the Liberian government.   The judiciary remains weak and ineffective as a check 
on the legislative and executive branches, partially due to infrastructure restraints.  See Figure 5.2 
below. 
 
Figure 5.2: Rule of Law in Liberia-1981-201029 
Vertical line represents the TRC from 2006 to 2009 
 
 
Source: CIRI  
As can be seen in Figure 5.2, a positive change in rule of law occurred before the TRC and is 
therefore not attributable to the actions of the TRC.  In fact, the rule of law scores declined slightly 
during the period of the TRC, from a high in 2005 of 21 points, to a low in 2009 of 17 points.   
USAID in its “Rule of Law Programs in Liberia” report in April of 2009 identified a number of 
barriers to progress and impact in rule of law programs, including: 
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1. The lack of political will for reform by high- level GOL officials in all three branches (limited 
political buy-in, conditionality or accountability for most rule of law programming);  
2. Legal gaps and deficiencies in the law (outdated criminal, civil and administrative laws, 
sanctions and weak enforcement mechanisms);  
3. The lack of administrative, management and enforcement capacity of key justice institutions 
to implement legal reforms;  
4. The inability of justice sector officials and the public to access the law itself (both the laws 
and court decisions are virtually inaccessible for most Liberians and many rural Liberians 
cannot read English);  
5. The lack of legal rights awareness and societal consensus on reform priorities and issues 
(including how to reform “competing” justice systems formal, traditional and tribal justice 
systems);  
6. Limited access to transparent, fair and efficient justice in either the capital or rural counties 
(lack of law school graduates, private lawyers, county attorneys, public defenders, 
paralegals and qualified judges);  
7. The high cost of accessing the justice system for most impoverished Liberians (court fees 
and time and expenses traveling to distant courthouses);  
8. The lack of a focused rule of law strategy within post-conflict Liberian context;  
9. The lack of donor coordination and collaboration;  
10. Unchecked endemic corruption throughout the justice sector and  
11. The lack of accountability within the justice sector (USAID Report, April, 2009). 
 
Many of these concerns relate to the lack of resources and infrastructure for a sound judicial 
system.  Many Liberian counties lack even a jail to house offenders pending trial, adequately trained 
judges and attorneys and police officers.  Many courthouses were damaged or destroyed during the two 
civil wars and Liberia only has one law school which graduates less than forty lawyers per year.  For a 
country of over three million people, this is hopelessly inadequate to meet the demand for attorneys, 
judges and magistrates. 30  The TRC did not create and was not mandated to fix this problem but it does 
have an impact on improvements in the rule of law, showing that there is a limitation on what changes a 
TRC can make in rule of law and providing.  The Berkeley University Human Rights Center surveyed 
Liberians regarding their perceptions of the justice system.  The inabilities pointed out above by USAID 
to provide capacity for the judicial system, to create an awareness of the formal justice system, to 
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provide access to a transparent and effective justice system, to make the justice system financially 
accessible, and the unchecked corruption in the justice system all relate to perceptions of the justice 
system (USAID Report, April, 2009).  75% of Liberians agree that going to court is too expensive for an 
average person.  Liberians turn to informal justice systems such as Palava Huts and the intercession of 
tribal chiefs for their legal problems rather than utilizing the formal justice system.  Vigilante justice is 
also common because of the problems with the system.  Most Liberians also believe that judges do not 
treat people equally with 28% believing that judges treat everyone equally and only 23% believing that 
judgments are the same for everyone.  This probably results from the predominance of Americo-
Liberians in the legal and judicial fields.  Most also believe they can’t trust the justice system or judges 
and 44% argue they have to bribe a judge to get a positive ruling (Human Rights Center, 2011, 64).  See 
Table 5.1 below. 
 
Table 5.1:  Liberian perceptions of justice system, 2011. 
Perception (% agree)  Total 
   
Liberian judges treat everyone equally  28 
Judgments are the same for everyone  23 
Going to court is too expensive  75 
You trust the Liberian court system  36 
Your trust the Liberian judges  31 
Going to court means you have to bribe the judges  44 
Liberian lawyers are able to do their work freely  30 
     Source:  Berkeley Human Rights Center 
The TRC had some effect on the feelings of Liberians regarding the judicial system but much of 
the lack of trust relates to the class struggle between the Americo-Liberians and the indigenous 
population.  It has little if any impact on the cost of going to court, but could have an impact on trust in 
the system, judges and lawyers.  However, developing that trust will take time and the two years 
between the TRC and this survey is not sufficient to develop that trust.  The lack of prosecution of 
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offenders and the finding of unconstitutionality of the lustration provision lessened the ability of the 
TRC to develop that trust by making promises of justice to the Liberian people that were not delivered. 
USAID’s barrier one, the lack of political will for reform and eight, the lack of a focused rule of 
law strategy are more relevant to the TRC process (USAID Report, April, 2009).  The TRC report notes 
that the feeling of unjust enrichment by elites, particularly the small minority of Americo-Liberians led to 
a belief that only force could be used to bring about democratic change.  It also notes that combatants 
and indigenous groups used violence to seek revenge against the groups in power in an attempt to 
change the balance of power, leading to more violence and conflict.  Lastly, it notes that judicial 
institutions in Liberia had historically failed to control abuses by the other branches of government, 
including the security forces and that rampant corruption eliminated the average Liberian’s faith in 
judicial institutions (TRC, Consolidated Final Report, Vol. 2, 16).  One of the key findings that relates to 
the TRC and the rule of law was Additional Finding 16 from the Finding and Determinations: 
[The] lack of human rights culture and education, depravation and over a century of state 
suppression and insensitivity, and wealth acclamation by a privileged few created a debased 
conscience for massive rights violations during the conflict thus engendering a culture of 
violence as a means to an end; with an entrenched culture of impunity. 
This culture of impunity and feeling of entitlement is precisely the type of issue the TRC was designed to 
address.  The findings of the TRC that one hundred sixteen people were “Most Notorious Perpetrators” 
who should be tried as war criminals and that thirty eight others should be referred to the Palava Hut 
program is clearly an attempt, whether one that follows due process or not, to address impunity and 
change the culture of impunity.  The recommendation for lustration of forty nine people, including the 
sitting president of Liberia is also an attempt to fight impunity (TRC, Consolidated Final Report, Vol. 2, 
350-353, 363). 
 Part of the problem, however, is that the TRC relied on the possibility of other actions such as 
lustration and trials to end impunity and change the political culture.  Since lustration has been declared 
unconstitutional and war crimes trials have not started and people named for prosecution, such as 
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Prince Johnson, are currently acting as senators in the Liberian Senate the question becomes, if the TRC 
has had any relationship to improvements in the rule of law and, more importantly, have there been 
improvements in the rule of law in Liberia?  There appear to be two main improvements:  respect for 
physical integrity as measured by the CIRI and reduced corruption as measured by Transparency 
International.  Both of these are key elements of the rule of law.  This is encouraging and may be a result 
of the exposure of the abuses and names of perpetrators by the TRC report even if there has not been 
direct action as a result. 
The CIRI index shows that physical integrity has been improved in Liberia since 2004 but no 
change has occurred since the conclusion of the TRC in 2009.  It may be too early to measure any change 
in this scale since only data from 2010 is available through the CIRI.  It is notable that despite a very 
contentious election in 2011 and the boycott of the runoff election by the number two party, the CDC, 
the amount of violence that resulted from the election was minor.  This is a reflection of the presence of 
the international community, but also of a growing consensus for non-violent dispute resolutions and 
the use of the rule of law rather than repression to deal with political dissension (NEC-Liberia). 
Another barrier to the rule of law is point ten, endemic, pervasive corruption throughout Liberia 
(USAID Report, April, 2009).  CIRI does not specifically measure corruption and there are no studies of 
corruption for Liberia that predate the end of the civil war.  However, Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index measures corruption before and after the TRC, with data from 2005 to 
2011.  Figure 5.3 below shows the improved scores for corruption in Liberia, with the score reflecting 
the relative placement of Liberia against the other nations in the world.  In 2005, right before the 
election, Liberia was 164th in the world in corruption.  In 2009, after the completion of the TRC, Liberia 
was ranked 97th in the world and they continued to improve to 95th by 2011.  After the 2011 election 
they improved to 81st in the world.  31  See Figure 5.3 below. 
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Figure 5.3: CPI Index for Liberia-1999 to 2012 32 
Vertical lines represent the TRC from 2006 to 2009 
 
 
Source:  Transparency International 
Transparency International’s ranking are based on surveys taken of corporations and financial 
institutions, so while 44% of Liberians may believe you have to bribe a judge to get a positive result, the 
financial community has a better opinion of corruption in Liberia (Transparency International-Liberia).    
 Although the CIRI index shows improvement in the rule of law in Liberia since the peace 
agreement was signed in 2003 it is clear from the surveys of Liberian citizens that there continue to be 
perceived problems with the corruption in the judicial system.  The CIRI index shows that physical 
integrity rights have improved since the peace agreement, from one out of eight in 2003 to a high of 
seven in 2004 and 2005 during the transitional government and the first election, but that score has 
deteriorated to a five since then despite the TRC proceedings.  
 There has been an improvement in the rule of law since the end of the second civil war in 2003, 
but there is no clear improvement in it since the TRC ended in 2009.  The one indicator that shows 
improvement is in corruption and that has improved dramatically but the others do not show 
improvement since 2009.  It is important because of the limited time between the end of the TRC in 
2009 and the last information from CIRI and from the Berkeley Human Rights Center in 2011 to look 
again at Liberia in a few years to see if the gains in physical integrity rights, empowerment, and 
                                                          
32
 No data is available from 1998 to 2004 or for 2006. 
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corruption have continued and to see if the perceptions by Liberians of the reliability of their justice 
system have improved.  That would indicate that the TRC may have a continuing and positive impact on 
rule of law. 
 
The Effect of the de facto Amnesty on Liberia 
Liberia did not offer an official amnesty in the TRC like the conditional amnesty that was offered 
in South Africa, but the failure to adopt the recommendations of the TRC to prosecute and lustrate 
various people involved in the civil war has resulted in a de facto amnesty.  Although Liberia is not 
prevented from prosecuting offenders, the failure to do so in the ten years since the civil war shows it 
does not have the political will to overturn this de facto amnesty.  
Authors such as Moore (1990-1991) argue that amnesties can cause impunity and interfere with 
the growth of the rule of law.  The Accra Peace Accord in 2003 for Liberia provided for the possibility of 
amnesty but no formal general or conditional amnesty was ever granted to perpetrators by the 
government.  However, the failure to follow through on the recommendation of the TRC for prosecution 
amounts to a de facto amnesty, adding to the feeling of impunity.   
A survey conducted by Afrobarometer in 2008 asked Liberians for their opinion regarding 
amnesty for human rights violations.  The survey gave participants two statements to consider and 
choose one to agree with.  Statement 1 asked them to agree that “Those who are responsible for human 
rights violations committed during the past conflicts should be granted amnesty, which means that they 
would never be subject to criminal or other consequences for their action.”  Statement 2 asked them to 
agree that “Those who are responsible for human rights violations should be held accountable and face 
consequences for what they have done.”  See Table 5.2 below for the results of that survey. 
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Table 5.2: Afrobarometer 2008 Question-Amnesty for Human Rights Violations-Liberia 
 
 
 
 
            
          Source: Afrobarometer 2008 
 40% of the Liberians surveyed agreed with Statement 1, either strongly or somewhat, while 59% 
agreed with Statement 2.  The sentiment for amnesty is fairly strong, but more than one half of the 
population did not support amnesty in 2008 (Afrobarometer-Liberia, 2008).  Although Liberia did hold a 
TRC, which worked to combat impunity by bringing out the story of abuses, the lack of prosecutions is 
resulting in a de facto amnesty, something that a majority of Liberians do not want.   
The Afrobarometer’s survey data was taken in 2008, before the TRC.  The Human Rights Center’s 
surveys, conducted after the release of the TRC report showed that 54% of Liberians supported 
forgiveness, while the remainder supported some form of accountability.  Although forgiveness isn’t 
identical to amnesty, since it was the non-punitive option it is similar to amnesty.  So,  in 2008, 40% of 
Liberians supported amnesty, in 2010 54% favored a non-punitive option for perpetrators while 
46%supported trials (27%), some form of punishment (13%), killing them (3%), and other (3%). 33  
In 2012 Afrobarometer did not resurvey Liberians regarding their views on amnesty, but they 
did ask for opinions regarding lustration.  The survey gave participants two statements to consider and 
choose one to agree with.  Statement 1 asked them to agree that “In order for the country to move 
forward, those who committed crimes against humanity should not be required to confess their roles 
before they can stand for elected office.”  Statement 2 asked them to agree that “Since reconciliation is 
                                                          
33
 Support for non-punitive options varied by county, with the lowest support from Monrovia and counties where 
some of the fiercest fighting occurred, while support for non-punitive options was the highest in Bong County, the 
headquarters of Charles Taylor, Lofa County and Nimba County where rebel forces were organized and the 
birthplace of Senator Prince Johnson and Gbarpolu County which has the largest Muslim population in Liberia.  
These counties border the surrounding states of Guinea, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire 
Answer to Survey Question  Total 
   
Agree or strongly agree with statement 1  40 
Agree or strongly agree with statement 2  59 
Agree with neither  0 
Don’t know  1 
Don’t know  1 
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about speaking the truth, individuals who committed crimes against humanity should not be allowed to 
stand for elected office unless they publicly confess to their wrong doing during the conflicts in Liberia.”  
See Table 5.3 below for the results of that survey. 
 
Table 5.3: Afrobarometer 2012 Question-Lustration for Human Rights Violations-Liberia 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    
 
      Source: Afrobarometer 2012 
 
Like with amnesty most Liberians support accountability through lustration for the human rights 
abuses during the war although more support lustration (74%) than supported the general concept of 
accountability (59%).  This may be because four more years have passed since the first set of surveys 
and Liberians have seen that prosecutions did not result from the TRC nor has any other type of 
accountability occurred, making lustration an attractive compromise measure.    Lustration may also be 
something more easily understood by the survey takers than the more general term of accountability.  
Regardless, it is clear the majority of Liberians continue, nine years after the peace agreement, to want 
some kind of accountability for the abuses that occurred during the war and they supported the 
lustration recommendation of the TRC even though it suggested accountability for the sitting president 
of Liberia. 
Liberians clearly want accountability, whether it is prosecutions, lustration or some other form 
of accountability.  Although there is no clear stated amnesty in Liberia, the effect of the judicial 
declaration that the lustration provision was unconstitutional and the fact no trials have been conducted 
in the ten years since the war ended is to leave Liberians without this accountability.  This has lessened 
Answer to Survey Question  Total 
   
Agree or strongly agree with statement 1  24 
Agree or strongly agree with statement 2  74 
Agree with neither  1 
Don’t know  1 
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the impact of the TRC by undercutting its recommendations, reducing its credibility and reducing its 
impact on rule of law in Liberia. 
Conclusion 
Liberia has not been a consolidated democracy in its history.  For most of its history Liberia was 
a single party autocracy, ruled by the tiny minority of Americo-Liberians.  Since 1980 various groups 
have rebelled against the rule of this group, with the first non-Americo-Liberian taking office through a 
coup d'état and staying in power not through democratic means but through a variety of extrajudicial 
means.  Liberia has, since the end of the second civil war, conducted two elections which are generally 
considered to be fair and free and has elected a president, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, who took office 
through the democratic process and continues to rule democratically after the second election.  It is a 
multi-party state and the president’s party, the Unity Party holds only a plurality in the legislature, not a 
majority (necliberia.org).  Since the end of the second civil war Liberia has improved its rule of law and 
at least in terms of freedom from torture, disappearance and the political violence is a much safer, more 
legal place to live.  The ability of the state to conduct two free and fair elections and control the protests 
and boycott of the runoff election by the losing party in the 2011 election without the resort to 
significant repression and violence signals the growth of both democracy and the rule of law.  The 
modest reduction in corruption also points to positive changes in the state, particularly given the 
concern from citizens about corruption. 
However, there are still major issues in Liberia.  In a shocking nine out of fourteen counties, 
more than 40% of Liberians say no one provides them with security and many other Liberians identify 
community watch groups, neighbors, rubber plantation security guards, God, local defense and 
traditional leaders as sources of security instead of the government or police (Human Rights Center, 
2011, 55).   
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The Liberian TRC was created to address concerns regarding impunity and the conflict between 
groups that led to two disastrous civil wars. It did provide a forum for a national discussion of the events 
of the two wars and its recommendations for lustration and prosecution offered the hope of 
accountability for the abuses that occurred.  The failure of the TRC to follow through on 
recommendations for war crimes trials and lustration (and in fact the finding by the Liberian Supreme 
Court that lustration was unconstitutional) has worked against the development of trust and confidence 
in the Liberian judicial system and government in general.  It will be difficult to move toward a fully 
consolidated democracy without making changes in the political culture that favors the Americo-
Liberian class over the rest of Liberians.  Less than 50% of Liberians believe in amnesty for human rights 
violations, but to date there has been a de facto amnesty due to the failure to prosecute and only the 
former president has been held accountable for the abuses from the war.  And most importantly, the 
power relationship between the Americo-Liberians and the rest of the population in Liberia has not 
changed; although President Johnson-Sirleaf is of mixed heritage she was a long time member of the 
True Whig Party and is identified with the interests of Americo-Liberians, not the rest of the population 
(Sessay, Ukeje, Gbla and Ismail, 2009, 48).  Since this power relationship was a major factor in the two 
civil wars, the inability to address it is concerning for Liberia’s future. 
In Chapter Four quantitative testing showed that states that conducted a TRC after a conflict 
were more likely to see improvements in democracy and the rule of law than states that did not.  It was 
also found that states that states with intense conflicts saw decreases in democracy and rule of law 
scores as compared to states with less intense conflicts.  Liberia experienced a very intense conflict, with 
over 8% of the total population dying during the wars and over 25% being displaced.  Liberia has seen 
improvements since the end of the second civil war in democracy and rule of law and in fact has seen 
improvements greater than those predicted by the quantitative testing if the improvements had 
occurred as a result of the TRC.  However, other than improvements in corruption, there have been no 
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real improvements in democracy and rule of law since 2009, and really minor improvements since the 
beginning of the TRC in 2006. 
It may be too early to see the effect of the TRC and Liberia may experience greater chance in the 
future.  It also may be that because the TRC in Liberia was so flawed, with recommendations for 
lustration and prosecution that were not based on any form of due process and have not been followed, 
and limited dissemination of information about the TRC and its recommendations, that the TRC has 
actually decreased the chances for improvement by supporting impunity rather than accountability.  For 
a TRC, such as the one in Liberia, to affect real change in a state it may need to have sound 
recommendations based on due process and widely discussed, that are followed through by the state to 
make a real difference in democracy and the rule of law.  However, Liberia has benefited from the TRC 
to the extent that the true story about the civil wars and the ethnic struggle that caused them has been 
discussed and a record made of it.  It will take a concerted effort by Liberia, with the support of the 
international community, to enact the recommendations or hold additional hearings with due process 
rights if it decides to make and implement more recommendations for lustration or prosecution.   
The next chapter will look at the state of Mozambique, a state which chose a different route in 
the post conflict period, choosing forgiveness and forgetfulness over a TRC.  The experiences of 
Mozambique will be compared and contrasted to those of Liberia in terms of their ability to make the 
transition to a democracy and improve their rule of law.  Mozambique’s civil war ended eleven years 
before Liberia’s so they have had a longer time to make a transition. All other things being equal, they 
should have made greater progress than Liberia.  Unfortunately, Mozambique continues to struggle to 
achieve democracy and the rule of law and as we shall see, there are signs that democracy is 
deteriorating in the past three years. 
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CHAPTER SIX: MOZAMBIQUE-FORGIVE AND FORGET  
 
Mozambique, like Liberia, suffered through a long period of civil war, lasting seventeen years, 
from 1975 to 1992.  Unlike Liberia, Mozambique chose a “forgive and forget” policy for recovery from 
the civil war and made a conscious decision to not conduct a TRC, war crimes tribunals or any type of 
transitional justice other than a general amnesty.  Mozambique’s civil war is often described as one of 
the most brutal civil wars in the history of Africa, with nine hundred thousand people killed, many of 
them dying of malnutrition due to the disruption in agriculture caused by both the war and the 
economic policies of the Mozambican government (DeRouen and Heo, 2007, 509).  Because of the 
severity and length of its conflict, this is an important state to study to understand the impact of a 
“hands-off” policy of transitional justice on democracy and the rule of law. 
Mozambique and Liberia are not perfectly parallel cases. In Mozambique the violence was 
related to political affiliation, rather than the ethnic or racial differences as seen in Liberia; this often 
resulted in families and communities being divided.   However, as in Liberia, In addition to the large 
number of deaths from the civil war, approximately 1.7 million Mozambicans fled the country to live in 
refugee camps in neighboring Malawi and Zimbabwe, while another 3 million were internally displaced 
within Mozambique.  The war devastated the economy which was also damaged by periodic droughts, 
leaving one half of the population of Mozambique either forced to become refugees, be internally 
displaced or unable to economically support themselves and their families (Reconstruction National 
Integrity System Survey, Mozambique 2007, 17). 
The effect of this many deaths and devastation to such a large portion of its population has 
created problems for Mozambique in its efforts to recover from the civil war and move toward a strong 
democracy and improved rule of law.   Because the civil war ended with a negotiated peace, rather than 
military victory for either side in the conflict, and because there has been no effort to prosecute anyone 
for the violence and human rights abuses that occurred during the conflict, both sides in the conflict 
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have remained active in Mozambican politics.  Mozambique today is a two party state and with the two 
former combatant groups from the civil war, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and 
the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) making up these two parties.  This results in an 
uncomfortable situation where both sides to a devastating conflict have to work together for the 
betterment of the state. 
This case study of Mozambique reviews the political history of Mozambique particularly the 
history that relates to the political and ideological divides that rose after Mozambique obtained its 
independence from Portugal, provided the fuel for the civil war and continues today.  This case study 
looks at the effect of this division on the ability of Mozambique to both make the transition to 
democracy by and to establish the rule of law.  The lack of any transitional justice methods being used 
other than an amnesty has perpetuated the political power of the two political parties to battle for 
dominance.  Unlike Liberia, Mozambique has not used any form of transitional justice. In fact, the 
government has refused to prosecute alleged war criminals, even those from the minority RENAMO 
party.  This chapter considers the impact of that failure and compares and contrasts the findings in 
Liberia to Mozambique with regard to their movement toward democracy and the rule of law.   
 
Background-Mozambique 
Mozambique is a southern African nation slightly less than twice the size of California.  It has a 
population of over twenty-three million people, with more than ninety-nine percent of its population 
being African along with a small number of Europeans and Indians.  Very little of Mozambique is 
agricultural land and even less is irrigated although it does have natural resources, including coal, 
titanium and natural gas.  It is subject to severe droughts and cyclones and flooding and the civil war 
caused movement from the agricultural interior land into the urban and coastal areas, stressing the 
environment and causing increased pollution and desertification.  Only seventeen percent of the 
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population has access to sanitation and the danger of exposure to infectious disease, including malaria, 
the plague and hepatitis,  is ranked as “very high” by the CIA World Factbook.  It has the seventh highest 
HIV/AIDs rate in the world at 11 % of the population, which has resulted in a life expectancy at birth of 
only fifty two years.  Maternal and infant mortality rates are also high (CIA World Fact Book).   
These problems cause challenges for a struggling democracy to provide services to the 
population.  Drought and its impact on food supply have been regular pressing issues since the end of 
the civil war.  In 2008 Mozambique experienced riots and demonstrations when food prices were raised 
dramatically (Conceição,P., S. Levine and Z. Brixiova, 2011). Riots in 2010 led to ten dead and more than 
three hundred injured and further riots occurred in 2012 over food costs.  Berazneva and Lee conclude 
that the cause of the riots and civil unrest is the level of poverty in Mozambique and the low level of 
food production (Berazneva and Lee, 2011, 3, 21).  The government response to the riots and 
demonstrations was to use physical force against the rioters and then to lower temporarily the cost of 
food, leading to the next set of riots when the prices rose again.  Mozambique continues to struggle 
with providing methods for peaceful discussion of and settlement of disputes and of providing basic 
services to its people. 
 
History of the conflict 
Mozambique’s first inhabitants were a tribal group called the Koisani, who were 
hunter/gatherers.  Additional hunter/gatherer tribes from the north and west of Africa came in the third 
century and eventually evolved into farmers and herders.  An Arab influence occurred by the tenth 
century and continued through slave trading and commercial trade in gold, rhino horn and ivory in 
return for pottery, cloth and metal goods.  Arabs intermarried with native groups and a small number of 
Arabs remain there today.  The primary religion today is Christianity, although approximately eighteen 
percent of Mozambique is Muslim (CIA World Fact Book-Mozambique). 
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Mozambique was invaded by the Portuguese explorer Vasco de Gama in 1498.  Over the next 
two hundred years the Portuguese moved from the coastal areas to the interior and set up trading posts 
and mines to extract gold and export it to Portugal.  Land in the interior was divided into parcels and 
granted to European settlers.  Portugal also set up an extensive slave trade from Mozambique which 
operated legally until 1842 (although it continued for decades clandestinely).  While native Africans 
were not enslaved as part of Portugal’s colonization efforts, they were worked as sharecroppers in a 
virtually feudal system, while other natives were exported to the Middle East and the Ottoman Empire 
until 1877.  In 1884 Mozambique officially became a colony of Portugal and the country was exploited 
by trading companies who leased large tracts of land to French and British companies (Electoral Institute 
for Sustainable Democracy in Africa: The slave trade and early colonialism 1700-1926). 
Periodic uprisings against Portugal occurred in Mozambique from 1917 to until independence in 
1975.  Trading companies retained a tremendous amount of power throughout that time period and in 
1933 Portugal’s prime minister in 1933, Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, encouraged immigration of 
Portuguese citizens into Mozambique to rid Portugal of landless peasants demanding land reform (The 
Intractability Project, Mozambique 1977-1992 Narrative, n.d.).  Their privileged place socially and 
economically created the class conflicts between the immigrants and the indigenous population that 
gave rise to the war for independence in the 1960’s and although many other colonies peacefully gained 
independence in the 1950’s and 1960’s, Mozambique continued to be a type of province of Portugal 
with Mozambican citizens not having political rights and education and the pathway to becoming a 
Portuguese citizen, being very limited. In 1962 the rebel group Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) 
was formed. FRELIMO and fought an eleven year war for independence from the Portuguese.  When 
independence was finally gained after a vicious war of independence from Portugal no elections were 
arranged as part of the transfer of power and Mozambique declared itself a one-party state (Cabrita, 
2000, 5).   
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The Civil War in Mozambique 
At the time of independence Mozambique had no experience with democracy.  It had been a 
colony of Portugal, itself initially a monarchy, and later a Marxist regime.  As noted above, the transfer 
of power from the colonial authority to FRELIMO was accomplished without elections or any effort to 
assess popular sentiment such as through a referendum.  FRELIMO was a socialist organization with 
support from the Soviet Union and East Germany and attempted to apply socialist solutions to 
Mozambique. These included land and economic reforms and an educational program to eliminate the 
class differences between the ruling elite and the Mozambican population (BTI 2012-Mozambique, 3). 
This movement toward socialism resulted in the conflicts in Mozambique being considered as 
ideological and class based, not based on ethnic issues (Newitt, 1995, 542-543).  FRELIMO removed 
traditional indigenous leaders and leaders who cooperated with the Portuguese and exerted complete 
control over both the economy and the government (Newitt, 1995, 544).    
Despite the efforts by FRELIMO to eliminate class conflicts and bring about reforms, 
Mozambique continued to be plagued by significant economic problems. Between 1975 and 1992 there 
were several coup attempts against the FRELIMO run government, many of them sparked by disgruntled 
members of the military who had been promised material benefits for supporting independence from 
Portugal but had instead received virtually nothing from the socialist government.  White settlers fled 
Mozambique as their houses and businesses were confiscated.    The government also attempted to 
collectivize agricultural land, forbidding private ownership and buying heavy, mechanized farm 
equipment without considering the need for mechanics and operators of the machinery (Cabrita, 2000, 
106, 109, 111-112).   
Armed resistance by various rebel groups, including the Mozambican National Resistance 
(RENAMO), occurred against FRELIMO even before independence. RENAMO was created to conduct a 
campaign against the Marxist Mozambican government and to challenge its authority and was 
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supported by both Rhodesia and South Africa.  RENAMO claimed in their 1982 Congress to have goals of 
creating a multi-party state, a free economy, a state that provided for human rights for all citizens 
although other authors such as Vine argue that in reality it created these goals to obtain international 
support rather than out of any desire to protect or support civilians or traditional leaders (Robinson, 
2006, 54-55).  RENAMO was supported by the white neighboring governments of South Africa and South 
Rhodesia and Malawi acted a channel for guns and money to be sent to RENAMO forces (Newitt, 1995, 
565).  Before 1984 the conflict between FRELIMO and the various rebels groups was limited but the 
conflict intensified in 1984 and more than 900,000 people died between 1975 and the peace agreement 
in 1992 (Bertlesman’s Transformation Index 2012-Mozambique, 3).   
The civil war between FRELIMO and RENAMO was finally resolved by a UN brokered peace 
agreement between them in 1992.  Both parties agreed to a multi-party election which finally occurred 
in 1994 (General Peace Agreement of Mozambique-1992).  The peace settlement called for the 
disbanding of FRELIMO’s secret police and for disbanding of the private armies of all groups.  Despite 
these provisions in the peace agreement FRELIMO and RENAMO have dominated Mozambique 
politically since the peace agreement.  The previous centrally planned economy evolved to a market 
economy, with most of the former political leaders and their followers benefiting (Cabrita, 2000, 270-
271).  The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) report of 2009 notes that this control over the 
market and the administration of the state by FRELIMO continues to be the impediment to the 
consolidation of democracy in Mozambique (APRM-Mozambique-2009). 
At the height of the United Nations peacekeeping mission from 1992 to 1994 with over 6,000 
troops along with 2,500 police and civilian assistants and 900 observers.  However, unlike Liberia which 
has had United Nations peacekeepers continuously since the peace agreement, UN peacekeepers were 
only in Mozambique from the peace agreement in 1992 to November of 1994, and were removed 
shortly after the first election (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumozF.html).  The 
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peacekeeping mission in Mozambique was generally thought to be one of the more successful UN 
peacekeeping missions (BTI-Mozambique, 2012).  
However, even though elections in 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009 have been generally declared 
free and fair, FRELIMO has won every election.  BTI argues that FRELIMO has worked to exclude 
participation by rival parties, particularly the newest party the Democratic Movement of Mozambique 
(MDM) which is a splinter party from RENAMO. In the 2009 election MDM was unable to run in nine out 
of thirteen parliamentary districts, although BTI states that it is currently impossible to verify the 
exclusion was a concerted effort by FRELIMO since the records are not yet publicly available (BTI 2012-
Mozambique, 4, 7).  FRELIMO has also dominated the legislature, winning 75% of the parliamentary 
seats in 2009 for example.  The single-party dominance by FRELIMO has resulted in continued discord 
between the two major parties and the population and demands by RENAMO and its supporters for the 
right to secede from Mozambique and form its own independent state.  It has support in northern and 
central Mozambique in an area spanning five contiguous provinces, but two provinces to the north of 
this area, Sofala and Cabo Delgado are under the control of FRELIMO, meaning any secession by 
RENAMO from Mozambique would isolate these two FRELIMO provinces from the rest of Mozambique 
(Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa:  Mozambique 2009 Assembly of the Republic 
national results, January, 2010).  
 
History of Mozambican Democracy 
Prior to independence Mozambique was governed by the Portuguese without political 
participation by the Mozambicans, leaving them with no experience in self-government.  The new 
government of Mozambique was a single-party system.  A resistance group, RENAMO, supported by 
South Africa and Rhodesia was formed to contest FRELIMO power.  Mozambique’s government became 
a totalitarian state with all powers vested in the ruling FRELIMO party (Cabrita, 2000, 81, 86).   
148 
 
. 
Polity IV data is available for Mozambique from 1975 to 2012.  From 1975 to 1986 Mozambique 
scored a two out of seven for executive restraint.  This indicates a state with almost no restraint on the 
power of the executive, but with some slight but real limitations.  This indicates a state run by the 
executive branch with little constraint by the people, the legislature or the judiciary rep (Polity IV-
Mozambique). 
The legal system was also under the control of the ruling party, which, in an effort to maintain 
control, eliminated private law chambers and created a governmental legal service in its place during 
the civil war.  Few people had access to attorneys and the new service was controlled by the 
government rather than acting as a hedge against governmental oppression.  A political police force was 
also created, empowered to search and arrest people without a warrant and to either detain people, 
send them to court or to a re-education camp.  The police were also able to confiscate property owned 
by political opponents (Cabrita, 2000, 86, 90).   
With its first multiparty election in 1994 Mozambique began its transition to democracy.  In 
1994, after the General Peace Agreement (GPA), Mozambique had a score of four out of seven for 
executive constraint.  This indicates a state that is between having some slight constraints and 
substantial limitations on the executive and is an improvement on this issue before the peace, but still is 
not a fully constrained executive.  This shows the tentative movement toward democracy with the 
establishment of the first multi-party election in 1994 where representatives were elected for the first 
time from parties other than FRELIMO.  This score has stayed the same since 1994 (Polity IV-
Mozambique).  This shows there was no improvement in the concentration of power in the hands of the 
executive, which is also a reflection of the fact that FRELIMO has stayed in continuously in power since 
1994.   
Despite the fact that Mozambique has had regular elections since the GPA, all elections since 
then have been dominated by FRELIMO. In every case, RENAMO has registered complaints of electoral 
149 
 
. 
irregularities and the failure by Mozambique to correct the problems in their elections has reduced trust 
in government by the citizens.  For example, FRELIMO won the 1994 election through a system of 
distribution of seats that favored them.  FRELIMO won the 2009 presidential election with 75% of the 
vote (Cabrita, 2000, 272).    
One of the problems with elections in Mozambique is the allegations that because of the ruling 
party’s control over the government they were able to control the electoral process and government 
policies sufficiently to eliminate any serious threat from other parties.  The problems were resolved 
sufficiently to avoid another civil war when revisions were made in the electoral laws in 2004 and a third 
party, the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM) was organized, giving citizens a third choice. 
This improvement is perhaps reflected in the increase in voter turnout in 2009, after steady declines in 
turnout since the 1994 transitional election.  
To date Mozambique struggles with its transition to democracy.  The 2009 election, despite 
improved turnout had  numerous irregularities in the 2009, such as FRELIMO’s use of power to disqualify 
candidates from other parties.   FRELIMO made  use of state resources for campaigning and controlled in 
large part the media, making difficulty for rival parties to get their message across.  In the 2009 election 
there was also violence directed against rival parties in an attempt to prevent them from holding rallies 
(FreedomHouse.org/2010/Mozambique).  Nonetheless, in 2009 the MDM contested successfully for 
seats in the parliament, despite being excluded from nine out thirteen provincial seat elections by the 
ruling party (BTI-Mozambique, 12).   
One of the ongoing difficulties for Mozambique in becoming a fully consolidated democracy 
involves decentralization of state power.  Mozambique historically had strong traditional leaders and a 
decentralized government.   When FRELIMO took over after independence they attempted to distance 
themselves from these traditional leaders and control the government centrally.  At the end of the civil 
war FRELIMO attempted to reconnect with the traditional leaders, with the president announcing in 
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1995 that he wanted the power of traditional leaders to be reinstated (West and Kloeck-Jenson, 1999, 
462, 457).  This desire to co-opt traditional leaders into the government is also seen in Liberia.  However, 
to date in Mozabique no authority has been granted to them by the central government, resulting in a 
continued conflict between the traditional authorities and central government.  Because of the 
exclusion of traditional leaders in municipal governments FRELIMO also controls that level of 
government, controlling twenty eight out of thirty three municipalities in the 2003 local elections 
(Reconstruction National System Survey-Mozambique, 24).  This further consolidates power in the 
hands of the executive, particularly in a country like Mozambique where the ruling party has had the 
control over the all three branches of government since the end of the civil war.  
 
Transitional Justice and Democracy in Mozambique 
 Although Mozambique did not conduct a TRC, to structure a comparison between this case and 
that of Liberia, I look at Brahms’ (2007) five goals for a TRC to see if they were met in some other way in 
Mozambique.  If a state likeMozambique is able to meet these goals after a serious conflict without 
resort to formal methods of transitional justice such as a TRC this may obviate the need for such 
methods.  If they are less able to make the transition, the need for transitional justice is supported.  This 
section will review those five factors and Mozambique’s post conflict history and the next section will 
look at empirical evidence regarding Mozambique’s success at achieving a democracy. 
Brahms’ first factor regarding TRCs was that they contribute to the loss of authoritarian power 
and help to create democratic alternatives by identifying problems and recommending institutional 
changes that promote accountability and increase civilian control over the military (23).  This did not 
occur in Mozambique because the state adopted a “forgive and forget” attitude regarding the events of 
the war.  Graybill (2004) notes that Mozambique never seriously considered a TRC or war crimes trials.  
According to Graybill both sides were afraid that opening inquiry into abuses by the other side would 
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lead to inquires into abuses by their side and that there was a strong belief in silence rather than justice 
(1125).  The problems that occurred during the war were never addressed and although a written 
amnesty has not been signed by the government, the peace agreement provided for a general amnesty 
and Mozambique has made no efforts to prosecute any of the violators from the war.  This results in at 
least a de facto amnesty.  The Bertlesman Transformation Index (BTI) notes that Mozambique has a 
monopoly of the use of force and control over both the police and military but that the control is not 
enough to guarantee peace and safety due to the extremely high levels of corruption.  This results in 
vigilante justice and challenges both democracy and the rule of law.  Additionally, BTI notes that the 
domination of the administration of the state and public enterprise by FRELIMO is a major challenge to 
democracy; this partially results from the failure to remove or prosecute leaders of the ruling party after 
the peace agreement (BTI-Mozambique, 5).  Although the peace was a negotiated peace between 
FRELIMO and RENAMO, the continued domination of the political arena by one group impairs 
Mozambique’s ability to resolve disputes. 
This failure to provide for transparent and accountable institutions after the conflict is a serious 
impediment to not only democracy and the rule of law, but also to peace and security.  O’Neill (2008) 
notes among states that did not create these transparent and accountable institutions, none of them 
have avoided further violent conflicts with the possible exception of Mozambique (10).  While there has 
not been a return to war since 1992, there have been a number of incidents of civil unrest including the 
bread riots in 2010 which left thirteen dead and 2012 which left several Mozambicans dead (BTI-
Mozambique, 2).  Such conflicts are a sign of growing unrest that cannot be controlled by the 
government.  These riots are related, at least in part, to the slowing of the Mozambican economy from 
2007 to 2012 with an increasing poverty rate that runs counter to its economic growth since the peace 
agreement (BTI-Mozambique, 2).  BTI identifies income inequality as a continuing problem although it 
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has improved since 2003, with a GINI coefficient of 47.3 in 2003 and 45.6 in 2008 (CIA World Factbook-
Mozambique). 34 
The second goal for TRCs was that they allow divergent groups to be heard regarding their 
concerns.  A TRC would accomplish this by having public hearings that allow the airing of all sides of a 
conflict to be heard and publicly disseminated.  Without a TRC, this did not occur formally in 
Mozambique.  Mozambique has a good record in terms of freedom of speech with the Reconstruction 
National Integration System Survey (RNISS) report noting that freedom of speech and of the press is 
guaranteed in Mozambique and that there is little governmental backlash for unpopular positions.  This 
includes the reporting by the media of information about material critical of the government for 
corruption (RNISS, Mozambique 2007, 12). Despite the fact Mozambique has fairly good experience with 
freedom of speech, we should not overlook that fact that in times of elections, the government has 
placed restraints on oppositions groups.  Also if a TRC had been conducted this would have allowed 
more specific criticisms during the hearings of the government and the rebel group RENAMO over their 
actions during the conflict; because there was no TRC that did not occur.   
The third factor is irrelevant since Mozambique did not conduct a TRC, so the contribution of a 
TRC to the movement toward democracy cannot be evaluated.  The fourth and fifth factors can be 
combined because they involve some of the same concepts.   Brahms (2010) argues that TRCs assist in 
the removal of enclaves of non-democratic power by naming names of perpetrators (or at least exposing 
their actions) and contribute to stability and the growth of democracy by “(re)building a sense of shared 
destiny among groups giving them a stake in the ‘national project’ and through shaming perpetrators, 
thereby depriving them of support that might otherwise encourage them to protect their interests 
through extra-constitutional means” (23). 
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 The GINI scale of income inequality has scores from 1 (perfect equality) to 100 (perfect inequality).  The higher 
the number the greater the income inequality; Mozambique’s score makes it 37
th
 out of 136 countries (the lower 
ranking, the worse the inequality). 
153 
 
. 
This has clearly not occurred in Mozambique.  The same two parties that fought in the civil war 
are still the main parties in the government.  The president of Mozambique, Joachim Chissano, was a 
moderate leader who ended the civil war and established a multi-party government in Mozambique.  He 
was not generally connected with war crimes and human rights violations.  However, many members of 
both FRELIMO and RENAMO, including the leader of RENAMO, Afonso Dhlakama, who has run for the 
presidency in every election since independence, have been connected to war crimes and human rights 
violations during the war (Vines, 1998).  Weinstein (2002) argues that because the two parties involved 
in the civil war evolved into the parties vying for control of the government, the fear of retribution from 
a former enemy should they gain control of the government is enormous.  According to Weinstein: 
In a country where the two leading parties were shooting at one another only a few years ago, 
the prospect of “payback time” is frightening to contemplate. Unfortunately, Mozambique’s 
constitution—with its conspicuous lack of federalism, separation of powers, and checks and 
balances—is tailor-made to become a charter of revenge for sore winners lusting to punish their 
defeated rivals (153). 
 
Graybill (2004) argues there is concern for peace in Mozambique, noting that even if the current leaders 
are willing to “forgive and forget”, future generations may not be.  He also notes that when individual 
perpetrators were not at least identified the chance of a return to war intensifies (1127). 
Mozambique’s highly centralized government, where the president and his cabinet can appoint 
all government positions other than Assembly members, down to the district level, makes the 
presidential election more critical (152).  Almost all seats in the legislature have been held by one of the 
two parties since 1995, with FRELIMO winning over 76% of the seats in the 2009 Assembly election 
(Electoral Institute for Democracy in Africa, 2009 Assembly Electoral Results, January 2010).  So, in 
addition to holding the power to appoint virtually all government positions in Mozambique, FRELIMO 
holds control over the unicameral legislature.  Were RENAMO to win the presidency they would at least 
control government appointments and, by manipulating election procedures, conceivably the assembly. 
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 Unlike Liberia’s political system where the Unity Party holds the presidency and the power to 
appoint government jobs but is forced to share power with a variety of political parties because it does 
not dominate the legislature, Mozambique has been controlled since independence by one party.  The 
creation of at least a de facto amnesty by the failure to prosecute anyone for war crimes or human 
rights violations during the war has allowed both parties, but particularly FRELIMO, to benefit financially 
(RNISS-Mozambique, 2007, 19).  RNISS notes the World Bank states that Mozambique 
…started the transition (to democracy) with greater continuity between the old and new 
systems, less developed public administrations, and weaker civil societies tended to adopt a 
path of partial political and economic reforms that intensified a wide range of rent generating 
economic distortions and placed only minimal mechanisms for accountability on public officials. 
This has proven to be fertile ground for the growth of state capture and administrative 
corruption (30). 
 
RNISS notes that because the FRELIMO was in control at the time of the peace agreement and 
had the only experience in governing it was able to control the peace process to insure it stayed in 
power.  This leaves the other power, RENAMO, to have to threaten to return to war to be heard, not an 
effective way to participate (RNISS-Mozambique, 17).  According to Manning (2010) FRELIMO 
manipulated elections rules, particularly prior to the 2009 federal election, to limit opposition and small 
parties from being able to contest elections.  She notes that in the 2009 election in particular there was 
widespread and systematic manipulation of the system to insure a FRELIMO victory (151).  Manning also 
notes because FRELIMO came out of the civil war with large amounts of government property to finance 
its operations it is better able financially to dominate the political scene (153).  Because FRELIMO 
controls government it controls the rules of the political game in Mozambique, allowing it to control the 
state without having to appear authoritarian (154).   
Mansfield and Snyder (1995) discuss the dangers of democratization in post-conflict societies 
and recommend that elites, particularly from the military, in the authoritarian regime be given golden 
parachutes in terms of incentives to leave the government but be removed from positions of authority 
to make the transition to democracy possible (88-89).  This has not happened in Mozambique because 
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there was no removal or neutralization of elites and the military by war crimes trials, TRCs or lustration, 
the elites have continued to rule the state much as they did prior to the peace agreement.   
 
Measures of Democracy In Mozambique 
Like with the Liberian case study, this case study utilizes more detailed data from Polity IV, along 
with the subset data from Freedom House on individual aspects of democracy.  According to Polity IV 
Mozambique has made great strides in its transition from autocracy to democracy in the post civil war 
period, but Mozambique has never  been a democracy since the inception of the Polity IV index despite 
these great strides.  In 1981, during the civil war, Mozambique scored a -8 out of a possible score of -10 
to +10 on the autocracy/democracy scale, with a -10 being a perfect autocracy and +10 being a perfect 
democracy.  In 1992, at the time of the peace negotiations, it had only progressed to a -6, still an 
autocracy.  In 1994, the year of the first election its score improved to a +5, giving it slightly short of a 
democratic score.  Its Polity IV score has remained at a +5 from 1994 to 2012, reflecting the successful 
election in 1994 but no more strides toward a consolidated democracy since that election.  This shows 
that although they have made some movement toward democracy since the peace agreement, further 
progress toward democracy has not occurred in nine years.  See Figure 6.1 below. 
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Figure 6.1: Mozambique and Polity IV Scores-1981 to 2010 35 
 
Source:  Polity IV 
 
Polity IV’s index shows that Mozambique has a score of seven out of a possible ten for the first 
component of democracy, that of Executive Recruitment.   This is described as showing “transitional or 
restricted elections”.  They note that although Mozambique’s elections are considered relatively free 
and fair, the same party has been in control since 1992.  The control by FRELIMO is maintained, at least 
in part, by its control over the electoral process and its ability to use the media and other resources to 
publicize its candidates.  The ruling party chooses the candidates without competition and citizens vote 
for that party’s candidate because there are no other real choices—the only other visible party, 
RENAMO, is incapable of winning enough seats in parliament or contesting the presidency.  
 Mozambique’s elections are contested and FRELIMO is not winning with huge margins but the 
margin of victory continues to increase with each presidential election.  The margin of victory over 
RENAMO in the first election in 1994 was 53.3% FRELIMO versus 33.7% for RENAMO, but in 2009 
FRELIMO garnered 75% of the vote versus 16.4% for RENAMO.  The deterioration of RENAMO’s position 
is equally as stark in terms of parliamentary seats, with RENAMO’s share decreasing from a high of 117 
seats in 1999 to a low of 51 in 2009 while FRELIMO’s share went from a low of 129 in 1994 to a high of 
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191 in 2009.  There was a relative balance of 129 seats to 112 seats in the first election in 1994 but the 
balance has tilted dramatically toward FRELIMO by 2009 (Manning, 2010, 153).    
Manning notes that not only does FRELIMO dominate in the national offices they also control 
99% of the municipal assemblies and mayoral positions and all of the provincial assemblies (160).  
Ostheimer (2005) notes that while the presidential election tends to be the focus of international 
groups, the impact of election irregularities and fraud is much greater on the parliamentary level and 
probably resulted, at least in the 2004 election, in the loss of several seats to opposition parties (134). 
The last component of the Polity IV score for Mozambique concerns political participation.  
According to Polity IV, there are several, clearly identifiable political groups in Mozambique, although 
FRELIMO and RENAMO are the most powerful.  The hostilities between the groups still continue and 
have resulted in political violence and demonstrations, boycotted elections and secession threats by 
RENAMO in the northern and central provinces.  One positive occurrence has been the emergence of a 
third party, the MDM, which was not part of the polarized civil war years and may be able to offer an 
alternative for voters.  In the 2009 they won a respectable 8.6% of the presidential vote and 8 seats in 
the parliament, showing they have the ability to become a factor in Mozambique if they can more fully 
participate (Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa).  Political participation is an area, 
according to Polity IV, where Mozambique is making its best showing, with a score for political 
competitiveness showing a transition to competitive patterns of participation and scores for regulation 
of participation showing that groups are stable and enduring and contest elections, although they have 
great difficulty working with each other (Polity IV Country Reports-Mozambique).  However, ten parties 
other than FRELIMO and RENAMO had their entire candidate lists rejected by the National Electoral 
Commission (CNE) in 2009, seventeen other parties were excluded from running in at least one district, 
and MDM was excluded in nine out of thirteen electoral districts without the possibility of review or 
redress for the exclusion (Manning, 2010, 156-157).   
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However, the fact that Mozambique’s Polity IV scores have stayed at a +5 since the first election 
shows that while it is stable, which is good, it is not improving. This may be due to the unresolved 
conflicts between FRELIMO and RENAMO.  Not long ago Ostheimer (2005) perdicted that because there 
were no opponents poised to contest FRELIMO successfully and the political institutions are too weak to 
provide a check against the government, there was a strong chance Mozambique might return to a one-
party authoritarian state (135).  Despite Ostheimer’s predictions, by 2013 Mozambique has still 
continued to function as a multi-party state although the 2009 election which was dominated by 
FRELIMO continues to be concerning. The recent attempts by the third party, MDM to become a viable 
political party are a good sign for Mozambican politics.   
Polity IV only measures political or governmental organizations or polities and does not consider 
civil liberties.  The Freedom House index measures both political and civil rights.  Mozambique has 
remained fairly steady from 1994 to 2011 according to the Freedom House scale, similar to its 
performance in the Polity IV scale; however Freedom House has noted a negative slide in democracy in 
Mozambique since the election of 2009.  According to Freedom House, Mozambique was an electoral 
democracy from2007 to 2009, but slipped to a non-electoral democracy in 2010 due to widespread 
irregularities in the 2009 election, including in the rejection of party lists and tabulation of election 
results.  In 2010 Mozambique’s scores for electoral process slipped from the threshold seven out of 
twelve to a six out of twelve, dropping it from the list of electoral democracies.  Their score in political 
pluralism slipped in the same year, reflecting the concerns regarding the 2009 elections.  They have not 
improved since 2010.  Manning (2010) agrees with this evaluation by Freedom House noting that 
although Mozambique was originally thought of as one of the democratic success stories in Africa, it is 
now looking more like a single party dominant regime than a democracy due to the manipulation of 
elections and the continued strength of FRELIMO makes democracy unlikely (163-4).  She notes that 
although the ruling party has not engaged in violations of civil liberties they have been able to control 
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the state by manipulating the institutions that control elections and by the superior economic status 
they received from being the controlling party when peace was negotiated (154). 
 Both Manning and Freedom House note widespread corruption (this will be considered under 
Rule of Law, below) and efforts to restrict or harass journalists and the press, along with periodic 
violence during political demonstrations.  Two other problems with Mozambique from 2010 to date, 
according to Freedom House, were the food and transportation riots and violence by state security 
forces and rival parties against political campaigns and rallies (Freedom House-Mozambique-2010).  No 
changes, positive or negative, were noted for between 2011 and 2013 (Freedom House-Mozambique-
2011, 2012, 2013). 
The Freedom House scores for civil liberties show slight improvements in civil liberties from 
2006 to 2013, with improvements in freedom of expression, rule of law and individual rights from 2006 
to 2013.  The biggest gain, from a ten out of sixteen to a twelve of sixteen occurred in freedom of 
expression and that right continues to have the highest score for Mozambique (Freedom House-
Mozambique).  This is consistent with the finding that the Mozambican government has been fairly 
supportive of freedom of speech but tends to ignore the opinions that are given that are contrary to 
their policies. 
Both the Polity IV and Freedom House scores show a substantial improvement in Mozambique’s 
levels of democracy immediately after the peace agreement but essentially stasis since that time.  After 
the civil war ended Mozambique made substantial gains toward becoming a consolidated democracy, 
holding their first post-independence elections in 1994 and subsequent elections in 1999, 2004 and 
2009.  Those elections have been criticized for electoral irregularities and have been boycotted 
periodically by the minority party RENAMO.  Racial and ethnic disputes do not divide the country; the 
biggest division is caused by political divisions between the two main parties who were also the two 
antagonistic groups in the civil war.  Unfortunately, there has been no substantial movement toward 
160 
 
. 
healing those divisions since 1992 and the country appears to be stuck in limbo, partially democratic and 
partially authoritarian because of the rule of the majority party.  This creates animosity between the 
parties and makes it difficult for them to work together to better.  The choice to “forgive and forget” has 
resulted in a polarized society with unresolved justice claims. 
Mozambique’s decision to grant amnesty and to avoid most methods of transitional justice has 
resulted in relative stability.  They have not experienced a return to civil war, which is extremely 
important for them given the sixteen year length of the previous civil war and the large number of 
casualties and displaced people as a result of the violence.  This stability is the rationale often given for 
the use of amnesties and the avoidance of war crimes tribunals and TRCs.  However, Mozambique 
appears to be stagnant politically due to the implacable nature of the conflict between FRELIMO and 
RENAMO and if the 2009 is an indication, may be sliding back towards repression and autocracy.   
 
The Effect of a “Forgive and Forget” Policy on Rule of Law 
 Mozambique did not conduct a TRC or war crimes trials or any other type of transitional justice 
other than a de facto amnesty.  The literature suggests that the failure to bring accountability for crimes 
that occurred during a conflict leads to impunity, a lack of accountability and lack of respect for the rule 
of law.  According to the BTI there several areas of concern in Mozambique with regard to the rule of 
law, including corruption, the lack of an efficient police and judicial system, lack of judicial independence 
and the continued use of torture by the police (BTI-2012-Mozambique).  These issues reflect the 
improvement of rule of law to a certain level but the lack of continued growth or improvement.   
Figure 6.2 below shows the CIRI index data from 1981 to 2010.  When the peace agreement was 
signed in 1992 the rule of law score improved dramatically from a fifteen to a twenty in 1993, based 
primarily on an improvement in physical integrity rights across the entire index, including scores on 
torture, disappearances, extra-judicial killing and in the treatment of political prisoners.  Unfortunately, 
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the scores went down immediately thereafter and in several years returned to the pre-peace agreement 
levels or lower.  The scores improved slightly in 2010 but are still substantially below the 1993 score.  
This makes it clear there are ongoing problems with the rule of law in Mozambique.   
 
Figure 6.2:  Rule of Law in Mozambique-1981 to 2010. 36 
 
 
 
Source:  CIRI Index 
 
 One of the areas where rule of law scores in Mozambique also deteriorated was in the 
empowerment index, an index which looks at civil liberties in general including freedom of expression 
and association, freedom of movement, electoral self-determination, freedom of religion, and worker’s 
right.  Both Freedom House 37 and BTI note the deterioration of civil liberties in Mozambique, including 
arbitrary harassment and violence by the police, the use of torture and increased control over the 
media.  Although Mozambique has signed most of the human rights conventions including the 
Convention on Torture and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, their record for 
human rights abuses still continues to be a concern (BTI-2012-Mozambique).   
BTI notes that FRELIMO appeals to Mozambicans because it was the party that obtained 
independence for Mozambique and therefore has legitimacy with the populace.  The party uses this 
legitimacy to control most aspects of Mozambican life including public administration; because the party 
                                                          
36
 Vertical line represents the peace agreement in 1992 
37
 Noted above in the discussion of democracy and Freedom House. 
0 
3 
6 
9 
12 
15 
18 
21 
24 
27 
30 
1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 
162 
 
. 
is so embedded in public life, it can guarantee party members jobs and patronage.  BTI notes that is 
spreads down even to the provincial assembly level, where party members can obtain jobs and incomes 
in areas so impoverished and lacking in resources that the government does not even have a place to 
meet (BTI-2012-Mozambique).     
This pervasive corruption is also seen in the corruption perception index score for Mozambique.  
The index has scores from 1999 to 2011 although no data is available for 2001 and 2002.  The scores 
show an increase in the level of corruption but more critically, the status of Mozambique compared to 
the rest of the world in terms of corruption is also deteriorating.  See Figure 6.3 below for the 2003 to 
2011 data. 
 
Figure 6.3: CPI Index for Mozambique-2002 to 2012 38 
 
Source: Transparency International                            
In 1999, the first year that Transparency International had data for Mozambique it had an 
adjusted score of 102nd in the world out of 180 countries.  A low ranking in the world is good, with one 
being the least corrupt country in the world out of approximately 180 ranked states.  Unfortunately for 
Mozambique, this was their best position with Transparency International.  In 2002 Mozambique’s 
scores deteriorated to 162nd in the world and although they have improved since 2003 they have not 
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recovered to the 1999 level.  By 2012 the scores have improved slightly but their ranking in the world 
slipped to 127th, showing they are not improving in comparison to the rest of the world.   
 Transparency International’s comparative rankings are based on information from corporate 
and government sources, including banks, but not on information from citizens within the state.  
However, in April and May of 2011 they conducted a survey of one thousand Mozambique citizens.  56% 
of citizens surveyed in 2011 answered that the level of corruption in Mozambique had increased and 
23% answered that it has stayed the same.  Only 21% believed it had decreased and only 4.9% of them 
believed it had decreased a lot. 
Citizens were also surveyed regarding the institutions that were viewed as corrupt.  This is 
relevant since if the source of corruption is a non-governmental agency it may not be under the control 
of the government or may not have an effect on the rule of law.  They were asked to rate the corruption 
of a variety of institutions on a one to five scale, with five representing extreme corruption and one 
representing not at all corrupt.  The institution with the highest ranking for corruption was the police, 
with 58.2% feeling giving them a 5, 21.8% giving them a 4 and 11.6% giving them a 3.  Only 7.7% of the 
population gave them a 1 or 2.  In contrast, NGOs and the media both received very low scores for 
corruption (70.9% for media, 72.2% for NGOs).  Interestingly, only 45% of the people surveyed had ever 
had contact with the police.  The judicial system had better scores, with 27% giving them a 4 or 5 and 
25.3% giving them a 3.  This shows there is more confidence in the judiciary as opposed to the police, 
although only 19.7% percent of those surveyed said they had had contact with the judiciary, which may 
explain the difference in scores (Transparency International-Public Perceptions of Corruption-
Mozambique). 
This belief in widespread corruption in the Mozambican police force is supported by the United 
States’ Department of State.  In March of 2012 they issued a report on crime and safety in Mozambique 
which noted various obstacles to effective policing, including the lack of landline telephones, 
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transportation, funds for fuel for transportation, the lack of police equipment and low pay for police 
officers.  The report also notes that bribes of even a few dollars can make charges disappear and that 
“Tolerance of corruption breeds a complacent attitude toward dealing with it in the PRM” (OSAC Crime 
and Safety Report). 
Mozambicans have been surveyed three times by Afrobarometer regarding the views of the rule 
of law in Mozambique.  As part of the survey process in 2008 a briefing paper was issued by 
Afrobarometer because, as noted in the paper, the rule of law is a great challenge in Africa’s democratic 
reform process, but even a bigger challenge for Mozambique because of the history of Marxist-Leninist 
ideology.  The paper also notes the even greater likelihood of the subversion of the rule of law in a 
country like Mozambique which is highly centralized (Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 86, 2010, 1). 
Afrobarometer looked at survey questions asked in the 3rd round in 2005, the 4th round in 2008 
and the 5th round in 2012.  The questions and the percentage of people giving different answers to the 
questions are noted below in Tables 6.1 through 6.3. 
 
Table 6.1: President’s Observance of Rule of Law, 2005, 2008 and 2012 
 Never Rarely Often Always Don’t Know 
       
2005 47 14 9 6 25 
2008 28 20 8 5 39 
2012 33 17 9 6 35 
 Source: Afrobarometer-Mozambique 
 For Table 6.1 Mozambicans were asked to respond to the question “How often does the 
president ignore the constitution (2005)/the laws of this country (2008) the courts and laws of this 
country (2012)”.  The number of people believing he never ignores the laws or the constitution went 
down dramatically from 47% to 28% from 2005 to 2008 even though the same president was in office.  
The number who didn’t know also went up dramatically.  After the 2009 election the number of people 
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believing he never ignores the courts and laws of the country improved slightly from 28% to 33% and 
the number not knowing also improved.  The change from 2005 to 2008 was consistent with a 
decreasing faith in the office of the president and may have been caused by the change in presidents to 
the new president, Guebuza, in 2005, with citizens becoming more informed from 2005 to 2008 on the 
new president.  It may also be consistent with a decreasing faith in the rule of law, making the next 
survey results critical.  The fact the percentage of people believing in the president increased is a 
positive sign for Mozambique, indicating the new president may be inspiring faith. 
 A second survey question involved citizens’ belief that officials observed the rule of law and was 
again asked in 2005, 2008 and 2012.  See Table 6.2 below for the results of that survey. 
 
Table 6.2: Official’s Observance of Rule of Law, 2005, 2008 and 2012 
 Never Rarely Often Always Don’t Know 
       
2005 26 19 20 18 16 
2008 18 22 28 14 19 
2012 20 21 28 21 9 
Source: Afrobarometer-Mozambique 
 In 2005 and 2008 Mozambicans were asked the question “How often are people treated 
unequally under the law?”  In 2012 they were asked the question “Are people treated unequally under 
the law?”  People in Mozambique were 38% confident in 2005, 42% in 2008 and 49% in 2012 that the 
judicial system treats people unequally.  This shows that trust in the legal system is deteriorating, with 
almost half of Mozambicans believing people are treated unequally under the law.  This is consistent 
with a deteriorating belief in the rule of law in Mozambique. 
 A third survey question involved the punishment of ordinary people as opposed to officials.  A 
belief that ordinary people get punished more often than officials would be consistent with the belief 
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that officials are able to use corrupt methods, such as bribery or threats based on their official positions, 
to influence punishment.  See Table 6.3 below for those survey results. 
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Table 6.3: Ordinary People as Opposed to Officials Going Unpunished, 2008 and 2012 
 Never Rarely Often Always Don’t Know 
      
2008 Ordinary People 26 27 22 9 17 
2008 Officials 21 24 27 9 19 
2012 Ordinary People 26 27 18 12 16 
2012 Officials 21 28 21 13 17 
             Source: Afrobarometer-Mozambique 
For this table for both 2008 and 2012 people were asked “How often, in this country, do 
ordinary people who break the law go unpunished?” and “How often, in this country, do officials who 
commit crimes go unpunished?”.  The difference between ordinary citizens’ and officials’ treatment is 
relatively minor in both 2008 and 2012, showing a belief there is comparable treatment between the 
two groups, according to the survey but 36% in 2008 and 34% in 2012, or over one-third of participants 
in both surveys believed officials are often or always allowed to escape punishment and 31% in 2008 
and 30% in 2012 believe that ordinary citizens escape punishment.  This is indicative of the corruption 
noted by Transparency International and although it has not deteriorated, the fact there is a consistent 
belief that ordinary people and public officials go unpunished shows a deficit in the rule of law in 
Mozambique. 
These surveys and the Transparency International Index indicate an increasing and ongoing level 
of corruption in Mozambique which is incompatible with improvements in the rule of law.  Additionally, 
Mozambique seems to be experiencing an increase in corruption, unlike Liberia which is making some 
improvement.  While both states still struggle with corruption, Mozambique’s political system seems to 
lead to corruption.  This domination is due, at least in part, to the power that FRELIMO received from 
the GPA and the failure to provide for any sort of accountability for leaders; the same leaders during the 
civil war are in government in Mozambique today. It is possible a TRC would have avoided this by acting 
as a check on the power of the two warring parties, exposing their actions and demanding some form of 
accountability. This is also true of Liberia to some extent, but the failure of any political party to 
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dominate in Liberia (the UP won both the 2005 and 2011 elections but both in a runoff election and the 
UP has not held a majority in Congress in 2005 or 2011) makes the possibility of addressing corruption 
more clear.  While citizens in both states have discussed concerns regarding corruption, the ability to 
vote a corrupt party member out of office in Liberia acts as a constraint on corruption.  Term limits for 
the president does as well-the head of the UP is president Johnson-Sirleaf and it is questionable if the 
party will prevail in 2016 due to the two term limit for the President in the Liberian constitution.  This 
constraint does not exist in Mozambique and although it is not a one party state, only one party has 
controlled most of the government since independence to today.  
 
The Effect of Amnesty on Mozambique 
 The General Peace Agreement, negotiated and signed by Popular Assembly, controlled by the 
ruling FRELIMO party, contained a provision for a general and unconditional amnesty for all 
Mozambicans in 1992, including those held in prison for political reasons and those working with the 
various rebel factions (Bulletin of the Republic).  Unlike in South Africa, there was no requirement of 
confession for violations of law and no testimony required in front of a truth commission.  Instead, 
everyone was given an amnesty and to date there has been no attempt to prosecute.  There is a 
question as to whether there was actually a signed and implemented amnesty; Hayner (2011) discussed 
this amnesty with several governmental leaders in Mozambique who asserted there was not an amnesty 
granted because RENAMO refused an amnesty, feeling they had done nothing wrong to need an 
amnesty (197).  Regardless of perception, a general amnesty was granted and even more importantly, 
the lack of any effort at prosecution since 1992 amounts to a de facto amnesty.   
 According to Hayner, even Human Rights Watch, a group that generally supports war crimes 
prosecutions, agrees that prosecution would be difficult in Mozambique because atrocities occurred on 
all sides and because the major actors had tampered with evidence, prosecutions would more likely 
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have resulted in personal revenge than in justice (198).  Although a TRC might have alleviated this 
concern by allowing all sides to make a record of the events during the civil war without fear of 
prosecution, a TRC was not considered by Mozambique and trials were rejected out of hand.  As noted 
by Hayner, this has resulted in many people who committed the worst atrocities sitting in Parliament or 
still involved in the military.  She also notes that since atrocities were committed on all sides, including 
the government side during the war, it would be impossible to accurately hold everyone involved in the 
conflict accountable (197).  Liberia faced this same problem after its civil war.  The Liberian its TRC, while 
trying to create accountability, had produced some of the same results as the amnesty in Mozambique.  
The failure to carry out the recommendations for prosecution and lustration in Liberia after the TRC 
mirrors the conditions resulting from the de facto amnesty in Mozambique. 
 Hayner (2011) also looks at the effect of the general amnesty in Mozambique on Mozambican 
politics and argues that the failure to prosecute has had an effect on Mozambique.  Because FRELIMO 
has stayed in power since the end of the civil war, they have been able to control the transitional justice 
agenda.   They are in control of the government and much of the resources of government, letting them 
set the agenda for the discussion.  Hayner notes that Mozambican politicians, particularly those of third 
parties, have tried to use the atrocities during the civil war politically without success. Hayner attributes 
this to the belief that efforts to talk about the past would result in restarting the hate, leading to 
another war (198-199). 
 One of the concerns regarding amnesties is the possibility they lead to impunity.  Igreja (2007) 
notes that the effect of the amnesty in Mozambique was to provide for a “culture of denial”, one where 
no retribution, acknowledgement of suffering, financial compensation, counseling for stress, or mental 
health services for victims or perpetrators was provided.  He predicts that out of this culture of denial 
could come the collapse of the post-war communities of Mozambique, meaning either the return of the 
violence of the civil war or an alienation of the victims from the rest of society because of the failure of 
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society to recognize or deal with the effects of the violence (22).  There are, unfortunately, few case 
studies of Mozambique and Igreja’s is one the few that addressed directly the effect of the war and 
amnesty on the people and in particular in one region in Mozambique, Gorongosa.  Unfortunately the 
study was conducted in a stronghold area of the RENAMO and is not, therefore, indicative of the entire 
country, but does provide some insights into the effect of the amnesty. 
Colvin (2007) looks comparatively at Mozambique, Namibia, Malawi, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe and their efforts at reconciliation.  He notes that Mozambique had their demobilization and 
reintegration of former combatants well-funded and had significant international cooperation, but were 
unusual in the insistence on using none of the methods of transitional justice such as trials, memorials, 
TRCs or reparations out of fear that these methods, particularly that of memorialization, will provide a 
place that could exacerbate tensions by providing an ongoing reminder of the events (324, 328).   
After the GPA, Mozambique's leaders chose a different approach to democratization and rule of 
law than Liberia. They were rewarded with some initial success.  Eleven years after the end of the war 
the country is still at peace and despite some food riots and threats by the rival party RENAMO,   has 
been successfully controlled by its current government.  It was able to conduct four violence- free 
elections and has achieved substantial economic success.  It also improved in rule of law although its 
record on corruption has begun to deteriorate in the past thirteen years.  The growth of a third party, 
MDM, is a positive sign for Mozambicans dissatisfied with the status quo two parties from the civil war. 
However, Mozambique appears to be unable to make further progress on democracy since the 
initial post-GPA gains.  Freedom House reports that democracy is actually deteriorating and the 
allegations regarding restrictions on political participation by MDM candidates in the 2009 election are 
disturbing.  The increasing level of corruption, and perhaps more importantly, the perception by citizens 
that corruption in endemic and increasing, is concerning for future improvements in the rule of law. 
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Mozambique made a conscious choice at the end of the civil war to offer a de facto amnesty for 
all perpetrators and to not conduct a TRC or other type of commission regarding the events of the war.  
The result is the continued political domination of both of the parties from the civil war, FRELIMO and 
RENAMO, and many of the same commanders and leaders from the war.  Political elites have not been 
removed from either party and they continue to experience difficulties in working together for 
Mozambique.  
 
Comparison of Mozambique and Liberia 
Overall, despite concerns over the amnesty and lack of transitional justice , Mozambique, like 
Liberia, has been able to maintain the status quo in terms of both democracy and the rule of law since 
the conclusion of their conflicts.  In Mozambique, however, corruption appears to be growing and there 
has been additional civil unrest resulting in small numbers of civilian deaths over economic issues.  What 
is most concerning about Mozambique, however, is the fact that it has been unable to overcome the 
political and ideological divide that led, in large part, to the brutal civil war.  Calls by RENAMO for 
secession of six northern and central provinces are a sign this conflict has not been resolved and 
continues to create problems for Mozambique and interfering with its transition to democracy and the 
rule of law. 
The question is, of course, would Mozambique have been better able to resolve this conflict if 
they had utilized a TRC in place of amnesty and did Liberia benefit from utilizing a TRC?  Both Liberia and 
Mozambique experienced intense conflicts, with large numbers of battle deaths and an extended war.  
Neither was a democracy prior to the civil war and both emerged with higher levels of democracy and 
the rule of law after their respective peace agreements were signed.   
Both Liberia and Mozambique have similar scores regarding democracy and rule of law after 
their civil wars.  Liberia chose to allow a de facto amnesty to occur and, although it carried out and 
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publicized results of a TRC, the government did not follow the recommendations of the TRC for 
lustration and prosecution of offenders.  This has resulted in acknowledged offenders such as Prince 
Johnson continuing in political office while others walk freely with no fear of prosecution.  Despite the 
fact that over 60% of the population wants offenders to be held accountable, this has not happened yet 
in Liberia.  While there is no direct evidence that the TRC has improved democracy in Liberia nor does it 
appear that the TRCs has cause democracy to deteriorate or the state to destabilize.  Polity IV notes 
some positive signs in Liberia, including improvements in the electoral processes and political 
participation and in constraints on the executive.  However, Liberians continue to distrust their 
government and particularly their judicial system.  The fact the recommendations of the TRC were made 
and then not followed through on has not helped with the creation of trust.  Even if a TRC had been 
held, Mozambique would have had similar resource problems to those experienced by Liberia, although 
Mozambique experienced substantial economic growth after the GPA and may have been better able to 
provide for compensation, memorials or a TRC than Liberia. 
Mozambique consciously chose to not seek transitional justice and to leave in power the same 
two parties that were on opposite sides in the civil war.  The result of that choice is that the two parties 
who were opponents in the civil war remain in power, with FRELIMO continuing to dominate the 
government.  If a TRC had been conducted it is possible either prosecution or lustration could have 
occurred, but at minimum the facts about the civil war would have come out and might have influenced 
people’s support of FRELIMO.  FRELIMO’s control of the electoral process has caused Freedom House to 
remove Mozambique from the list of electoral democracies due to election irregularities, an ominous 
sign for Mozambique given the difficult relationship between the two parties.  Mozambique is now 
experiencing deterioration in democracy, unlike Liberia. 39 
                                                          
39
 It should be noted that Liberia’s civil war ended eleven years after Mozambique’s. 
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The question, of course, is whether a TRC would have changed this stalemate position in 
Mozambique.  That is impossible to answer with certainty, particularly given Liberia’s experience with its 
TRC recommendations.  However, at worst it might have cleared up the record regarding the actions of 
both parties during the war and allowed the emergence of a different party or leaders.  At best, it might 
have led to accountability of the worst offenders and reduced the power of FRELIMO.  
 Liberia has done better in rule of law: since the decision to conduct a TRC in 2005 Liberia 
improved in both CIRI scores and in corruption relative to the rest of the world.  There has, however, 
been no improvement in CIRI scores since the commencement of the TRC and it is possible that the 
failure to adopt the recommendations of the TRC for prosecution and lustration may impact rule of law.  
The fact that more than half of Liberians want accountability for the violations during the civil war and 
have not to date received it may have an impact on rule of law.  Additionally, the fact that the judicial 
system remains corrupt and expensive means trust in law has not occurred.  That is not directly 
attributable to the TRC, nor are the economic problems that still plague Liberia and certainly have an 
impact on the ability of the government in general and the judicial system and police force in particular 
to function adequately.    
Mozambique’s experience with the rule of law is similar to their experience with democracy.  
Some gains were made immediately after the end of the civil war, but without any accountability 
corruption has become rampant in Mozambique and in fact is worsening.  Mozambique has experienced 
reductions in its CIRI scores, particularly for empowerment and in 2010 and 2012 experienced riots that 
involved deaths.  The riots did not involve enough deaths to reach the 25 battle death threshold for 
PRIO, but are certainly concerning, as was Mozambique’s reaction to the riots.  Instead of trying to 
remedy the cause of the riots, the government’s response was simply to pacify the rioters by reducing 
the price of food again, at best a short term remedy.  Mozambique has had over 10 years to improve its 
rule of law scores and instead of improving them, has actually allowed them to deteriorate. 
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Despite the issues of Liberia’s TRC it appears to be consistent with the quantitative findings of 
this dissertation.  Liberia had an intense conflict, created a TRC and is making movement toward an 
improved rule of law and has achieved a democracy.  It certainly has not completed the transition to 
democracy but it has conducted two fair and free elections since the GPA and has improved dramatically 
its physical integrity rights and empowerment rights, both critical to the improvement in rule of law.  It 
remains to be seen if the limitations of the TRC affect Liberia in the future but it appears to at least be 
stable at this point. 
Mozambique, on the other hand, experienced a very intense conflict but has not had the benefit 
of any transitional justice methods.  It initially made some improvements in democracy and rule of law 
after the GPA but in the past few years, and particularly since the 2009 election, has scores in 
democracy and rule of law that are lower than Liberia’s and appear to be regressing.  It also continues to 
experience high levels of corruption which are increasing rather than improving.  
It may be premature to look at Liberia’s experience to see if it supports a relationship between 
TRCs and democracy and the rule of law because the TRC concluded so recently.  The successful 2011 
election, two years after the conclusion of the TRC is an encouraging sign.  The continued improvement 
in corruption scores and other scores are also encouraging and support the existence of a relationship.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN: ARE TRCS BENEFICIAL TO A STATE SEEKING DEMOCRACY AND RULE OF LAW? 
 TRCs have been conducted since 1981 at great cost, both economic and non-economic, to the 
states and the people participating in the.  Have the benefits of TRCs in terms of democracy and rule of 
law outweighed the costs?  This is a complicated question. While this study has helped to provide part of 
the answers to the question, many questions still remain for future study.  Several issues regarding the 
relationship were outlined in the Chapter Two review of the literature.  This concluding chapter provides  
brief recap and an application of the information from the quantitative data and the case studies to 
these various issues.   
Six hypotheses, derived from a review of the literature, were analyzed in this dissertation using 
quantitative methods.  The six hypotheses are: 
Hypothesis One:  There is a positive relationship between a state having conducted a TRC and an 
 increase in democracy. 
Hypothesis Two:  There is a greater change in democracy in post conflict states that utilized a 
 TRC as opposed to amnesties. 
Hypothesis Three: States that experience intense conflicts with cumulative battle deaths in 
 excess of one thousand and conduct a TRC experience higher democracy scores than states with 
 intense conflicts that do not conduct a TRC. 
Hypothesis Four:  There is a positive relationship between a state having conducted a TRC and 
 an increase in rule of law. 
Hypothesis Five:  There is a greater change in rule of law in post conflict states that utilized a 
 TRC as opposed to amnesties. 
Hypothesis Six: States that experience intense conflicts with cumulative battle deaths in excess 
 of one thousand and conduct a TRC experience higher rule of law scores than states with 
 intense conflicts that do not conduct a TRC. 
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The Relationship Between TRCs and Democracy 
 This relationship has been one of the hotly contested issues regarding TRCs since the first TRC 
were conducted.  Some authors, such as Olsen, Payne, and Reiter (2010) conclude that there is actually 
a negative relationship between TRCs and democracy probably because TRCs do not involve 
prosecutions of offenders and therefore lead to a culture of impunity and because they do not 
conclusively eliminate the leaders of the repressive regime, causing a potential backlash (134).  The 
author of the other main empirical study, Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010) agrees they are not related but 
argues that many of the important changes states make to achieve democracy, such as electoral 
systems and constraints on the executive branch are not related to the activities of a TRC and in fact 
often occur before the TRC is conducted (2005).  He does note, however, that in two of his case studies, 
El Salvador and Chile, substantial democratic progress was made but relates that progress to criminal 
prosecutions and the removal of spoilers by the government (26). 
The empirical tests in Chapter Four concluded there was a positive relationship between TRCs 
and democracy.  A higher percentage of states the conducted a TRC had positive changes in democracy 
scores than states with a conflict that did not use a TRC.  The regression analysis supports the means 
tests, with conducting a TRC being positively related to democracy score and being statistically 
significant.  This supports Hypothesis One, however the variable of TRCs provided less than 3% of the 
explanation for democratic change and none of the other variables such as amnesty, a TRC and an 
amnesty or cumulative intensity being statistically significant.  This demonstrates that while TRCs are 
positively related to democracy they provide a minor part of the explanation.   
The findings here are different from those of Olsen, Payne, and Reiter (2010), another empirical 
test of this relationship.  Their study found a negative relationship between TRCs and democracy (146).  
There are several possible explanations for the differences in the two findings.  First, Olsen, Payne, and 
Reiter used a different universe of states than used here.  Some of the TRCs included in their study do 
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not fit the common definition of a TRC as used in this dissertation, including Kenya and an early South 
African TRC.  Kenya was a single incident TRC and the early South African TRC involved a commission 
held by the African National Congress (ANC), which was a non-state actor.   
Second, Olsen, Payne and Reiter include many TRCs that were conducted in democracies, 
including Germany, Lithuania, Poland, and South Korea.  This has an effect on democracy scores since 
improvement in democracy is impossible if a state already receiving a maximum score for democracy 
and will be minimal if they are near the top of the scale for Polity IV.  This makes it hard to measure 
change.   
Third, and most critically, their study did not compare states experiencing TRCs to states that 
had conflicts and did not conduct a TRC.  Instead, in their study 161 states were examined, including all 
of Europe and other first world states such as the United States, Japan and Australia.  The only states 
that were excluded were those with a population of less than one million people (Olsen, Payne, and 
Reiter, 2010, 29).  The inclusion of states that did not experience a conflict makes comparison more 
difficult since states experiencing a conflict have different challenges for democratic change than states 
without conflicts.  While the transition from autocracy to democracy is challenging for any state, states 
that have experienced conflicts face problems with rebuilding infrastructure damaged in the conflict, 
rehabilitating and reintegrating combatants, often children, rebuilding judicial institutions, and regaining 
control over the military that are not faced by other states. 
The first two differences are fairly minor, although the inclusion of TRCs in states that were fully 
consolidated democracies with Polity IV and Freedom House scores at the top of the scale can have an 
effect.  More troubling is the inclusion of all states with populations in excess of one million as a 
comparison to the states experiencing a TRC.   
Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010) also conducted a quantitative analysis of the relationship between 
TRCs and democracy in addition to cases studies of the four states of South Africa, Chile, El Salvador and 
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Uganda.  His case studies showed no direct relationship between the TRC held in each state and 
democracy, although he points out that modest gains were made in democracy in all of his case study 
states, more clearly in South Africa and Chile where the commission’s work helped reduce support for 
the military and for undemocratically elected Senate seats (50, 78).   
For his quantitative study Wiebelhaus-Brahm used data from twenty nine TRCs, including TRCs 
in two democracies (Germany and South Korea).  His universe of TRCs was smaller than that used in this 
dissertation partially due to the fact he did not include any TRCs after the Liberian TRC in 2005.  
However, although he uses the same definition as used here there is no explanation for the exclusion of 
TRCs in Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, Central African Republic, Honduras, and Lebanon, among others 
(134).  The exclusion of these generally recognized TRCs and the inclusion of two TRCs in long term 
democracies can have an effect on his findings as discussed above.  He also compared states conducting 
TRCs to 157 states in the world, regardless of whether they experienced conflict, similar to the approach 
used by Olsen, Payne, and Reiter (137). 
His quantitative study shows no relationship between TRCs and democracy (140-141).  He 
explains the apparent contradiction between the case studies and the quantitative study primarily by 
noting that the case studies focused on effects on democracy that are not measured by Polity IV and 
Freedom House, the two indexes he used for the quantitative study.  He also notes that methodology 
may be a problem, including concerns that by treating all TRCs as the same regardless of procedures, 
funding, timing and issues masks very real differences that may affect the ability to influence democratic 
change (142). This dissertation does not discuss the difference in procedures in TRCs either but this is an 
issue that needs further study. 
To reiterate, then, the difference in the quantitative findings between this study and the Olsen, 
Payne, and Reiter and Wiebelhaus-Brahm studies may relate to three factors-the choice of TRCs, my 
exclusion of TRCs that were conducted in democracies and my choice to compare states conducting 
179 
 
. 
TRCs to states that had conflicts (rather than all states with populations in excess of one million people).  
I argue that the comparison of states conducting TRCs to other states with conflicts is a better measure 
of the relationship for two reasons.  First, states that are already democracies cannot experience much 
change in Polity IV scores because they are already at or near the top of the scale for democracy.  This 
acts to underreport change in democracy because change in scores is difficult or impossible.  Second, 
states experience conflicts share attributes in common that they do not share with states that have not 
had armed conflicts with battle deaths.  They face challenges to safety and security that make 
democratic change in terms of lessening executive control and increasing civil liberties that may give rise 
to protests and challenges to the government more problematic.  They also face demands for 
reintegration and demobilization funds, demands for mental health counseling and health care and 
damages to infrastructure that make democratic change more difficult economically.  Comparing a war 
torn state with almost one million dead and more citizens internally and externally displaced like Liberia 
to a state with a long history of peace like Switzerland does not appear to be a good comparison.  
Comparing it to Mozambique, which experienced many of the same challenges seems to be a better 
point of comparison. 
Additional material was provided in the case studies regarding the relationship between TRCs 
and democracy.  The case study on Liberia shows that although Liberia did experience a substantial 
increase in its Polity IV scores, from a +1 to a +6, the change occurred before the TRC was conducted.  In 
the years since the TRC was begun there have been no changes in Liberia’s Polity IV score.  It should be 
noted that Liberia experienced a hotly contested election in 2011 and was able to maintain its 
democracy scores despite the stresses from the election, but the lack of improvement in democracy 
despite positive improvements in Liberia shows the TRC did not lead to changes in democracy in Liberia.  
Chapter Five discusses some of the reasons for this failure in the context of Brahms’ five benefits to 
democracy from a TRC, particularly the failure to remove enclaves of non-democratic power and the 
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failure to provide accountability because of Liberia’s refusal to implement the TRC recommendations.  
The case study of Mozambique shows a similar pattern, with some initial improvement after the peace 
agreement followed by no change in democracy scores thereafter.  However, since Mozambique’s civil 
war ended in 1992 it has had twenty years to show improvement compared to Liberia’s seven years 
since the beginning of the TRC. 
 
TRCs as Opposed to Amnesty and Democracy 
 Both amnesties and TRCs have been used as transitional justice methods since the 1970’s and 
are often considered poor alternatives to war crimes trials since they do not provide the same level of 
accountability as seen in war crimes trials.  The means test in Chapter Four concluded that states that 
the highest of states to have positive changes in democracy scores conducted a TRC and issued an 
amnesty followed by states that conducted a TRC and did not issue an amnesty.  The lowest percentage 
of positive changes in democracy scores were seen in states that neither conducted a TRC nor issued an 
amnesty.  This supports Hypothesis Four.  However, the multivariate regression analysis in Chapter Four 
concluded there was no statistical relationship between amnesties or TRCs coupled with amnesties and 
democracy, although both variables were positive.   Therefore the support for Hypothesis Two is weak.  
 Olsen, Payne, and Reiter (2010) include amnesty as an independent variable in their empirical 
study of transitional justice, while Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010) does not.  His only consideration of 
amnesties was in his case studies in the context of amnesties role in neutralizing opponents by offering 
them amnesty to avoid further outbreaks of violence (88).  Olsen, Payne, and Reiter looked at amnesties 
and concluded that amnesties alone had no statistically significant effect on human rights, while 
amnesties coupled with trials had a positive relationship with human rights while TRCs with amnesties 
have a negative effect (144). This study shows that for states that conducted a TRC or experienced a 
conflict amnesties can be helpful if coupled with a TRC while states that did not conduct a TRC or an 
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amnesty experienced the lowest percentage of states experiencing improvements in democracy and 
rule of law.  Because this dissertation did not look at war crimes trials the findings are different than 
Olsen, Payne, and Reiter’s findings, but  the positive findings regarding TRCs and amnesties is contrary 
to their findings.  The difference may be explained by the difference in the choice of cases or in the 
differences between human rights, as studied by them, and rule of law as used in this dissertation.  
 With regard to the case studies, Liberia did not have a written amnesty although the General 
Peace Agreement left that possibility open.  Mozambique did include an amnesty in its General Peace 
Agreement.  Regardless, the failure of Liberia to pursue prosecution of offenders is a de facto amnesty 
at this point ten years after the peace agreement.  There has been a failure to prosecute offenders in 
both states.   
 In Liberia the effect on the rule of law is unclear. More than half of the population wants 
accountability for offense committed during the civil wars and they have not received it.  Offenders, or 
at least those named in the TRC report as offenders, continue to serve in the legislature and as the 
president of the country.  However, the discussion of amnesty occurred in 2003 and Liberia’s rule of law 
scores increased dramatically after the peace agreement was signed.  Despite the failure to prosecute 
offenders, physical integrity scores have increased and torture, extrajudicial killings and kidnapping has 
been reduced.  Liberians enjoy freedoms of speech and association and were able to have two 
successful elections in 2005 and 2011 that were not followed by large amounts of violence.  It is 
questionable what effect prosecutions would have at this point given the relative peace in Liberia.  Has 
the failure to prosecute kept Liberia from making further advances in rule of law?  It is hard to say, but 
there is no evidence at this point that shows this.   
 In Mozambique the effect of the amnesty is more dramatic.  It resulted in the two parties who 
were the primary offenders during the civil war, staying in power at the conclusion of the civil war.  The 
enclaves of offenders have not been removed in Mozambique, similar to the situation in Liberia, but 
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because the war was fought primarily over political ideologies, the fact there has been no accountability 
is of more importance in Mozambique.  Like Liberia, Mozambique saw an immediate rise in its rule of 
law scores after the peace agreement, but it has been unable to maintain those higher scores and in fact 
has begun to slip in both CIRI scores and in terms of its battle with corruption. Not only has the power 
structure dictated the type of transitional justice here, but the lack of accountability has led to the 
continuation of that power structure. 
 
The Relationship Between TRCs and Rule of Law 
 This relationship has become part of the literature on TRCs more recently as the focus has 
turned from democracy more to the impact of TRCs on rule of law.  The focus has changed because 
there is an increased awareness that TRCs may be more closely related to the concerns of rule of law, 
including physical integrity rights and empowerment rights than to broader aspects of democracy.  Rule 
of law ties into the creation of trust in governmental institutions like the police and judiciary and is 
related to the aim of TRCs. 
 The empirical tests in Chapter Four show a positive relationship between TRCs and the rule of 
law, with an increase in CIRI scores of 4.085, and that TRCs were a larger part of the explanation of 
changes in rule of law scores, particularly in states that had good democracy scores and conflicts of 
minor intensity. The explanatory power of TRCs was much higher, with the combination of variables 
providing nearly 45% of the explanation for changes in rule of law.  The means test supports this finding, 
showing that states which conducted TRCs had higher levels of human rights than states that did not.  
This testing supports Hypothesis Four. 
 The same comments with regard to the empirical studies of the relationship between TRCs and 
democracy apply to the relationship with rule of law.  Olsen, Payne, Reiter and Wibelhaus-Brahms’ 
studies compare states conducting TRCs to all states with populations over one million.  This has the 
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same complications present with democracy.  Additionally, they measured for impact on human rights 
rather than rule of law, using the physical integrity index and the political terror scale.  Both measure 
something that is part of rule of law, but not all of it as noted in Chapter Four. 
 The means test in Chapter Four shows that a higher percentage of states conducting a TRC 
experience positive changes in rule of law scores than states that did not and the percentage of states 
experiencing a negative change over the five year period after the TRC or the end of the conflict was 
virtually identical.  More states conducting a TRC have a positive change or no change than states not 
conducting a TRC.  The multivariate regression analysis shows a positive relationship that is statistically 
significant and along with the other variables studied provides almost 45% of the explanation for the 
variance.  This supports Hypothesis Four. 
Liberia’s rule of law score rose dramatically from 9 to 18 in 2004, before democracy improved 
and before the first election after the peace agreement.  It then rose to a high of 21 in 2005, the year of 
the first election.  During the TRC the rule of law score actually deteriorated slightly, from a 20 in 2006 
to a 17 in 2009, the year the TRC was concluded and the report was issued.  It should be noted that at 
the time of writing, Liberia had only had one year of CIRI scores since the conclusion of the TRC, not 
nearly enough time to see any real change in rule of law.  Also, Liberia is experiencing substantial 
improvements in corruption, which is a critical issue for improvement of the rule of law and is not 
measured by CIRI. 
 Problematically, however, the TRC in Liberia recommended prosecutions and lustration in its 
final report.  Prosecutions have not started and there appears to be no political will to conduct them.  
Lustrations were declared unconstitutional, devaluing the TRCs recommendations.  This has resulted in 
the continued presence of people accused of committing war crimes in the Presidency and in the 
Congress and has made it more difficult for Liberians to have trust in their government. 
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 Mozambique has experienced a similar pattern in changes to the rule of law as Liberia except its 
decline in the rule of law was earlier and larger.  Immediately after the peace agreement scores for rule 
of law improved.  There has been a steady decline in rule of law scores since then, particularly in 
physical integrity scores.  This is concerning since it shows that Mozambique might be slipping back into 
the patterns of human rights abuses it had during the civil war.  The growth in corruption is also 
concerning.  Both may relate to the failure to provide for accountability for both sides in the civil war 
and the fact that one, FRELIMO, has a firm grip on the government, further reducing any accountability.  
Although Mozambique has not turned back to civil war there have some riots and civil unrest and 
deterioration of freedoms that are compatible with entrenched elites from the former regime that face 
no accountability.  This is exacerbated by the fact that the only other party with power in Mozambique, 
RENAMO, is unmotivated to push for accountability since it would result in their members also being 
held accountable for war crimes. 
 
TRCs as Opposed to Amnesty and Rule of Law 
 The means test in Chapter Four for rule of law had somewhat different results than that for 
democracy.  While the highest percentage of states with positive changes in rule of law were those that 
conducted a TRC and issued an amnesty, the differences among the other three groups-states that 
conducted a TRC and did not issue an amnesty (50.0%), states that did not conduct a TRC but did issue 
an amnesty (40.6%), and states that did not conduct a TRC and did not issue an amnesty (43.8%) were 
within ten percentage points of difference and had similar levels of negative scores.  The multivariate 
regression analysis shows that states that conducted a TRC had somewhat higher scores than states that 
issued an amnesty, issued both an amnesty and conducted a TRC or did none of the methods of 
transitional justice and the differences were all statistically significant.  Although the differences in the 
means tests are minor, the two tests provide support for Hypothesis Five. 
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 There has been a failure to prosecute offenders in both states.  Liberia did not have a written 
amnesty although the General Peace Agreement left that possibility open.  Mozambique did include an 
amnesty in its General Peace Agreement.  Regardless, the failure of Liberia to pursue prosecution of 
offenders is a de facto amnesty at this point ten years after the peace agreement.   
In Liberia the effect of this failure to act on the rule of law is unclear. More than half of the 
population wants accountability for offense committed during the civil wars and they have not received 
it.  Offenders, or at least those named in the TRC report as offenders, continue to serve in the legislature 
and as the president of the country.  However, the discussion of amnesty occurred in 2003 and Liberia’s 
rule of law scores increased dramatically after the peace agreement was signed.  Despite the failure to 
prosecute offenders, physical integrity scores have increased and torture, extrajudicial killings and 
kidnapping has been reduced.  Liberians enjoy freedoms of speech and association and were able to 
have two successful elections in 2005 and 2011 that were not followed by large amounts of violence.  It 
is questionable what effect prosecutions would have at this point given the relative peace in Liberia.  
Has the failure to prosecute kept Liberia from making further advances in rule of law?  It is hard to say, 
but there is no evidence at this point that shows this.   
 In Mozambique the effect of the amnesty is more dramatic.  It resulted in the two parties who 
were the primary offenders during the civil war, staying in power at the conclusion of the civil war.  The 
enclaves of offenders have not been removed in Mozambique, similar to the situation in Liberia, but 
because the war was fought primarily over political ideologies, the fact there has been no accountability 
is of more importance in Mozambique.  Like Liberia, Mozambique saw an immediate rise in its rule of 
law scores after the peace agreement, but it has been unable to maintain those higher scores and in fact 
has begun to slip in both CIRI scores and in terms of its battle with corruption. Not only has the power 
structure dictated the type of transitional justice here, but the lack of accountability has led to the 
continuation of that power structure. 
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The Relationship Between Cumulative Intensity and Democracy and Rule of Law 
 The final two hypotheses, Hypothesis Three and Six, relate to the effect of intense conflicts with 
large number of battle deaths on democracy and rule of law.  Because both dependent variables have 
similar relations to this independent variable they are discussed together in this section.  The effect of 
intense conflicts on democracy and rule of law is a fairly new concept and there is little discussion of it in 
the literature.  The discussion that exists concludes, logically, that intense battles are likely to be 
problematic for states at the end of the conflict and that their levels of democracy and rule of law will be 
lower. 
 The hypotheses for this variable posit that states that experience intense conflicts and conduct a 
TRC will have higher levels of democracy and rule of law than states that do not conduct a TRC.  For both 
democracy and rule of law the test of means shows that a higher percentage of states with intense 
conflicts that conduct a TRC experience positive changes in democracy and rule of law.  For democracy 
the difference is 61.5% compared to 40.6%, for rule of law the difference is 52.0% compared to 21.9%.  
The regression analysis for democracy shows that cumulative intensity is negatively related to 
democracy, at -1.672 but not statistically significant, while it is greater for rule of law at -4.015 and is 
statistically significant.  These two tests are consistent because TRCs are positively related to both 
democracy and rule of law and both tests also support the two hypotheses. 
 
Strengthening of the Legal System 
Many authors, including principally Brahm (2007) argue that TRCs assist in the transition to 
democracy by improving government institutions, improving civil liberties and exposing the role of 
government in the commission of those abuses.  This allows the growth of the judiciary and its ability to 
act as a check on the other branches of government and the police and improves horizontal 
accountability within the state (24). Here, four additional questions are explored with reference to the 
187 
 
. 
case studies of Liberia and Mozambique.  First, did the TRC strengthen judicial institutions in Liberia, 
which could lead to future improvements in rule of law in a way not experienced in Mozambique?  
Second, were there other improvements in democracy and rule of law that that resulted from the 
Liberian TRC that were not experienced by Mozambique?  Third, was the TRC destabilizing for Liberia as 
often discussed in the literature?  And lastly did the TRC work to change the environment of evil that 
existed prior to the TRC?     
 USAID in its 2009 evaluation of Liberia’s rule of law programs noted a number of deficiencies, 
including the lack of political will, infrastructure, awareness, societal consensus, accountability, and 
donor coordination.  Many of these are not attributable to the TRC and not part of its agenda, including 
the lack of infrastructure, but the failure of accountability, political will and societal consensus clearly 
are related to the TRC.  As noted above in Chapter Five the only thing most Liberians agree to about the 
legal system is that it is too expensive and you have to bribe judges.  The failure to follow up on TRC 
recommendations for lustration or prosecution show a judicial system that is unable to provide redress 
for even the most egregious violations and certainly impacts trust in the system. 
 In Mozambique because there was no TRC there was no failure to follow recommendations.   
BTI, however, notes that because FRELIMO continues to dominate the government they are able to 
appoint judges that support their party and are often politically motivated (BTI-2012 Report-
Mozambique, 10).  The failure of RENAMO to take responsibility for its actions or to press for 
accountability adds to the problems with the judicial system.  The widespread corruption in the judicial 
system also has a detrimental effect on the judicial system and is related to the fact that elites from 
both parties, but particularly from FRELIMO were allowed to continue to govern without consequences.  
BTI notes that a patronage rather than political competition system runs Mozambique and there is 
declining trust in the Presidency (BTI-2012 Report-Mozambique, 10, 13).  The fact of a general, 
unconditional amnesty in Mozambique, coupled with a concerted effort to ignore and forget war crimes 
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and human rights abuses appear to have led to an inability in Mozambique to reduce corruption and 
provide a judicial system that provides justice to the population. 
 
Changes in Democracy and Rule of Law That Were Improved by a TRC 
 Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010) also argues that even if TRCs do not make a large change in 
democracy and rule of law in states conducting them, there may be some changes that would not have 
occurred without the TRC.  For example, he points to the prosecution and vilification of perpetrators of 
human rights abuses in Chile, including the former dictator Pinochet that might not have occurred 
without the TRC.  He also points to purges of former leaders and the provision of information used to 
keep former leaders from continuing in office.  He does note, however, that these changes might have 
occurred without the TRC and that he observed this phenomenon for his case study states, not all states 
with TRCs. 
 In Liberia neither has occurred.  The TRC named names and recommended lustration and 
prosecution of various offenders.  To date only one has been prosecuted, Charles Taylor. Taylor's ex-
former wife, Jewel Howard Taylor continues to serve in the Liberian Senate as does Prince Johnson who 
also ran for the presidency in 2011 and came in third. 40  Although 60% of Liberians answered in 
response to a question in Afrobarometer that people should be held accountable for human rights 
abuses, little accountability has occurred.  The heavy support for Prince Johnson and Jewel Taylor, as 
well as for President Johnson-Sirleaf who not only was not lustrated but also was re-elected in 2011 
shows there have been no changes from the TRC in terms of prosecution or vilification.  There have also 
been no purges and former leaders continue to serve in office without any detriment from the TRC 
report. 
                                                          
40
 The indictment for Charles Taylor was issued on June 4, 2003, two years before the Charter of the Liberian TRC 
was created. 
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 Neither has occurred in Mozambique either, although given the substantial involvement in 
government of both FRELIMO and RENAMO the situation is even worse than in Liberia.  At least in 
Liberia there has been a debate regarding lustration and prosecution.   Mozambique’s policy of “forgive 
and forget” has made any accountability impossible and the fact that both of the major parties from the 
civil war are still the major parties has made any of these smaller effects impossible.  There have been 
no purges of leaders from either side in the civil war and no attempts at lustration. 
 
TRCs as Stabilizing or Destabilizing to the State 
 Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2007) also looked at the question of destabilization that is alleged to come 
from transitional justice.  He notes that critics of TRCs argue they can be destabilizing and in fact have a 
negative effect on democracy, with perpetrators who feel threatened by the TRC taking steps to protect 
themselves (26). 
 This argument can only be explored in relation to Liberia because of its TRC and appears to have 
little validity.  Liberia’s democracy improved at the same time as the TRC was being proposed and their 
Polity IV scores for democracy have remained steady since the TRC concluded.  On the other hand, the 
fact that Liberia’s TRC recommended lustration of President Johnson-Sirleaf and prosecution of some 
offenders did result in death threats against members of the TRC, including the chairman Jerome 
Verdier (bbc.com).  However, those were reported in 2009 and there is no record of any actual violence 
against the members, nor has there been a return to civil war. Liberia had a successful, although hotly 
contested, election in 2011 which did not result in much violence or civil unrest.  The TRC has either had 
no effect on Liberian democracy or has had a positive, not destabilizing effect, or more likely the lack of 
political will to enforce the recommendations of the TRC has resulted in stability. 
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TRCs’ Role in Changing the Environment of Evil 
 The last issue regarding the relationship between TRCs and the rule of law involves the concept 
that TRCs, by dealing with the past in truth-telling, can help rid a state of the environment of evil caused 
by the conflict.  This is an interesting argument, raised by Dimitrijević (2006), among other authors, and 
works as a justification for a TRC that transcends its ability to bring about democracy and rule of law, 
although it may be related to both.  The argument is that looking at the horrible atrocities in the past 
such as Germany’s actions in World War II and Serbia’s actions in the Yugoslavian civil war, forgiving and 
forgetting, rather than using a TRC, results in people not knowing right from wrong and being unable to 
change attitudes about the rights of all people.  This will, inevitably, lead back more conflicts (371). 
 Unfortunately this does not appear to have occurred in Liberia as a result of the TRC.  As noted 
in Chapter Five, according to the Berkley Human Rights Center, although 73% of Liberians had heard of 
the TRC, 91% of Liberians knew little or nothing about what happened in the TRC (Human Rights Center, 
2011, 69-71).  Although they may have heard the discussion regarding the events without being familiar 
with the TRC this lack of knowledge may also have led to a lack of support for the recommendations of 
the TRC.  This is disturbing since the report and recommendations were widely disseminated in Liberia 
and any impact of the TRC on the environment of evil is lessened if people are not even aware of it.  
 In Mozambique, without any effort at truth telling or a TRC, there was no ability to change the 
environment of evil.  According to Graybill (2004) both sides in the conflict were afraid that truth telling 
would result in inquiries into their own abuses and chose to be silent on the abuses rather than speak 
about them publicly (1125).  As a result, both parties involved in the war remain in power in 
Mozambique and although people may be aware of the abuses of the party in control, FRELIMO, there 
has been no movement to oust them from power.  Would a TRC have changed this power balance in 
Mozambique?  It’s hard to say, but the failure to talk about the offenses during the war certainly makes 
it more difficult to change. 
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Final Thoughts and Future Research 
 It appears that at least among states that have had conflicts TRCs can provide benefits in efforts 
to improve democracy and the rule of law and that those benefits exceed the benefits amnesties can 
provide.   The case studies of Liberia and Mozambique show that both states have benefited from 
efforts to democratize and improve rule of law since their civil wars ended, but both still have 
substantial challenges facing them.  The failure of both states to grapple with the abuses that occurred 
their wars other than by offering an amnesty or a TRC that made recommendations that could be or 
would not be followed has led to two states that have made improvements but appear to be unable to 
make further changes at this time.  Liberia continues to have inequality between the Americo-Liberians 
and the indigenous population, the same inequality that led to the two civil wars.  Mozambique 
continues to have conflicts between the two political parties and those in power seem unable or 
unwilling to address that conflict. 
 There are several avenues for future research in this area.  Several authors, including Gibson 
(2004) suggest that procedural fairness of TRCs, including whether they hold public hearings, issue 
public reports and disseminate those reports need to be considered when looking at the effect of TRCs.  
Judging from the experience of Liberia having these due process procedures may not be enough to 
promote democracy and rule of law.  A measure of whether recommendations are followed through on 
by the state may be an additional factor to measure effectiveness because the recommendations are 
the way the TRC can bring about change.   
Olsen, Payne, and Reiter (2010) briefly considered regional differences in TRCs and Roht-Arriaza 
and Gibson (1998) have also suggested that regions may make a difference, as may whether the TRC 
was conducted before or after the South African TRC.  The effect of regional differences is a critical issue 
for future research because not all states need the same type of TRC.  TRCs in African states may need 
different procedures and objectives to be effective from TRCs in a western state. 
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There are also a variety of questions regarding the nature of the conflict that might be useful to 
determining the effectiveness of a TRC.  While the intensity of the conflict was included in this study, 
there are other relevant questions such as: were atrocities committed on one or on both sides?  Is there 
a generally accepted answer to the question of which side's forces were the worst offenders?  Did the 
worst offenders win or lose the war (or was it a stalemate)?  Did the worst offenders win or lose the first 
post-war election, and by how much?   Do the offenders maintain a latent capacity to deploy coercion, 
force, and/or violence?  Were the atrocities committed by isolated gangs of marauding thugs, or by 
forces authentically representing substantial communities that perceived themselves to have a stake in 
the conflict's outcome?  Because the nature of the conflict in terms of intensity was seen to be 
significant these other questions may also be significant in determining the relationship of a TRC to 
democracy and rule of law. 
 Lastly, on the question of differences between TRCs before and since 1994, it would be 
interesting to conduct a study limited to TRCs conducted since 1994. Many of the early TRCs had poor 
procedures and were more of a subterfuge for authoritarian regimes to justify their rule than true truth 
seeking efforts.  This is particularly true of TRCs like the first one in Uganda in 1974 but there are other 
examples as well.  
 If states continue to pay the non-economic and economic costs for a TRC and rely on them for 
justice, and if international organizations continue to support and encourage states to use TRCs, it is 
important that these questions be answered.  
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Every year millions of dollars are spent on Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) designed 
to bring about post-conflict resolutions in states through a formal process.  This paper explores the 
major TRCs comparatively to assess the relationship between TRCs and the growth of democracy and 
rule of law in post conflict societies and compares that performance to a control group of states that 
experienced a conflict but did not conduct a TRC.  Seventy-seven TRCs have been conducted or were 
seriously proposed since 1971.  All TRCs assert as part of their charter that their goals include the growth 
of democratic ideals and rule of law.  There has been little quantitative study of this relationship and 
qualitative studies focus primarily on single state case studies rather than looking comparatively.  This 
dissertation hypothesizes that there is a relationship between conducting a TRC and the growth of 
democracy and rule of law in post-conflict states.  In order to test this hypothesis, data from the forty 
one TRCs conducted and concluded between 1981 and 2010 was analyzed, as well as data from post-
conflict states where a TRC was not conducted.  Polity IV data regarding democracy and CIRI data 
regarding the rule of law was utilized to determine changes in democracy and the rule of law.  A case 
study was also concluded of Liberia, a state which conducted a TRC and Mozambique, a state which did 
not but did issue a general amnesty to look at the issues of democracy and rule of law most intensively.  
This paper concludes that post conflict states conducting TRCs have a greater improvement in 
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. 
democracy and rule of law than states that did not utilize a TRC and the relationship is significant 
statistically.  The relationship is less when the conflict was an intense conflict involving more than one 
thousand battle deaths and is improved when an amnesty is given along with the TRC.  The relationship 
provides a small portion of the explanation for change in democracy but when coupled with democracy 
scores provides almost one half of the explanation of change in rule of law but is also lower if the 
conflict has been intense in terms of battle deaths.  Lastly, it concludes that the experience in Liberia 
with their TRC is too recent to show a relationship but that Mozambique, which utilized only an 
amnesty, is starting to experience deterioration in the levels of democracy and rule of law. 
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